Introducing information technology in third world cities : the Tunisian experience by Hecht, Joy Eliza
INTRODUCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THIRD WORLD CITIES:
THE TUNISIAN EXPERIENCE
by
JOY ELIZA HECHT
B.A., Economics, Harvard University (1980)
M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1984)
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Plannning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Urban and Regional Planning
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
March, 1988
Q Joy Eliza Hecht, 1988
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
De rtm1t of Urban Studies and Planning
March 15, 1988
Certified by
Jo ph Ferreira
Associa Pr essor of Urban Stud') sand Planning
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by _____ ________________________
t bLangley Carleton Keyes
Director of the PhD Program
JUN 10 1988
INTRODUCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THIRD WORLD CITIES:
THE TUNISIAN EXPERIENCE
by
JOY ELIZA HECHT
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on March 15, 1988 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Urban and Regional Planning
ABSTRACT
Municipal governments in the Third World face complex and mounting
pressures from rapid urban growth. Information systems designed to meet
both transactions processing and decision support needs could help city
managers to address these problems, by streamlining routine city
operations, and providing the information base and the analytical tools
with which to assess the current situation and develop solutions.
In the West transactions processing and decision support systems have
developed sequentially, generating significant costs as the organizations
shifted from one focus to the other. The different technological
starting point available to Third World cities, and the opportunity to
learn from Western experiences, should allow them to avoid these
conflicts by developing information systems which meet both sets of
needs. However several factors could limit this opportunity,
particularly the need to learn about information systems from one's own
experience rather than from the experience of the West, and the
difficulty of balancing short-run and long-run needs in the design of
information systems.
The thesis looks at six Tunisian cities which have introduced computers
since the late 1970s. It finds that with few exceptions they have
concentrated only on transactions processing, and have not recognized the
need for decision support systems to help resolve their fundamental
problems. As a result they are introducing information systems which
will not be expandable to meet decision support needs, for both technical
and organizational reasons. Several factors explain this focus: the
immediacy of transactions processing needs, the centralization of
authority which characterizes public administration in Tunisia, and the
professional training and orientation of Tunisian computer scientists.
The thesis recommends strategies which could be followed by individual
cities, national governments, and foreign donors to help alleviate the
bottlenecks on this kind of development.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Municipal governments in the developing world face a complex and
mounting set of pressures. As urban populations grow, they place
increasing demands on city infrastructure, services, housing supply, and
financial resources. Rapid urban growth is straining the capacity of
urban management and financial systems, which were often designed for
small towns, and are ill suited to meet the needs of larger, growing
urban areas. Cities in many countries are hard pressed both to manage
their routine operations and to develop the information base and skills
needed to support the analysis of fundamental urban problems. These
problems are not limited to municipal governments; both the World Bank
and the U.S. Agency for International Development have identified
management capacity as a major limitation on the ability of Third World
governments to address development problems. 1
Information technology offers a way to resolve some of the
operational bottlenecks now confronting Third World urban managers, and
to provide them with the information and the analytical tools to develop
solutions to their basic problems. Automation of routine municipal
functions can simplify many of the bureaucratic procedures which
currently slow down city operations and keep them from devoting time to
actually solving problems. With access to automated information, city
managers will be better equipped to assess their major problems, and to
1 International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmenL (1981) and
USAID (1981).
use computer-based tools and analytical methods to search for ways to
address them.
It has sometimes been argued that computers are an inappropriate
technology for the developing world because they are too capital-
intensive to use in a surplus-labor environment.2 We do not consider
this a compelling argument. While there is certainly a surplus of
unskilled labor in most Third World countries, there is also typically a
shortage of skilled managers.3 Information technology is valuable in
Third World cities not because it will replace unskilled workers, but
because it can increase the impact of skilled managers. Adding unskilled
workers to supplement those handling low-level manual processing tasks
will not solve many of the existing problems. It will require additional
managers to supervise and coordinate the clerks; these managers are often
not available. It will not solve the accuracy problems which plague
manual records in many cities. Perhaps most importantly, it will not
facilitate the rapid interactive access to information which is needed in
order to develop solutions to policy problems, nor will it permit use of
analysis tools which are available once data have been automated. While
displacement of unskilled workers is a critical issue, and should be
explicitly addressed in introducing information systems in Third World
governments, it is not sufficient reason to avoid using a technology
which could bring badly-needed improvements in management capacity.
2 See, for example, Nilsen (1979).
3 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1981), pp. 9-
10.
USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE WEST
The use of information technology in the West has followed a staged
development pattern, in which both the technology and the purposes to
which it is put have changed over time. In the earliest stage, in the
1950s and 1960s, the technology was used to automate routine processing,
in order to make ongoing operations more efficient. These transactions
processing systems allowed corporations to save time on repetitive manual
tasks, to reduce the error involved in recopying information, especially
numbers, and to track the status of individuals or cases more easily.
Information systems also replaced routine structured decisions, such as
who should receive bills, making them simpler, less prone to mistakes,
and more consistent.
By the 1970s the focus of information systems projects began to
change, as managers came to realize that even with the automation of
routine operations they were still not receiving information which they
could use in making management or policy decisions. Efforts began to go
into information systems which could improve the way decisions were made,
by facilitating consideration of additional information, permitting
interactive access to data and analysis tools, and developing analytical
approaches to what had previously been viewed as unstructured problems.
The introduction of two new technologies--end user computing software and
microcomputers--greatly spurred the development of decision support
systems, as they are called.
The sequential development of IT use in the West has proven a
difficult and costly route to follow. As organizations shifted in focus
from transactions processing to decision support, especially with the
introduction of end user computing and microcomputers, conflicts arose
between end users of the systems and the data processing (DP)
professionals. Transactions processing (TP) systems typically ran on
large centralized computers, which could be controlled by the DP staff
who ensured the security and reliability of data and software. The
procedures necessary to protect and document TP systems came to be
perceived as a bottleneck created by the DP staff, which sometimes
hindered rapid development of new systems. Moreover the data available
from the TP systems often did not meet the decision support needs. As a
result, with the wide availability of smaller, less expensive computers
that offered user-friendly database and analysis tools, end user
departments in many organizations bypassed the DP staff to buy their own
hardware, and began developing their own information systems which met
decision support needs but did not meet the tight system controls
established by the DP departments. In some cases they also developed
their own information systems staff, skilled in the use of microcomputers
and the new end user computing tools rather than in development of the
traditional centralized systems.
The 1980s have seen many organizations trying to forge links between
these two separate information systems efforts. The links are both
technical--getting different kinds of computers to communicate with each
other--and organizational--getting different kinds of computer
professionals to communicate with each other. Although progress is being
made, the problems are costly and difficult at both levels. The software
and data structures created for the micros and minis are not usually
compatible with the centralized systems, nor are they typically well-
documented. The management structures of the centralized systems are
inappropriate for the rapidly evolving end user computing world, and most
organizations are still trying to develop management strategies which are
effective in the partly distributed, partly centralized computing
environments which are likely to be common in the 1990s.
USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Third World cities introducing information technology for the first
time in the 1980s are in a unique position to avoid many of the problems
now being faced by Western organizations. The urban problems currently
faced by the Third World clearly call for both transactions processing
and decisions support, in order to deal with bottlenecks in routine
operations and develop solutions to complex management and policy
problems. Instead of introducing the two kinds of systems sequentially,
which would generate the same conflicts as have arisen in the West, Third
World cities can avoid many of these problems by designing systems which
will address both sets of needs, and developing DP professional staff who
will support both kinds of system.
Two crucial factors suggest that Third World organizations may be
able to follow a development path which would allow them to work towards
both objectives at once, rather than introducing them sequentially.
First, the hardware and software currently available permits development
of information systems that will allow both the automation of routine
operations and the use and analysis of information in order to support
managers and decision-makers. Such tools include mini- and
microcomputers, PC-based software packages, and database managers and
fourth generation languages which offer a new and versatile applications
development environment. Second, new users of information technology
have the opportunity to learn from Western experiences, and so recognize
the costs involved in the sequential development path. This should allow
them to see the importance of planning for a broad range of uses of the
technology from the start, rather than designing systems which meet one
need at the start, but must be converted after a few years as the
perceived needs evolve over time.
Significant constraints could limit the ability to set up systems
which meet both transactions processing and decision support needs,
however. First, this strategy depends on a level of understanding of
information systems which may be available only from direct experience
with the technology. It is possible that new computer users will not be
able to learn from Western experience, but must relive it themselves in
order to develop an understanding of why they need both transactions
processing and decision support.
Second, pursuing this strategy requires the cities to resolve some
of the technical and organizational problems encountered in the West in
attempting to reconcile centralized and end user computer systems. This
involves making trade-offs between designing systems which can be used
quickly to meet immediate needs, and designing systems which will take
longer and require more sophistication to develop but may be much more
valuable in the long-run. These trade-offs are not easy to make; they
depend on both a strong understanding of the issues involved, and an
ability to balance the political or management benefits of showing quick
results against the long-run viability of the systems to be implemented.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This thesis investigates whether the different technological
starting point of Third World cities will be sufficient to allow them to
leapfrog the sequential development path of the West and introduce more
than one type information system from the initiation of their automation
efforts. We will investigate this question through a series of steps.
First, we will look at literature on use of information technology (IT)
in the West and the Third World to get a clearer sense of what has
happened, and how organizations have progressed in their uses of computer
systems. In particular, we will be particularly interested in
determining the impacts of technology change and learning from experience
in spurring changes in computer use. Based on this literature, we will
develop an approach to introducing information technology which should
enable organizations to work towards several objectives at once, rather
than following the sequential development of Western organizations.
We will then evaluate case studies of the introduction of automation
in six Tunisian municipalities, to see how they have approached and used
information technology. The cases could either confirm the utility of
this strategy, or highlight obstacles to this approach and indicate
whether or how they could be overcome. Based on the cases, we will make
recommendations for other Third World organizations or foreign funders
interested in this broad approach to information technology, suggesting
how they most effectively implement it.
About the Cases
The cases approach automation in the six Tunisian cities at two
different levels: introduction and use of information technology in
general, and automation of the management of the property tax in
particular. This two-tiered strategy lets us look at the overall
approach to use of information technology, and assess what that approach
means when applied to development of a particular information system.
The practical implications of an information systems strategy-,-whether it
will actually allow cities to pursue several objectives simultaneously--
can only be seen through the details of its implementation in a
particular application.
The decision to look at six cities within one country rather than
looking at more than one country was made to simplify the range of
questions for investigation and reduce some of the variability among
cases, as well as to simplify the process of carrying out the research.
By staying within a single country, we can control for many variables
which would otherwise be explained by differences across countries. This
makes it easier to concentrate on information systems issues alone,
rather than having to factor in differences in culture, economic
situation, or political structure. However this strategy clearly has
disadvantages. It does not allow the richness which would be provided by
looking at more than one country. As a result we must be cautious in
generalizing across countries, because we cannot be certain of the extent
to which our findings are particular to Tunisia.
It is difficult to claim that any country is typical. Tunisia is a
good choice for this kind of research, however, because it is
characteristic of relatively developed Third World countries and may
suggest patterns which will be followed elsewhere. As a former French
colony, Tunisia's legal and administrative systems are similar to those
of many other developing countries, suggesting that the context of their
automation efforts may well be transferable elsewhere. While it has no
particular expertise with information technology, Tunisia has already
begun using its own resources to automate public sector organizations.
As a result, the Tunisian experiences may be helpful for suggesting paths
that other countries will or could follow as they develop an interest in
using computers. Moreover, most Tunisian municipalities have begun their
automation with the property tax, which means that enough cities are
active in the area to provide a basis for comparison. In addition,
several practical concerns played a part in the choice of Tunisia,
particularly that French is widely spoken, and that special government
permission was not to carry out this research.
About the Property Tax
The property tax provides a good example for the detailed cases
because the problems involved in administration of the tax are broad and
varied. At the simplest level, the tax involves routine processing of
thousands of records each year, in order to produce tax roles, send out
bills, and keep accurate payment records. This processing can be a
significant bottleneck for Third World cities where all records are
maintained by hand. These tasks can be automated with standard
transactions processing systems used to record parcel descriptions and
ownership information, print standard reports like tax roles or bills,
and maintain full records of payment information.
Managing the property tax also involves assessing the market values
of all city properties in order to determine the tax base. Assessment is
a highly politicized process which can have a significant impact on the
profitability of real estate investments or the sale prices of individual
properties. How accurate and up-to-date the assessments are will
determine both whether the tax is levied evenly across properties and
neighborhoods, and whether the city is receiving as much revenue as it
could from the tax. Computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) systems are
being implemented on a wide scale in the West to automate this structured
problem. They allow low-cost reassessment of property values each year
based on recent sales data, which makes it possible to keep the
assessments up to date as long as current data on property sales are
available. However, much more than manual assessment practices they
depend on a sophisticated understanding of the economics of the local
housing market and the modelling techniques which can be applied to this
kind of problem.
Property tax systems can also provide the base data used to address
a wide range of other management and policy questions. At the most
immediate level, the data will be used to manage the tax itself,
particularly to design effective strategies to enforce tax payment. The
data may also be used by planners or policy-makers to assess other
crucial urban problems, such as housing availability, demand for water
and sewer services, or changes in land use and land value. A property
tax system could also provide the base data for development of a city-
wide geographic information system to serve a wide variety of
applications, such as land use planning, transportation routing, or
infrastructure management. It is in anticipating these uses of property
tax data that the significant trade-offs are involved between getting the
transactions processing system up and running quickly, and developing a
system which will also meet decision support needs.
Thus the property tax can involve several different kinds of
information systems; routine transactions processing, modelling of
structured decisions, and a wide range of applications of the data in
city management, policy making, and links to more comprehensive
information systems which could be developed in the future. This makes
the application a rich example for assessing the ability of Third World
cities to develop information systems which can meet both transactions
processing and decision support objectives. By looking at how Tunisian
cities have handled these issues, we should get a better insight into the
problems involved in designing and implementing such information systems.
Organization of the Thesis
This thesis will look more closely at Western experiences with
information technology to develop an understanding of how the Third World
cities could introduce information technology with a broader set of
objectives and so avoid at least some of the problems encountered in the
West. It will then describe and assess the extent to which the different
technological starting point has allowed Tunisian cities to bypass the
sequential development of the West. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on
private and public sector computing in the West, and on use of
information technology in development projects, in order to get a clear
picture of how information systems objectives have evolved and how that
has caused conflict in the West. Chapter 3 analyzes the literature in
order to highlight the exact cause of the problems with sequential
development, and then formulates an alternative approach to introducing
information technology which will be used as a framework for looking at
the Tunisian cases. Chapter 4 provides necessary background information
about Tunisian municipalities and use of information technology, and
Chapter 5 discusses each of the six cases in some detail. Chapter 6 then
compares the cases and analyzes them in terms of the key points set out
in the framework. Chapter 7 presents recommendations to Third World
cities, national governments, and foreign donors for how they can
encourage and support an approach to information technology which
emphasizes both transactions processing and decision support.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The literature on management and introduction of information
technology (IT) in the west and the Third World will help us to develop a
framework for looking at the Tunisian experiences by shedding light on
two general questions. First, it may provide some insight into the
causes underlying the staged growth of IT objectives and use in the West.
To the extent that we understand the importance of technological change
vs. organizational learning in allowing new uses of the technology, we
may get a better sense of whether we can expect Third World cities to
follow the same linear path as Western organizations have followed in the
past, or be able to pursue several objectives in parallel.
Second, the literature should enable us to describe the hardware,
software, and organizational configurations which characterize different
patterns of computer use. By looking at how different technologies have
been used in the past, we should be able to assess how current technology
could resolve some of the conflicts which have arisen in Western
organizations as they shifted from transactions processing to decision
support objectives. This will provide a basis for suggesting a
configuration which could be developed to support the parallel pursuit of
transactions processing and decision support objectives in Third World
cities.
To investigate these questions, we will look at three broad bodies
of literature. The largest and most fully developed comes from the
extensive work on the management of information technology in western
organizations, mostly private corporations. The second is the also-
extensive work on use of computers in public organizations in the West.
The third is the much more limited literature on the use of IT in the
developing world, much of which has been based on the experience of
consultants introducing microcomputers in the context of foreign aid
funded development projects.
STAGE MODELS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
The 1970s saw a number of attempts to put changes in IT use into a
developmental structure which explains and predicts changes over time.
By far the best known of these models is the work of Nolan (1973, 1979,
and Gibson and Nolan 1974). Based on work with a small group of firms,
Nolan posited initially four, and later six stages of growth in data
processing. In the early models, stage one is an initiation period in
which the first computer is acquired and put into use. In stage two, the
period of contagion, management is concerned about alleviating the
hostility towards the unfamiliar technology, and intensively developing
applications to justify the costs of the system. In the third stage,
termed the control period, the focus is on limiting the spiralling
expenditures which have resulted from the rapid growth of computer use,
by instituting chargeback systems and creating steering committees which
establish development priorities. Stage four, termed integration, is
characterized by overall maturation of computer use, in which the control
and reporting systems are integral to management, and planning is linked
to the budget process. In all four stages computers are being used to
improve the efficiency of manual procedures rather than to support
management.
The 1979 version of Nolan's model, the last which he published, is
based on studies in thirty five companies and a "large number" of IBM
customers. It extends the model to six stages take into account changes
in computer technology over the decade. The new model recognizes the
importance of interactive terminals in increasing user satisfaction with
automated systems in stage three, and the influence of database
management systems which are introduced in stage four. The fifth stage
is characterized by a basic shift in emphasis from management of
computers to management of data resources, and maturity is pushed back to
the sixth stage. In these two stages, therefore, attempts are made to
use IT to meet the information needs of managers. In this version Nolan
asserts that the model can be used to evaluate, rather than simply to
describe, the computing use and management strategies of the firm at each
stage.
The causes of movement from stage to stage vary in the Nolan model.
Through the third stage, the driving force seems to be the lumpiness of
the technology, and consequent economies of scale required to justify the
large investments. Technological changes which permit increased user
involvement with the systems--the development of interactive terminals
and database management software--are key in shifting organizations into
the fourth and fifth stages, and thus into the new objective of providing
management information. Movement into the sixth stage is not explained,
and none of the companies observed are considered to have reached that
level of development. Nolan asserts that organizational learning also
plays a key role in movement across stages, but he does not explain how
that occurs, nor does he cite clear examples of it.
Many researchers in the MIS field have attempted empirical tests of
portions of the Nolan model, most of them with little success. Benbasat
et alia (1984) review empirical tests of portions of the stage model by
about a dozen researchers, and find that very few of the testable
hypotheses generated from Nolan's many articles are substantiated.
According to their review, one investigation of Nolan's S-shaped budget
curve hypothesis finds that budget curves are in fact not S-shaped at
all, and that computer budgets do not seem to be good indicators of the
level of development of computer use (Lucas and Sutton, 1977). Studies
attempting to evaluate the link between data processing maturity and an
emphasis on data administration found that Nolan's indicators of maturity
were poor predictors of the importance of the data administration
function. They also found, however, that the independent features which
Nolan claims characterize the maturity stage were not sufficiently
correlated with one another to be considered aspects of a single stage at
all, and that industry prosperity was a better predictor of the emphasis
on data administration than any of the other variables considered.
(Goldstein and McGririck, 1981). Studies of some of the specific
planning and control techniques which Nolan associates with more mature
organizations find that neither chargeback systems nor information
systems steering committees are associated with maturity (Drury, 1980,
1983). Work on the organizational location of IS departments did find
that companies which initially placed computer professionals in
functional departments tend to move towards creating an independent IS
department, but that many firms started out with the IS function
centrally located at a high level of the organizational hierarchy and
never moved it (Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982).
Lee (1986) has tested Nolan's stage hypothesis in a developing
country setting, looking at the management of information systems in
forty-one Korean organizations. He argues that empirical tests of the
model may fail in the United States because the diffusion of IS personnel
and expertise among companies means that an individual organization need
not follow Nolan's learning process, but may simply hire a sophisticated
MIS manager instead. In a sense, this means that Nolan's stages are a
process of societal learning rather than organizational learning, and the
whole society has already passed through them. In Korea, by contrast,
because the general level of personnel turnover and IS expertise are both
much lower, Lee suggests that it may still be possible to observe Nolan's
stages in operation within individual firms.
Lee's data on Korean companies, however, do not validate the stage
hypothesis. He does not observe S-shaped MIS budgets, and cannot explain
the variation in budget size or growth. He cannot identify clustering of
variables which would allow him to empirically describe the
characteristics of different stages of development. Chargeback systems
are virtually unknown in Korea, irrespective of whether there has been
the exponential growth in DP expenditures which Nolan suggests will lead
to their development; Lee suggests that this may be due to Korean
management philosophies rather than the failure of the model. He also
does not observe a relation between either the position of the DP
director or the existence of a steering committee, and the age of
computer use in the organization. He concludes that companies no longer
need to proceed through the stages described by Nolan. Rather, they can
implement the management practices of "mature" organizations from the
start, because they have learned from Western experiences with the
technology. He warns Korean MIS managers to "beware the stage
hypothesis--it is seductive but completely inappropriate." (p. 117)
King and Kraemer critique Nolan's model on more theoretical grounds.
They question the assumption that budget curves could serve as a proxy
for a set of changes as complex as those described in the stages of the
model, and observe that much of the empirical literature does not
validate this assumption. They also question the extent to which
technological change is the driving force behind the growth of computing,
suggesting that three organizational factors also play an important role.
These are the pressure of "institutionalized demand" created by the need
to maintain and upgrade existing applications, the importance of
computing as a political resource within the organization, and the
entertainment or status provided by use of computers. King and Kraemer
are also critical of Nolan's implicit assumptions that the objectives of
automation are clearcut or uniform within the organization. They suggest
instead that individuals will have their own agendas for automation, and
the direction followed by the organization will depend on the interaction
among these agendas. They also question the ideas implicit in Nolan's
articles that there is some "right" knowledge about how to manage
information technology, and that change in information systems is a
continuous rather than cyclical or even erratic process.
Notwithstanding their sometimes harsh criticism, King and Kraemer
recognize that Nolan's model has made two important theoretical
contributions. First, it acknowledges that the growth of computing must
be explained by forces both within and outside of the organization,
rather than simply by internal considerations. Second, it highlights the
balance between control and freedom in the management of computing, which
yield periods of apparent equilibrium. Despite the obvious limitations
of the model, King and Kraemer, as well as Benbasat, Lee, and other
researchers trying unsuccessfully to validate it, recognize the
significance of Nolan's work as a set of theoretical hypotheses which
have stimulated further model-building, and as a major practical
influence which has structured thinking about IT management over time.
Kraemer (1980) has also developed his own model of the stages of
development of computer use. His focus is on the political and
organizational impacts of computing, developed in response to Downs's
(1967) prediction that computing will create a new technological elite to
which power will flow. Kraemer hypothesizes a shifting set of power
relationships which characterize the development of computing, and
describes a four-stage model of computer use in local governments by
means of a history of its use in the United States since the 1950s.
Kraemer's first stage, introduction and conquest, occurred in the
mid to late 1950s, when computers were introduced in larger governments
to automate accounting and budgeting. In the early to mid 1960s, the
stage of experimentation and expansion set in, characterized by concern
over how the benefits of computing would be distributed to other parts of
the government and a desire to expand its use in order to justify the
costs. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a period of competition and
regulation, as each department fought to justify its claim to a greater
share of limited computing resources. Top management realized that the
existing systems didn't satisfy even their simplest demands for
information, and they called for attention to city-wide rather than only
departmental needs. The late 1970s Kraemer characterizes as a period of
reassessment and consolidation, with departments organizing along the
lines of the "data haves" and "data have nots" in debate about integrated
data bases. Concerns about data management, data access, and data
control became important with the advent of integrated systems, which
generate significant potential for major power shifts.
Although the focus of attention is on political relationships rather
than management strategies, and the historical basis is more explicit,
Kraemer's stages are not that different from Nolan's. Like him, he
recognizes a shift in about the third stage from management of computers
to management of information, and identifies economies of scale (or
lumpiness of investment) as a motivating factor for the movement across
the first three stages. Unlike Nolan, however, he sees the
organizational power to be derived from control over computing resources
as a dynamic factor in the growth of computer use, and considers
technological change less critical. Contrary to Downs' predictions, he
does not see information politics as a major factor, at least prior to
the introduction of database technology. He does raise the possibility,
though, that the redistribution of access to information which the new
technology permits may make information politics into a significant
political force both within the government, and community-wide.
King and Kraemer (1986) look at several different frameworks for
explaining the causes of development in computer use. They distinguish
between the technological and organizational perspectives on computer
use. The first holds that changes in the technology create new
capabilities and economies which drive its use in organizations.
"Changes in technology" are broadly defined to include innovations in
theory, hardware, software, and methods of use, all of which can evolve
in close interaction with each other. The second view, by contrast,
holds that organizations adapt the technology to fit changes in their
processes, or in the objectives and interests of key actors, rather than
changing to fit developments in the technology. The types of
organizational change which King and Kraemer consider particularly
relevant to computer use are relatively short term (20 years) changes in
mission, type of operations, institutional learning, internal social
relations, and external resources or constraints.
The authors then review three major stage models--Nolan's, Kraemer's
(and Kraemer and King, 1981), and a model discussed by Glaser, Torrance,
and Schwartz in The Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Engineering
(1983)--to evaluate their beliefs about which causes of change are the
most important. The Glaser model is completely technologically driven,
focusing on the shift from batch to interactive computing and the
introduction of distributed processing as the key developments which have
influenced computer use. Nolan's model is considered to be
technologically driven, but within constraints set by the availability of
organizational resources. The Kraemer model views organizational demand
for computing relative to demand for other innovations as the basic
driving force determining which of many new technologies is adopted.
Based on these three models, Kraemer and King suggest a two-by-two
matrix for categorizing the factors which can cause change in computer
use; influences which are internal vs. external to the organization, and
influences which are technological vs. organizational. In order to
develop a causal model of the dynamics of computing, they raise the
question of which influences are dominant. Based on their prior work and
their beliefs about change in computer use, they hypothesize that factors
in the external organizational cell of the matrix, such as legal
constraints or the state of the economy, are the dominant causes of
change. These have a direct impact on the internal organizational
factors, which include such issues as policy leadership, managerial
style, political coalitions, and level of knowledge about technology.
These issues in turn influence the internal technological infrastructure,
i.e. the hardware and software choices made by the organization. The
external technological environment--the state of the technology, market
structure--directly influences internal technology, by constraining the
possible choices, and indirectly influences the internal organizational
structure.
This model is useful, in that it provides a way to sort out the
determinants of changes in computer use, and to think about the
interactions among them, whether or not one agrees with the importance
which Kraemer and King give to the different cells in their matrix.
However the authors do not distinguish between internal changes in
computer policy which are due to factors unrelated to computer use, such
as personnel turnover, and internal changes which are due to learning
from experience with computers. This is unfortunate, because it is
specifically through understanding the importance of learning from
experience with computers that we could predict whether new computer
users, such as Third World municipalities, would be able to move more
quickly than their Western counterparts did.
DECISION SUPPORT
The stage models of Nolan and Kraemer, and the other research they
spawned, were looking for a way to put all information technology
experience into one sequence of events leading to "maturity". Other
work, particularly that of Scott Morton and his collaborators, has
distinguished more clearly between IT efforts oriented towards efficient
processing, and those oriented towards effective decision-making. Most
of the automation efforts of the 1950s and 1960s were motivated by an
interest in improving operational efficiency, involving the development
of transactions processing systems which replaced routine manual
processing. The 1970s saw an increased focus on improving the
effectiveness of decision-making, as a way to support the activities of
managers, analysts, strategic planners, and top leaders of the
corporation. Initially companies tried to meet the demand for better
information by providing reports from the transactions processing data.
However this approach was found to be inadequate, and the focus shifted
to the development of systems designed explicitly to support decision-
making separately from transactions processing.
The seminal work in this area is an article by Gorry and Scott
Morton (1971), which recognized early on that use of information
technology to support management decision-making was distinct from its
use in processing activities. Using Anthony's (1965) taxonomy, they
distinguish between the types of information required for three
categories of managerial activity. Strategic planning is concerned with
setting broad policies for the organization, and relies on aggregate data
about the organization and the environment in which it operates. In
sharp contrast, operational control activities call for detailed data
arising from within the organization. Management control tasks, involved
with assuring that resources are being used properly, use aggregate data
from the organization's transactions processing applications,
supplemented with information obtained through personal rather than
official channels. The authors caution against trying to tightly link
the data bases on which the three categories of activities rely, both
because the operational systems are never "completed", so development of
other systems should not wait for them, and because management and
planning tasks depend on qualitatively different information from
operational tasks.
Gorry and Scott Morton also use Simon's (1960) distinction between
programmed and nonprogrammed decisions, or structured and unstructured
decisions, in looking at information system objectives. Structured
decisions can be automated easily, because it is possible to develop
rules according to which they can be made. Unstructured decisions, by
contrast, rely more on human judgment, and the algorithms for making them
do not exist, or are not yet known. This distinction focuses only on
information systems designed to provide information to managers and
decision-makers; transactions processings systems are outside of Simon's
frame of reference.
Combining the three categories of tasks and two types of decisions
into a six-cell matrix, Gorry and Scott Morton describe information
systems which could fit into each cell. They observe that historically
the development of information systems has begun with structured,
operational tasks, and moved only slowly into the arenas of unstructured
decisions or management and planning tasks. They do not explicitly state
any reasons for this development sequence, e.g. whether it is due to
societal learning or to organizational learning. They call for more
effort to address the cells which have received the least attention,
particularly modelling unstructured decisions as a precursor to
developing information systems which would then implement those models.
Gorry and Scott Morton emphasize several important distinctions
between systems to support structured operational operations and
unstructured strategic decisions. First, the system designs will be
quite different, because their information requirements are different,
the data access requirements differ, and the complexity of the models
involved differ. Second, the organizational structure of both users and
professional computer support will be quite different. Information
systems to support strategic planning will involve fewer end users than
operational control systems, and they will typically be from middle or
top management rather than lower down in the organizational hierarchy.
The analysts who develop these systems will have to work closely and
cooperatively with the users. Unlike the designers of systems to support
structured decision-making, they will not specialize in a particular
analytic problem, since strategic decisions are not often repeated. The
structure of the IS group will also be different, being designed to work
with managers to define and structure problems, rather than to develop
efficient computer solutions to resolve them. Third, the models
themselves will be different. Operational control decisions are rooted
in a known history of solutions to a particular problem, whereas
strategic planning models are the individualistic products of the
managers who use them.
Keen and Scott Morton (1978) explore in more detail the requirements
of information systems which can support decision-making. They
distinguish between three kinds of work on information systems. The
management information systems (MIS) field is concerned with automating
structured tasks, such as loan approvals, in order to improve the
efficiency of decision-making. Operations research/management science
concentrates on modelling structured problems, such as bus routing, in
order arrive at better decisions. Decision support works on semi-
structured decisions, such as portfolio management, in order to improve
the effectiveness with which managers solve problems. In the case of
decision support, the authors stress the need to perceive the development
of an information system as an ongoing, interactive process in which
design and implementation are closely linked, rather than as a one-time
design task which will be completed and then implemented.
Keen and Scott Morton suggest two possible explanations for why
decision support has followed transactions processing systems
historically. One is the changes in technology of the 1970s. Only
operational control systems could provide sufficient economies of scale
to justify use of the mainframes of the 1950s and 1960s. With the
development of smaller, less expensive computers, database management
systems, and fourth generation languages, however, the development of
specialized systems to support strategic decision-making is economically
feasible. The second "explanation" is a description of the familiar
pattern in which organizations begin with transactions processing,
attempt to support management with operational data, and eventually
realize that management information needs are not actually being met.
Implicit in this description is an inherent ordering of which needs are
easiest to meet or most urgent, in which supporting unstructured
decision-making is harder or less obviously necessary, and therefore is
recognized and met last.
Keen and Scott Morton see decision support as evolving out of the
firm's experience with transactions processing (TP). They describe the
TP life cycle in terms similar to the four stages described by Nolan.
The first stage is the missionary one, in which the goal is to build up a
critical mass of projects. In the second stage there is a need for
consolidation, in which new procedures are implemented to control the
proliferation of projects. In the third stage, institutionalization of
the control mechanisms begins to stifle innovation, and high-risk
projects cannot get implemented. The fourth stage is characterized by
diffusion of innovation, when established operational systems are
carefully managed with tight controls, while new, specialized groups are
given the freedom to innovate outside of the standard control mechanisms.
Once any particular innovation is operational, it will shift into the
conventional management system. Decision support systems, in this model,
are created by independent groups operating in the mode typical of the
diffusion stage, rather than by the regular information systems staff.
They are thus dependent on the organization passing through the third
stage of TP development.
Keen and Scott Morton's model assumes that transactions processing
and decision support are part of the same overall life cycle, and that
later innovations like DSS must funnel into the same cycle as the earlier
ones. McKenney and McFarlan (1982) and McFarlan, McKenney, and Pyburn
(1983) relax this restriction by presenting a model of the information
systems world focussed on technologies, rather than objectives of
automation, in which each new technology has its own life cycle, and the
stage of an organization with respect to one need not be the same as its
stages relative to others. They characterize current developments in
terms of three formerly independent technologies which are becoming
increasingly linked; data processing, telecommunications, and office
automation.
They describe a staged development sequence which could apply to the
introduction any new information technology. Each stage, or phase of
assimilation as the authors call them, must be managed appropriately if
the organization is to move smoothly on to the next phase rather than
stagnating. The four phases are similar to many of the other models.
Phase one involves a decision to innovate, and unless there is a disaster
like a failure of the vendor, the organization should be able move on to
phase two. The second phase involves learning to use the technology for
tasks other than the one for which it was initially introduced. In phase
two managers must have the freedom to learn from experiences implementing
the technology and to disseminate that learning. Otherwise the
organization will limit the benefits of the technology too much for it to
be profitable. If learning can spread, then the company will move on to
phase three, which is characterized by the development of controls to
guide the design and implementation of the technology to ensure cost-
effectiveness. If those controls are not too onerous, then the
organization will move into phase four, which involves spread of the
technology to other groups within the organization.
The problem, then, is how to manage several technologies which are
at different stages in the life cycle. In the context of the three
technologies of particular concern to them--data processing,
telecommunications, and office automation--the authors focus on the
location of information technology within the organization as the key
management issue. They describe four factors which influence the
decision; management control, technology, data professional services,
and organizational fit. They present a set of arguments for both
centralization and decentralization, but do not argue for one approach or
the other as "right".
END USER COMPUTING (EUC)
The research on end user computing which began in the 1980s,
particularly at the Center for Information Systems Research at MIT, is
not theoretically different from the work on decision support or the
model described by McKenney and McFarlan. However, rather than looking
at how to achieve broad objectives of automation, it explicitly addresses
management strategies for two technological developments, end user
computing and microcomputers. Because we expect these technologies to be
important in Third World computer use, the management strategies
developed in the West may be of some relevance.
Rockart and Flannery (1983) provide a good overview of how end user
computing is being used on time sharing systems in Western corporations,
based on interviews with 250 individuals in seven corporations. Their
interviewees use EUC tools because they are cheap and readily available,
because they feel increased pressure for effective analysis and planning,
and because of the inability of conventional IS channels to meet their
needs. The applications being developed with EUC tools were mostly (81%)
for financial or technical analysis, and 70% of the programs relied
primarily on data from operational control systems within the
corporation.
Rockart and Flannery classify the users whom they interviewed
according to how they work with EUC tools. At one end of the user
spectrum are nonprogramming end users, who access data through menu-
driven software written by others. Command level users perform simple
queries using report generators or a limited subset of commands from
languages like SQL, FOCUS, or SAS. End user programmers use EUC packages
to develop applications primarily for their own use. Functional support
personnel are professional staff who have developed sufficient expertise
with EUC tools to provide most of the programming and support to other
users within their own departments. EUC support personnel also assist
other end users and develop support software for their use, but they are
based in a corporate information center. DP programmers are regular
programmers who develop applications using EUC tools.
Rockart and Flannery observe very loose management of end user
computing in the corporations they visited. Most of the companies
essentially offered the users access to hardware, some software
languages, and limited training, and then turned them on their own. Two
companies had developed centralized support groups charged with
identifying good software tools and educating users. None of the
companies felt that they could actually control what the users did with
the tools, for example to ensure the reliability of the applications they
were developing, and they did not try. The control policies which were
in place were developed to manage the costs of centralized mainframe
computing, and were inapplicable to end user computing. Nor had any of
the firms developed strategies or priorities for choice and use of EUC
tools.
Rockart and Flannery develop a set of recommendations for the
management of end user computing, which are loosely based on their
interviews, although they do not follow directly from problems they
observed in their research. They call for development of a clearly-
stated corporate EUC planning and management strategy in which
responsibility is shared by end users and IS professionals. They
identify the need for a distributed organizational structure for EUC
support, provision of a diverse set of software tools, and education and
training which is tailored to meet the widely different needs of the
users. They also call for attention to mechanisms which could help
control the rapid growth of EUC applications, both from the perspective
of costs and, perhaps more important, from the perspective of quality
control. They recommend use of economic incentives to introduce
corporate standards for hardware and software, and some IS involvement in
decisions about which systems should be developed by end users with EUC
tools, and which following the conventional systems development
procedures.
Quillard et al (1983) continue the Rockart and Flannery work with a
similar study of the use of personal computers in ten U.S. corporations.
The uses of PCs are similar to those of other EUC tools, although the PCs
allow some additional applications, such as word processing and
communication with external data bases. Again, more than half of the
users rely on corporate data, which usually have to be entered from the
keyboard because it is not possible (or easy enough) to download them.
The users choose to work with PCs because of the software packages
available, the independence and control which it gives them, the low
cost, and the fact that once it has been purchased the PC is more readily
available than other machines.
The authors found management of personal computer use to be somewhat
more structured than EUC management, although all the firms but one
separated the policy-making on PCs from policy on EUC or office
automation. PC purchases are made under the authority of the user
department, but all of the firms required some kind of prior approval.
All of the firms but one had hardware standards designed to ensure
compatibility among users and allow support groups to concentrate their
efforts on a limited subset of the available technology. Most firms
allowed at least two brands of PC, in order to allow users some choice
and hedge against changes in the industry. Standards or controls on
software and purchasing are looser, and policies on access to corporate
data bases varied widely across the companies, from no controls at all to
restrictive approval processes for both purchases and data access.
PC user support was usually available from an information center or
corporate PC group, and at the departmental level from other users. It
generally involved helping end users to evaluate and purchase hardware
and software, and advising them as to whether a PC or some other solution
is most appropriate to a particular problem. The corporate services
considered most valuable by the users interviewed were designed to ease
the initial transition into use of the technology. Examples include
advice on which computer to purchase or which software to use. Once they
had begun using PCs, people seemed to rely more on support personnel
within their functional department for assistance than on support from
the corporate IS group. This suggests a need for partnership between IS
management and user departments in providing support for PC use, since
each group can meet different needs.
Henderson and Treacy (1984, 1986) suggest a stage model of the
management of end user computing, apparently applying McKenney and
McFarlan's framework to think about a specific technology and how to
manage it. From a review of recent research, they identify four basic
issues arising in EUC use; organizational support, technology decisions,
data standards and control, and evaluation or cost justification. They
then suggest that each of these issues is of primary importance during
one of the four stages of development in EUC use, and that the management
strategy appropriate to each stage must be based on a recognition of
which issue is most important. Thus the first stage is an implementation
period in which it is necessary to develop interest in and understanding
of the technology. The second stage is characterized by a marketing
perspective, in which management increases the "market share" held by the
corporation's MIS group in internal provision of EUC. This will enable
it to move into the third stage in which efficient operations call for
the establishment of standards and controls to ensure compatibility of
systems within the organization. Finally, in the fourth stage the
economic perspective dominates. In this period striking a balance
between a free EUC market and the regulation necessary to ensure
compatibility and cost-effectiveness is key to achieving the overall
objective, using investment in EUC to give the firm a competitive
advantage. The focus on competitive advantage reflects the new potential
of information technology for the development of new services--automatic
teller machines are the most familiar example--which involve a change in
strategy for the corporation and can substantially alter its position
within its industry (see Porter and Millar, 1985).
In the early stages of Henderson and Treacy's model, the authors
assume that the objective of EUC use is to support decision-making, as
described in Keen and Scott Morton (1978) and Gorry and Scott Morton
(1971). In the fourth stage, however, their focus shifts. They call for
the technology to be managed so as to improve the firm's competitive
position rather than simply to improve decision-making. This highlights
the fact that the authors never define what they actually mean by end
user computing. From the literature they review, it appears that they
are interested in a set of technologies - microcomputers, PC-based
packages, or fourth generation languages on minis or mainframes. However
since the objective in stage four is improving the competitive position
of the firm, it appears that they are actually interested in a set of
objectives for automation--decision support or improving the firm's
competitive position within its industry or market--which could be
achieved through carefully managed uses of those technologies.
Gerrity and Rockart (1984), in an article which reviews current
management approaches to EUC and PCs, also raise the objective of using
information technology to develop new services which will improve the
competitive position of the firm. They are discussing ways to value the
benefits of EUC, and observe that frequently IS managers are suspicious
of the cost-effectiveness of PCs because they cannot see how they are
being used. They claim, however, that the most significant benefits from
EUC arise not from measurable increases in efficiency, but from the
opportunity it creates to learn about new ways of carrying out tasks and
about the potential and limits of the technology itself. The use of the
technology itself enables people to learn what it can do, and to see new
ways of using it to improve the firm's competitive position or its
internal effectiveness. They argue that the risks of diffusing the
technology are low, since user departments will not waste huge sums on
machines from which there is no return, and that the potential rewards
are great.
The development and spread of end user computing tools has shifted
the focus of IT management discussions, introducing a new emphasis on
whether computer facilities and the control over them should be
distributed throughout the organization or centralized in one IS
department. Buchanan and Linowes (1980) have addressed the issue of how
to think about organizing distributed data processing systems. They
define distributed data processing (DDP) very broadly, as a system in
which authority for any of a number of different information system
activities is distributed either horizontally or vertically within the
organization, rather than being centralized in a single DP department.
They make two basic assumptions: that the distribution of
responsibilities for IS activities should match the organizational
structure and strategy of the corporation, and that it is possible to
separate different IS activities and distribute responsibility for them
differently among user and IS departments.
The authors then suggest a breakdown of IS activity into seventeen
responsibility areas, such as hardware operation, database
administration, applications programming, setting priorities, accessing
data, and budgeting. The seventeen areas are divided into operations and
development, and into execution (technical work) and control
(management). For each area they set up a user control-DP control
continuum, and suggest how that responsibility would be handled if the
organization were at different points on the continuum. Since they
assume that the responsibilities can be separated from each other, an
organization can allocate authority over them independently. Developing
a DDP strategy therefore involves deciding how to allocate authority over
each of these responsibilities.
Based on examples from several companies, the authors observe that
most organizations tend to centralize responsibility for hardware and
some technical standards and controls, but decentralize aspects of user
support, budgetary control, and applications development. Their examples
also illustrate how the distribution of authority over different kinds of
IS activities can be related to organizational structure, and how
different authority patterns can be appropriate for different
applications. Their categorization of responsibilities provides a
valuable framework for thinking about how to structure the management and
control of information systems activity in different organizations.
ANALYSIS OF THE WESTERN PRIVATE SECTOR LITERATURE
This literature on management of information technology in Western
corporations focusses on two different phenomena which are occurring
simultaneously in the information systems arena. One is the introduction
of new objectives which can be met through careful use of information
technology. The other is the introduction of specific new technologies
whose use may or may not be directly linked to furthering those
objectives. In some cases the development of a new technology encourages
the introduction of new objectives, in others the realization of new
objectives may create pressure to develop a new technology; but there is
not a one-to-one correspondence between them.
The literature which we have discussed identifies three general
objectives which could be met by information technology. These are
analogous to the three management issues described by Corry and Scott
Morton in their 1971 article. In the early stages of automation the
major objective was efficiency. Transactions processing systems, or
operational control systems, were built to automate routine processes in
order to speed them up, reduce errors, and streamline simple rule-based
decisions. By the time Gorry and Scott Morton wrote their article,
improving the effectiveness of managerial decision-making had been
recognized as another important objective of information systems
development. Such systems were designed to help managers make better
decisions by providing the right information in the right form, rather
than to enable the machine could make the decision better or faster. By
the early 1980s, a third objective had entered the picture, using
information technology in creative new ways which could change the nature
of the services provided by the firm and so improve its competitive
position.
These objectives evolved as the technology with which to fulfill
them was also changing. At the start of computer use, the development of
mainframe computers led to automation of manual processes and complex
computations, the tasks which offered the most cost-effective use of the
expensive, centralized machines. In the 1960s the introduction of
interactive terminals contributed greatly to the accomplishment of
transactions processing objectives, and led to the development of systems
which attempted to support management needs by providing on-line access
to operational data bases. The development of database management
systems spurred the shift in focus to management of data resources rather
than computers, further contributing to attempts to support management
with on-line operational data.
In the 1970s three additional technological developments led to
further shifts in the ways computers were being used. Fourth generation
languages and packages running on time-sharing systems made it possible
for the first time for managers and other end users to access and analyze
data in ways which could meet their changing needs. The introduction of
PCs and, perhaps even more important, the packaged software which runs on
them, made this end user access much easier with little training, and
greatly facilitated the use of information technology to support
effective decision-making. The development of PCs also permitted
organizations which could not afford mainframe computer use--small
businesses, town governments, and a variety of large public agencies in
the Third World--to work towards both efficiency and effectiveness
objectives. The development of the technology for distributed data
processing--networking and telecommunications--improved the ability to
support decision-making, and permitted development of new computer-based
services which could change the position of the firm in its industry.
The literature which we have considered so far focusses variously on
objectives, technologies, or some combination of the two. Nolan and
Kraemer both focus initially, and most clearly, on the efficiency
objective. Writing in the late 1970s, based on research conducted in the
mid-1970s, this is not surprising, since this objective was by far the
most advanced at that time. Both authors recognize the addition of a
decision support objective in the late 1970s, and their models show this
in the later stages. However the primary emphasis of their work is
information systems intended to improve efficiency. The work of Scott
Morton and his collaborators is clearly focussed on the decision support
objective, while McFarlan and McKenney are clearly oriented towards how
to manage specific technologies. The EUC literature focuses on
management of a group of related technologies, used for transactions
processing, decision support, and as a tool with which to improve the
competitive position of the firm.
In looking at the use of information technology in Third World
cities, our primary focus is on the objectives of automation, rather than
on the implementation of particular technologies. Of the three general
objectives identified, our interest is in whether the first two,
efficiency of routine processing and effectiveness of decision support,
can both be introduced together in organizations which are new to
computer use. The focus on these two objectives, and not on competitive
strategy, is based on a judgment that the first two objectives are both
clearly needed in the developing world, and that it should be possible
for new users to work towards both of them. The third, by contrast, is
very new even in the West, and it is not yet clear what it would mean in
the public sector context.
The primary focus on the objectives of automation rather than on
specific technologies in no way implies that we are not interested in the
characteristics or potential of specific technologies. To the contrary,
it is only through the careful choice of technology, particularly taking
advantage of the potential of end user computing and microcomputers, that
it may be possible for Third World public agencies to accomplish two
different kinds of objectives in the early stages of automation. In
developing a framework for looking at Third World cities, therefore, and
in applying it to the Tunisian case, we will be looking closely at
technology choice as one of the major factors which can help or hinder
the accomplishment of a broad range of objectives.
PUBLIC SECTOR USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Several areas of focus in the literature on public sector IT use are
relevant to our interests. The literature on managing public sector
information systems and on using IT for public decision-making considers
whether the differences between public and private sector organizations
have significant implications for the use of information technology. A
few pieces on information systems in small cities will shed some light on
the problems of new users or organizations small enough to rely on
microcomputers alone. Finally, the literature on land information
systems will illustrate the issues involved in parcel-based data systems,
an application of particular importance in the public sector.
Management
The URBIS project at the Public Policy Research Organization of U.C.
Irvine has done by far the most comprehensive empirical survey of the
management of information technology in the public sector (Kraemer,
Dutton and Northrop 1981, King and Kraemer 1985, Kraemer and King 1986).
The study collected data on 42 American cities in 1976, obtaining
detailed information about six applications which represented the range
of application types then in use. Three of the applications were in the
public safety area; police manpower-allocation support, detective
investigative support, and patrol officer support. The manpower
allocation program involved sophisticated data modelling and analysis,
while the other two involved simpler data searches and queries. The
fourth application was a routine transactions processing system to
process traffic tickets for the courts. The fifth was a budgetary
reporting system for the finance department, and the sixth was an urban
planning and management policy analysis system.
The study categorizes IS management strategies as being of two
types. The reform approach, rooted in the reform movement of the 1920s
which sought to professionalize urban management, advocates the use of
advanced computer technologies, a centralized management structure and a
professional administrative atmosphere. The post-reform approach has
grown out of a concern about the unanticipated negative impacts of
computers on working conditions and resultant resistance to automation
projects. It advocates incremental adoption of new applications,
decentralized management in order to allow for user participation in
decision-making and system design, and more political administration of
IS management in order to keep it responsive to employees and to the
public.
Within this framework, the study evaluates the impact of a number of
specific management strategies, each of which is characterized as either
reform or post-reform. These include centralized vs. decentralized
provision of computer services, user participation in systems design, use
of chargeback policies, and creation of IS steering committees. Not
surprisingly, they find that the more technically sophisticated the
systems, the greater the impact on the availability of information for
decision-making, the efficiency of processing, and the provision of
services. They find that participatory structures for system design and
implementation are important in systems designed to provide information
for management decisions, but less relevant to transactions processing
systems. Both chargeback systems, in which user departments are charged
for computer services based on how much they use, and steering committees
are identified with user perception of major IS problems. The authors
take this to imply that either the policies are badly implemented or that
they don't work; of course it could also mean that such policies were
implemented because users feel there are problems. They also find that
information systems are more effective under the professional management
style which they associate with the reform approach to public
administration, than under the political management style of the post-
reform movement.
The authors observe that of all their dependent variables, a
commitment to technological advancement is by far the best predictor of
the success of automated systems. From this they conclude that the
reform approach is more effective for information systems management than
the post-reform approach. This may not be an appropriate conclusion.
Their typology of management approaches does not make sense in an era of
microcomputers and end user computing, and may not even have been
appropriate when they collected their data, because there is not
necessarily a link between post-reform values and less current
technology. Moreover, it is obvious that fast, interactive systems which
use the technology in more sophisticated ways will have more impact than
slower batch systems which reflect an earlier technology or lower
investment; the issue is to evaluate management strategies assuming the
use of up-to-date technology.
Decision Making
The use of information technology in decision-making has taken a
number of forms over the past thirty five years. Langendorf (1985) and
Kraemer and King (1982) both review the use of operations
research/management science techniques in the public sector, and
particularly in the planning profession. These techniques received
substantial attention in the 1950s and 1960s, when federal funds were
channelled into developing large-scale urban and regional data bases and
modelling the relationships between transportation and land use patterns.
These efforts flourished in a context of Simon's "rational man" model of
the public sector decision-maker (Simon, 1957), in which the existence of
"right" answers to policy questions was considered possible, or even
likely. To the extent that they concentrated on structured problems like
optimizing traffic flows or emergency response times, they have been
found useful, especially in large cities which could afford the model
development effort. In the same vein the 1970s have seen the development
of urban financial modelling systems and mass appraisal systems in
response to the threat of urban fiscal crisis and calls for more
equitable property taxation.
The extent to which these models are actually used, however, is not
clear. By the mid-1960s the planning profession began to shift from
viewing itself as rational process to stressing the political dimensions
of many public decisions. This led to criticisms of the OR/MS models
because they were designed to deal with structured problems, whereas the
decisions faced by most planners are unstructured. Perhaps worse, the
models seemed to provide answers where in fact they defined the problem
too narrowly, so they could mislead policy-makers into thinking they had
solutions when they didn't. Kraemer and King also point out that even
when the models are well-designed, their impact depends largely on the
political milieu in which they are introduced, and that the extensive
federal funding which went into much of this work has served more to
alert local officials to its potential than to actually ensure its use.
Various authors have looked into the use of decision support systems
in the public sector, to find ways of using information technology to
support unstructured decisions. McGowan and Lombardo (1986) have
surveyed the use of decision support systems in state agencies in
Colorado. They find that there is a good understanding of the decision-
support concept, and 57% of their respondents indicated that their
agencies had at least one DSS in place. Most of the systems support
financial decisions, and they are used by middle as well as top level
managers. Just over half of the users felt that the systems had a
positive effect on their work, mostly in anticipating problems and
obtaining interagency cooperation. The authors feel that more efforts
are needed to convince top managers in the public sector of the value of
DSS, and that further research is needed to assess their impact.
Henderson and Schilling (1985) report on their experiences designing
and implementing a decision support system for a county mental health
board. The board was concerned about allocation of its resources among
different types of services and service providers. The DSS was initially
intended to be primarily a modelling tool which would allow flexible
implementation of the Balanced Service System, which is a model of mental
health service provision. As the system was developed, however, it
became clear that it would be based on operational data, and that the
database component of the system would be very important. This
contrasted with Keen and Scott Morton's (1978) view that decision support
systems would be quite distinct from operational systems, and would place
more emphasis on analytical models than on database use.
The authors draw conclusions from this experience which relate both
to the development of decision support systems in general, and to
particular features of their use in the public sector. The dependence of
this system on operational data runs counter to earlier suggestions that
end user computing and DSS development would be independent of the MIS
department (Keen and Scott Morton 1978, Rockart and Flannery 1983). The
authors therefore suggest that DSS may actually involve increased
interdependence among different types of computer users, rather than
decreased ties. The authors also observe that public sector use of DSS
differs somewhat from private sector use in its focus on decision process
as well as product, and in the importance of equity considerations in
the way decisions are made. They feel that these concerns are likely to
characterize the public sector in many cases, and must be taken into
account in developing decision support tools.
Small governments
Two recent works have looked in particular at the uses of
information technology in small governments. Both of them have been
interested in the impacts of mini and microcomputers, and their potential
to extend the reach of computer technology into organizations which could
not have had in-house computing before. Both have found that although
many of the organizations are using software packages which would permit
both operational control and support of management decisions, their uses
of the technology reflect an almost exclusive concern with operations.
Norris (1984) surveyed 165 counties and small cities in the west in
an effort to update the data collected in the URBIS project (see above).
Although he found that the number of small governments owning computers
had increased by 17%, he did not consider this to be evidence of an
overwhelming shift to computer use in response to the drop in cost and
scale of the technology. He found that larger governments and those with
professional rather than political management were more likely to have
bought computers than smaller, non-professional ones, but there was no
relationship between the government's perceived financial status and the
adoption of information technology. Most of the governments with in-
house computers had minicomputers (59%), with micros second (22%). The
applications automated were very similar to those reported in the URBIS
data. Overwhelmingly they were in the finance area--payroll, accounting,
budgeting, and utility billing--with additional applications for property
tax assessment and billing, personnel, and police. The applications were
almost all for operational control, rather than for MIS or any kind of
decision support.
Bockelman (1986) has looked at the use of microcomputers in seven
very small towns (population 385-7,315) in Massachusetts to assess when
and how they are being used, and insofar as possible what impact
computers have on the governments. Using a framework from the literature
on technological innovation in city government (Lambright 1980), he
identifies four key factors in the decision to innovate: features of the
towns involved, such as lack of clerical staff and availability of some
funds for automation; characteristics of the microcomputers, particularly
their low price and ease of use; factors in the external environment such
as the local economy and access to information about computer use in
other towns; and personality characteristics of the individuals pushing
for the introduction of microcomputers. Many of the towns went through
extensive evaluation procedures and feasibility studies before purchasing
the machines, often with grants from the state government which amounted
to more than the cost of hardware and software. Bockelman suggests that
the state is encouraging an approach to microcomputer adoption which was
developed for larger cities making more significant investments, but
which is unnecessary for small towns using micros.
The systems he looked at are being used for operational control in
the areas of accounting, list management (dog licenses were a favorite
starting application), and billing. The towns are all using packaged
software, and none has any specialized computer staff. So far no towns
have expressed explicit intentions to use the systems to support
decision-making, although one town is using the "what-if" capabilities of
their spreadsheet package to help develop the annual budget. Bockelman
anticipates that as they become more accustomed to their computers and
have more data automated, town officials will begin exploring the wider
capabilities of their software and of other packages which they could
easily obtain, and so move into a wider range of uses for the systems.
Property Tax Administration
Cole (1969) provides a succinct description of the ways in which
automation can improve automation of the property tax. First, it can
take over the routine tasks of storing property data, computing taxes
based on assessments and tax rates, and billing for and collecting the
tax. Second, it can improve the equity of tax assessment and
administration in four ways: by standardizing the assessment methodology,
by permitting the city to monitor and evaluate the accuracy and equity of
its own assessments, by permitting frequent and rapid reassessments to
account for changes in real estate markets, and by providing base data
for creation of an urban data bank (which Cole does not consider useful
to tax managers). Cole's first purpose for automation clearly fulfills a
straightforward transactions processing objective; improving the
efficiency of ongoing administrative operations. His second group of
objectives are motivated by decision support concerns; automation will
allow the city to improve the way in which it makes assessment decisions,
and ensure that it can maintain the improvement in its practices.
Most of the literature on the use of computers in property tax
administration focuses on Cole's second set of concerns, improving
property assessments. Case (1978), clearly sets out the issues in an
analysis of the causes of intrajurisdictional variations in effective
property tax rates. Much of the problem in property tax administration
arises from the fact that the tax is levied on some percentage--the
assessment rate--of the estimated market value of the property, rather
than on the full estimated value. The effective tax rate is the actual
tax paid divided by the actual market value of the property (sale price).
City or state laws usually specify the actual tax rate, but the
assessment ratio--and therefore the effective tax rate--is an
administrative decision made by city officials. Effective tax rates can
vary widely within a jurisdiction, both because market values are
difficult to determine and because actual assessment ratios vary widely.
Pinpointing the source of variations in effective tax rates is also
difficult. This invisible variation in effective tax rates is crucial,
because it means that different people pay tax at different rates,
without that differentiation across tax-payers having been agreed to or
authorized by law.
Case analyzes the causes of high variation in effective tax rates
within jurisdictions through both a theoretical and an empirical
analysis. He suggests four possible explanations for the variation he
observes: the housing market theory underlying the assessments is wrong,
the time lags in the assessment process mean that assessments are out of
date in some neighborhoods, the assessment models are implemented
inefficiently, or the assessments are deliberately biased so they are
higher in some areas than in others. Based on three different empirical
analyses of assessments in Massachusetts towns and cities, he concludes
that two major factors cause the variation in tax rates: errors in the
assessment models which give neighborhood characteristics too little
impact on property values, and the lengthy time delays between
assessments which mean that housing markets can change without changes in
assessed values. He recommends the use of computer-aided mass appraisal
techniques, particularly hedonic pricing models based on regression
analysis, as both an accurate way to assess property values and an
efficient way to update assessments frequently.
An extensive literature looks at how mass appraisal models should be
designed in order to accurately reflect real estate markets. Cook
(1983), in an overview article, describes how CAMA systems are used to
implement a number of different assessment methodologies, including the
replacement cost method used in manual assessments, the multiple
regression techniques advocated by Case, a feedback system in which the
CAMA model is refined with each new sale of property, and the base home
technique which uses regression results to develop values for "base"
properties with which the properties to be valued can be compared.
Woolery and Shea (1985) go into assessment models in much more depth.
Their collection of papers covers all of the models mentioned by Cook, as
well as many other, and discusses the technical and managerial issues
involved in introducing computer assisted valuation techniques.
Paul (1975) concentrates on the political reasons why tools like
CAMA are not used to improve property tax administration in many cities.
Based on case studies of assessment practices in Boston and San
Francisco, she concludes that current practices favor homeowners over
businessmen, and whites over blacks. Politicians practice this strategy
to prevent middle-class white flight to the suburbs, and because of fear
of direct political retaliation at the polls if property taxes rise. The
victims of this bias do not fight against it, either because they do not
see that they are being victimized, or because they benefit from their
relationship with municipal authorities in other ways which might be
jeopardized by taking a stand on assessment practices. This analysis is
useful, because it highlights the kinds of political constraints which
may be expected to limit efforts to improve administration of the
property tax in Third World cities as well as in the United States.
Bahl (1976, 1982) and Bahl, Holland and Linn (1982) have
investigated property tax systems in the developing world. They observe
that although urban property values are rising rapidly in developing
countries, property tax revenues are not keeping pace. They attribute
this to several problems in tax administration. One problem is the lags
in reassessment which Case discusses in the United States. A second
issue is land ownership patterns which concentrate taxable land in the
hands of influential government officials who use their power to prevent
improvements in tax administration. A third issue is simple inefficiency
in tax collection which keeps recovery rates very low. Although the land
ownership patterns can create obstacles which cities would have to
address in improving their property tax systems, both the assessment lags
and the inefficiency in tax collection could easily be improved through
the introduction of automation.
Land Information Systems
The issues involved in setting up land information systems are of
particular importance in the public sector, because so much public
activity, especially in local governments, is land-related and depends on
good land data. This includes, for example, property tax management,
registries of deeds, transportation and infrastructure management, and
development review and authorizations. The report of a National Academy
of Sciences panel on the need for a multi-purpose cadastre (National
Research Council 1980) offers a definitive statement of the need for a
good national land database and what will be required to set it up.
For a variety of reasons, it is desirable that the establishment of
a cadastre be an integrated effort, rather than an independent effort by
individual governments or agencies. There are many agencies whose
routine activities involve the collection of land data, and many of which
are data users. Their needs frequently overlap, suggesting that sharing
the substantial costs would be desirable. The development of the general
infrastructure which is part of any geographic information system--
geodetic referencing, address and street name coding conventions, data
structures, base maps--is also costly. It will be to everyone's
advantage to share this infrastructure, both for economic reasons, and
because this will permit the development of a single system with which
everyone will be compatible. Moreover, the current system of scattered
land data makes it time-consuming and expensive to find the information
about a specific parcel or region, so an integrated system would benefit
those with even occasional land data needs.
The NRC report describes the technical issues to be resolved in
setting up such a system, and proposes a large-scale federal effort to
support and coordinate it. They indicate the roles of different levels
of government in providing base data, developing coding systems, working
on the integration of existing databases, setting up the geodetic
reference frame, and encouraging the involvement of a wide range of
organizational participants. However they do not directly address the
enormous difficulty in coordinating a project of this magnitude which
requires extensive cooperation among independent agencies and
governments.
The logistical difficulties in developing parcel-based information
systems surface clearly in case studies of the experiences of individual
governments. Many people have discussed the technical and organizational
problems involved in integrating data sets or developing joint land
information systems across public agencies; see, for example, the papers
of the URISA annual meetings (URISA 1986 and 1987), and the papers of the
Second Annual International Conference on Geographic Information Systems
(American Society for Photogrammetry, 1987).
The experiences of the city of New Haven in developing their Land
Use Information System (LUIS) are typical (New Haven, 1984). The city
decided to develop an integrated parcel-based database to meet the needs
of planners and policy-makers. Their base data come from several
different sources, which must be integrated in order to create a usable
database. Because the city's MIS department does not offer time-sharing
services, the developers of LUIS essentially bypassed the MIS department,
handling much of the data work on rented space at Yale University. The
system cannot access the property data directly, because assessor's
system was designed by an outside firm specializing in mass appraisal
systems to run independently. The parcel ownership data must be
periodically updated from the keyboard, since the registry of deeds is
not automated at all. Because all data are updated in batch mode from
tapes or from the keyboard, rather than in real time, they cannot be used
by agencies which need current land-related data, like the fire
department or other emergency response services. Notwithstanding all of
these limitations, the users of the system find it very valuable as a
support for policy decisions; however this case suggests the difficulty
of coordinating data and agencies even within a city, much less on the
scale suggest by the NRC report.
Loy (1986) describes the problems involved in setting up an
integrated land information system at the national level in a developing
country. He describes development of the Malaysian National Integrated
Data System (NIDAS), to be used for administrative, planning, and policy-
making purposes. Four types of data were to be included in the system;
land characteristics, parcel data, geocode referencing, and census data.
Only the census data were centrally available when the project began, so
the Prime Minister's Department, which implemented the system, initiated
projects to collect parcel data at the local level and land data at the
state level. At the local level the system was to collect parcel data
with which to reassess all properties, and set up the administrative
systems to handle the property tax. At the state level the system was to
develop the administrative systems for the state's property tax, and
establish an on-line land information system which would meet NIDAS
needs.
These projects have encountered varying degrees of success. The
overall NIDAS project never got underway because it was simply too
ambitious a design. The technical issues were resolvable, but the
significant hurdles turned out to be costs and incentives for data
collection, and interagency cooperation. The local and state projects
were successful to the extent that they met the needs of those agencies,
but the systems designed only to meet NIDAS needs were never fully
implemented. Moreover the data would only be collected and kept up-to-
date when this was necessary for ongoing government operations; otherwise
the governments were not willing the invest the resources required for
data maintenance. Loy cautions that these systems have been very
expensive to develop, and governments should be careful about embarking
on projects which may turn out to be costly mistakes.
THIRD WORLD USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
In looking at the literature on use of information technology in the
developing world, we have several objectives in mind. First, we are
interested in the objectives for use of IT in Third World public
agencies, and the kinds of technological and organizational
configurations they have developed to accomplish their objectives.
Second, we want to identify factors in the technical, organizational, or
cultural environment which differ from the West and may have particular
importance for the use of computers or the applicability of the Western
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literature on managing information technology.
Foreign-Funded Development Projects
Much of the literature on use of information technology in the
developing world is based on the introduction of microcomputers by
foreign consultants in the context of foreign-funded development
projects.1 A number of articles have reviewed the experiences of an
individual project, and used it to suggest general recommendations about
the use of microcomputers in the developing world. Although these
articles vary greatly in the breadth of their descriptions and the
strength of their analysis, their recommendations are strikingly similar.
These articles include the detailed descriptions and analyses of
the use of microcomputers for financial management in the Kenyan Ministry
of Agriculture written by Pinckney, Cohen and Leonard (1984, 1987). In
this project Apple microcomputers, initially running VisiCalc and later
running dBase, were brought in to help monitor expenditures, produce
expenditure reports, and prepare budget allocation requests. The project
was designed to speed up and simplify some routine procedures, in the
process making timely data available to managers who could use them to
made budget decisions.
Westcott's descriptions of the use of microcomputers to produce the
Kenyan national budget (1986, 1987) also fall into this group. With
funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), this
project automated routine budget processes, provided timely information
to budget decision-makers, and produced a camera-ready copy of the budget
1 Much of what has been written about these projects is in the form of
reports by the consultants to their funding agencies, and therefore
is not readily available to the public.
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without retyping. By soliciting a donation of ten Kaypro PCs from the
manufacturer, the project team of expatriots and Kenyans were able to
bypass the Ministry of Finance's own MIS department and set up an
independent microcomputer facility serving this project alone.
Calhoun, Drummond, and Whittington (1985) have provided a fairly
complete discussion of their AID-funded work introducing microcomputers
in the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Originally
requested to develop a management information system on recent and
current development projects, the authors quickly recognized that
development of several basic operational systems was an essential
prerequisite to any more general information systems work. Using dBase
and Lotus, they developed a financial accounting system for foreign aid
expenditures, a database on aid-financed commodity flows, and a support
system for preparation of the annual development budget.
Several less detailed articles also draw conclusions from the
experiences using microcomputers in development projects. Mann (1987)
discusses the differences between microcomputers and other imported
technologies based on his experiences in the Tunisian Ministry of
Agriculture. Coiner (1987) provides some observations about
microcomputer use based on implementation of an application to monitor
the subdivision approval process for the Jamaican Town Planning
Department. Schware and Trembour (1985) issue some caveats about
microcomputer technology transfer to the developing world, based on
projects in the Central Tunisia Development Authority and the Egyptian
Ministry of Health. Gotsch (1987) draws on four years of experience with
the Project on Microcomputers in Development at Stanford University's
Food Research Institute to make general recommendations about
applications choice, hardware, software, and training.
The applications chosen for automation in these project almost all
involved a mix of routine processing or data collection, and data access
and analysis. The Sudanese and Kenyan projects were in the area of
financial management, with an emphasis on using up-to-date data for
making budget decisions. Both of the Tunisian projects were involved
with development and analysis of agricultural statistics, while the
Egyptian project was in development and analysis of health statistics.
Only the Jamaican application has no data analysis component, but is
limited in scope to monitoring and tracking an existing procedure. To
the extent that these projects have been successful--and all of them were
partial, if not total successes--they suggest that it is possible to link
operational control systems to changes in the ways in which data are used
in decision-making.
The recommendations which come out of these studies are quite
similar to one another. The authors consistently recommend that the
initial microcomputer applications be carefully chosen. In many of these
projects the foreign advisors had to convince reluctant host country
officials that automation was a good thing. To accomplish this goal,
they recommend that the applications chosen be designed to solve problems
identified by host country people, or at least considered by them to be
significant. Several authors also recommend starting with simple
applications which are sure to succeed, and avoiding problems which
require changes in existing procedures or information flows before they
can be automated.
All of the projects used microcomputers, and none of the authors
even questions whether this is the right technology. In choosing a brand
or vendor, however, they do stress that purchasing machines which are
familiar and easy to maintain is preferable to buying state-of-the-art
equipment. The availability of local vendors and the presence of other
users of the same hardware are important pluses, since in the developing
country context one cannot rely on the level of support which is
routinely available in the West. A few of the studies recommend specific
machines or configurations; however their recommendations reflect the
state of the PC market at the time they were writing rather than any
special needs of developing countries.
In the area of software choice, all of the projects except Jamaica
relied on spreadsheet and database packages rather than custom
programming in conventional languages. The designer of the Jamaican
system was concerned about rapid data access more than the ability to
query the database for analysis purposes, so his decision to use Turbo
Pascal rather than a database manager was probably appropriate. For the
other systems, it was of primary importance that the system be as
transparent as possible, in order to convince the users that they could
learn and work with it. For this reason spreadsheets proved more
effective than database management systems, since they make it easy for a
new user to grasp the general concept of what is going on. Mann
describes spreadsheets as an ideal type of software for new users,
because they provide a metaphor for something which is quite familiar,
but then suggest new ways for the user to go "beyond the metaphor" in
using the package to do things which a paper and pencil spreadsheet would
not allow.
The authors all identify user training as fundamental to the success
of microcomputer systems. The systems were all implemented in
departments with no computer experience. (Although some of the
ministries had MIS departments, they were not involved with the use of
microcomputers.) It was therefore necessary to train users from scratch.
The authors stress the need for hands-on training, and the importance of
having enough machine time available for people to learn. They also cite
the problems involved in holding onto trained staff, because the civil
service can pay so much less than the private sector for people with
scarce computer skills. To combat this, they recommend training many
more people than are actually needed to operate the system, and
developing ways to compensate people for their new skills so they have
some incentive to stay in the public sector.
The patterns of user roles which emerge in these projects are
somewhat different from those described by Rockart and Flannery for EUC
use in the West. Pinckney, Cohen and Leonard describe the roles of four
key groups. Professional staff used the system to carry out simple
analyses of financial data, or to play out scenarios for different budget
allocations. Clerical staff did the data entry, and produced reports on
request from other people. Decision-makers would request reports, but
would not use the system directly to generate their own information or to
explore the consequences of different decisions. The outside advisors
and Kenyan consultants whom they hired wrote the dBase applications and
generally managed the automation of the budget operation. By contrast
Rockart and Flannery observe an important role for existing DP staff who
are not involved with the Kenyan project, and emphasize the importance of
the development of in-house experts in the use of EUC tools within the
end user departments.
Several issues arise from this pattern of use. One is that many
people who would be end users in the West are asking others to provide
them with information rather than finding it themselves. This has been
explained in various ways: they are reluctant to show their ignorance of
the computer to more skilled junior staff, or they are unfamiliar with
use of a keyboard and consider it beneath them. Undoubtedly to some
extent it is simply a function of the availability of their time and the
machine time for them to learn to work with a system which they may need
only occasionally. One consequence, however, is that junior or clerical
staff may be called upon to become EUC programmers as well as doing data
entry. Once their skills have developed to that level, it is hard to
keep them in the public sector. Since changing civil service pay scales
for people with computer skills is beyond the scope of most development
projects, the staff retention problems make it difficult to keep the
projects operational. The reluctance to show their ignorance about the
computer suggests that top level managers need to be trained separately
from and perhaps differently from low-level staff, and in some cases that
they must be trained by high-status people in order that they not feel
threatened.
A key consequence of the important role of outside consultants is
the need to "institutionalize" microcomputer use, i.e. to create a system
which will survive and even continue to grow once the foreign advisors
leave. The support of top management is essential to the
institutionalization of PC use, as it is in all stages of the projects.
Another key issue is the development of staff who are capable of taking
over not only routine operations, but also systems development,
management, and other tasks requiring greater responsibility. A third
concern is that the host country agency recognize and take financial
responsibility for operating the system, including hardware maintenance
contracts, staff needed to keep it running, and other costs which are
initially borne by foreign donors.
Manuals on Computers in Development Projects
Two groups of authors have developed manuals on the use of
information technology in development projects. Ingle, Berge, and
Hamilton (1983, and Berge, Ingle, and Hamilton, 1986) have published a
manual specifically concentrating on the use of microcomputers for
management. It is written for development project managers who know
nothing about computers at all, and so presents a great deal of basic
information about the types of applications which may be useful, hardware
and physical conditions for setting up microcomputers, and types of
software. It also includes brief descriptions of seven representative
applications in developing country organizations, and lessons to be
learned from each.
Four general conclusions arise from these case descriptions. First,
not surprisingly, the authors observe that introducing microcomputers
requires planning, monitoring, and training, as would any major
organizational development project. This may sound obvious; however in
some cases the enthusiasm generated by easy, inexpensive microcomputers
has led people to minimize the amount of change actually involved in
introducing them. Second, they feel that microcomputers can be used not
only for organizational development, but to provide incentives for
improved staff performance or professional development, because access to
the computer itself is often regarded as a bonus. Third, they caution
that use of microcomputers can disrupt existing roles, responsibilities,
and power structures, and may therefore be met with resistance. Fourth,
they observe that the use of microcomputers as a management tool makes
information directly accessible as a resource which can be used to
improve organizational performance.
Ingle, Berge, and Hamilton are among the converted with respect to
microcomputer use; their guide contains only a very brief reference to
any limitations in their use. The guide recently prepared by VanSant et
alia (USAID, 1988) for USAID takes a broader view of information
technology and raises more questions about when it can effectively be
used. The authors develop an automated system project cycle, in which
the introduction of any information technology is preceded by a general
assessment of the state of manual information systems and analysis of the
best opportunities for automation. This forces the project manager to
begin by considering the context for automation within the agency and
outside it and the extent of senior management support for automation;
only if there is sufficient support do the authors recommend going
further. In planning for particular systems, VanSant et alia raises much
broader issues than Ingle. They discuss the advantages and disadvantages
of centralized vs. decentralized systems, emphasizing that the design of
a system is the product both of technical factors of the application
requirements and of considerations such as the availability of
maintenance support and the potential for system expansion. They also
emphasize the need to consider the tradeoffs involved in choosing among a
wide and rapidly growing range of hardware and software options. They
recognize the complexity of current information technology, and are less
sanguine than Ingle about any one option.
The VanSant guide, however, attempts to cover such a wide range of
issues that it is questionable whether it can serve as any more than
background information for the development manager. A project manager
could hope to introduce a few microcomputers based on the information in
the Ingle guide. However the issues involved in introducing
minicomputers, or distributed processing over a network of
microcomputers, may well become too complex for a non-computer
professional to manage in the context of a development project, even with
the information provided by VanSant et alia.
Isolating the Impact of Foreign Aid
Many of the concerns raised in the literature discussed so far may
be specifically attributable to the influence of outside funding on the
use of computers. Because foreign donors pay for hardware, software
development, training, and a substantial amount of technical staff for at
least the first years of the project, the host agencies may be able to
avoid taking responsibility for managing or paying for their own
automation projects. While strong leadership is likely to be necessary
to introduce any innovation, the literature's emphasis on eliciting top
management support and finding ways to institutionalize computer use
suggest that leadership problems may be worse when the innovation is
introduced by outsiders, who have their own funds, and therefore do not
need a real commitment from the host agency before they begin work.
Similarly, the need to choose applications and design systems which
convince host country professionals that automation is feasible and
desirable may be a product of foreign initiation and funding of the
projects. Where the agency is paying for its own system, it will not
begin if it is not already convinced.
The studies by Brodman (1985, 1986, 1987) comparing the use of
microcomputers in Kenya and Indonesia provides some insight into the role
of foreign funding. She identifies four management factors which she
predicts will be key in the success of developing country automation
projects; top management support, training in the use of information and
microcomputer-generated reports as well as in use of the computers
themselves, development of an incentive/sanction system to encourage
learning about computers, and the presence of an organizational power
structure which supports the use of information to support decision-
making. She distinguishes between two types of information system;
"technical systems" and "comprehensive solutions." The former correspond
closely to the Gorry and Scott Morton operational control systems, or to
conventional transactions processing systems, while the latter are
designed to improve both efficiency of operations and effectiveness of
decision-making, and therefore correspond more closely to decision
support systems. Her research investigates the importance of the four
management factors in successful development of comprehensive solutions.
Using this framework, she looks at the experiences with
microcomputers in two contexts. The first is the set of projects carried
out by Pinckney, Cohen and Leonard and by Westcott in the Kenyan
Ministries of Agriculture and Finance. In these projects automation was
initiated and funded by outside donors, and incentives in the form of
training and increased responsibility were provided by the donors to
learn about the computers and use them in everyday work. Training was
provided in a wide range of microcomputer and analytic skills, and
teaching people how to present information so decision-makers could make
use of it proved to be quite important. Obtaining top leadership support
for the projects was an ongoing problem which was crucial to their
success.
The Indonesian case was a project in the Ministry of Finance to gain
national control over local tax collection. It involved placing
microcomputers in all local and regional tax collection offices and
developing a set of programs for reporting on collections which would
ensure that both current information and complete funds had to flow from
the local offices to the capital. The project was initiated and funded
by the Ministry's MIS department. While top management leadership was
essential to its implementation, this was not a source of problems,
because without that leadership the department would never have been
authorized to purchase the 200 PCs required to carry it out. Training
was simple, because end users were taught only to run the menu-driven
programs developed by the central office. While it was necessary, it
also did not pose problems. Some incentives were provided to use the
system, in the form of the training itself and the possibility of further
training overseas. At some point the Ministry anticipated introducing
financial incentives for more sophisticated uses of the system; however
at the start these were not necessary because those uses were not
implemented. This system did have a definite impact on the existing
power structure, however. The district tax officials who had previously
been able to run the collection operation without control or
accountability felt they were being undercut by the system, and resisted
its implementation. In fact they were being undercut--this was the
objective of the project--but they did not have the power to resist the
central authorities who decreed that the system would be used.
These two cases do suggest that some of the problems discussed in
the literature may result from foreign aid, while others may result from
the nature of the automation project. The leadership issues seem to be
worse when foreign funders initiate and pay for automation, and are then
faced with trying to keep it running once they leave. The overwhelming
importance of training, and the problems in keeping trained staff,
however, may relate more to the type of project. "Technical systems", in
Brodman's usage, do not require sophisticated user skills. Training is
not a serious obstacle, therefore, and the users have not learned enough
to be bought off by the private sector. "Comprehensive systems", on the
other hand, require much more highly trained users, particularly with
respect to analysis skills and computer experience. A lack of training
can cause the system to fail, while well-trained civil servants are
likely to be offered more lucrative positions elsewhere. The need for
incentives to use the system may arise either when there is not enough
top management support to force user cooperation, or when the system
itself does not require complete participation. The Indonesian tax
system replaced a set of ongoing manual procedures, so it would be
impossible for a single user to refuse to cooperate. A system which
provides background information for financial decisions, however, can
easily be ignored by one individual or department. In this case the need
will arise for incentives to use the computer, whereas in the Indonesian
technical system mandated by the Minister of Finance compulsion is
sufficient incentive.
CONCLUSIONS
This review of the literature gives a broad picture of the issues
which have arisen in the introduction of information technology in the
Western public and private sectors, and in donor-funded development
projects. Two concerns will be particularly important in developing a
framework for looking at the Tunisian experiences with information
technology. First, the stage model approach of Nolan and others, given
broader scope with the introduction of end user computing and
microcomputers, suggests a historical pattern of development in which
initially efficiency objectives motivated the development of transactions
processing systems, and later a concern about effective decision-making
motivated the introduction of decision support systems. This raises the
question of whether this sequential pattern of development is necessary,
or whether with some understanding of this history organizations now
introducing computers for the first time could combine these two kinds of
information systems. As we shall see in the next chapter, the conflicts
emerging in Western organizations between these two different approaches
to automation suggest that combining them would be highly desirable if
possible.
Second, the literature review suggests some of the problems which
have arisen in the use of information technology in donor-funded
development projects in the Third World. In particular, it raises issues
about the importance of leadership support, ensuring the
institutionalization of information stystems projects, and staff
retention. In developing a framework for looking at Tunisian cities, we
should expect these to be of some importance in the effectiveness of
information technology. We must take into consideration, however, the
impact of donor funding itself on the problems which arose in system
implementation; it is possible when cities initiate their own information
systems without financial support or technical assistance from donor
agencies, they encounter a different set of problems from those which
arise in the development project literature.
CHAPTER 3
FRAMEWORK
The literature on the use of information technology in the West and
the developing world raises several key issues which will be important in
developing a framework for looking at automation in Tunisian
municipalities. First, it distinguishes between two important objectives
for automation, which have developed in sequence in the West. Initially
information technology was used to improve operational efficiency in
organizations, developing transactions processing applications. As
organizations gained experience using computers, and as the technology
changed, it came to be viewed as a tool to support managers and decision-
makers by providing information with which to improve their
effectiveness.
Second, the literature allows us to describe the technical and
organizational characteristics of these two objectives, and to identify
differences between them. This will allow us to observe how the
differences between them have led to conflicts in the West as
organizations shifted from one to the other. These conflicts, and the
costs which are associated with them, might be avoided by organizations
which are new to automation because of the different technological
starting point which is currently available. The literature also
highlights some issues which have been of particular importance in the
introduction of information technology in the developing world,
particular in donor-funded projects, and which may be of some relevance
in looking at Tunisia.
This chapter will begin by describing the patterns of development
which have historically characterized the pursuit of efficiency and
effectiveness objectives in Western organizations. It will discuss the
major conflicts which have arisen between the two patterns of
development, and consider how the technological starting point available
to new computer users could help avoid those conflicts. It will then
review some of the major lessons to be learned from the use of computers
in developing countries. Taking into consideration all of these issues,
we will suggest an approach to introducing computers in developing
country organizations which might permit them to avoid the problems which
have arisen in the West and benefit from both Western and developing
country experiences.
In the discussion which follows, as in the entire thesis, we use the
terms "transactions processing system" and "decision support system"
loosely to refer to two different kinds of computer systems.
Transactions processing systems, in this usage, are any systems which
automate ongoing records or procedures in order to improve the efficiency
of routine operations. The term is not used in the more narrow sense,
which would limit it to automation of repeated transactions, rather than
of any manual records.
Decision support, by contrast, is used to refer to any computer
system which provides information to support unstructured or semi-
structured management or policy decisions. This could include anything
from simple reports generated from a database management system or a set
of analytical tools, to a complex application designed specifically to
provide information to support a particular unstructured decision. We
are not using the term with the precise meaning of Gorry and Scott Morton
(1971) and Keen and Scott Morton (1978), to refer to a sophisticated
modelling and analytical environment for dealing with a particular
problem which is typically not connected to transactions processing data.
Local governments may use computer-based information to support
unstructured decisions without using systems as complex as the ones
described by Scott Morton et alia. It is important to recognize the
existing local government systems as contributing to the objective of
decision support even if they are not well developed. We can think of
decision support tools as a continuum ranging in sophistication from
simple printed summary data from transactions processing systems, to
interactive EUC packages with which professional staff can access data
directly, to complex models designed to assist in making specific
decisions. When we talk about cities introducing decision support, they
could be anywhere on this continuum, although at the start they are
likely to be closer to the low end than to the more sophisticated
modelling systems.
CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN THE WEST
The development of information systems use in the West has been a
process of gradual evolution from transactions processing towards
decision support. In order to understand this evolution and the
differences between the two kinds of systems, we can characterize them in
terms of the technology and management strategy which they follow;
however it is important to remember that these are not really discrete
systems, but may be thought of as points along a continuum. Six system
features are important to consider: hardware and software configuration,
languages used to develop applications software, the roles of the key
actors involved in the introduction or use of information technology, the
training or education of the different actors, the design process or
style, and the data requirements of the system. By comparing how these
six issues are resolved in organizations interested in each of the two
objectives, we can develop a sense of where the conflicts between the two
have arisen in the past, and how current technology might make it
possible to avoid those conflicts in organizations which are new to
automation.
Efficiency Objectives
Improving the efficiency of routine operations has been one of the
primary objectives of transactions processing systems in the West. The
general strategy for achieving this objective has been the design of
fast, error-free processing systems, with emphasis on the ability to
handle a high volume of transactions rapidly.
Hardware and Software
The hardware and software configurations used for transactions
processing systems has conventionally involved large centralized
computers, with programs which are run either in batch mode by the DP
staff, or interactively by the users working on terminals in their
offices. The programs do not offer much flexibility; for example, the
rules for carrying out processes or making routine decisions are
programmed into the software, rather than being manipulable by the end
users. This is still the predominant configuration for TP systems in
many organizations. The pattern is changing, however, because of the
development of microcomputers and minicomputers, which permit
decentralized development of small scale transactions processing
applications. Moreover, the development of the PC packages and database
management systems which run on these machines allows development of
applications which rely more on end users and less on computer
professionals than the conventional centralized path. They may also
allow the introduction of computers in small organizations like town
governments, or poor ones like some developing country ministries, which
could not have considered purchasing their own system in the past.
With the range of options available using current technology, the
size of the organization may be a key determinant of hardware and
software configuration. The smallest organizations can afford neither
the large hardware systems nor the skilled staff required to maintain and
develop software for them, whereas the largest ones require the greater
processing power and storage capacity available only from large systems.
Organizations in the middle face an array of choices, which will have
significant implications for the automation path they follow in the
future.
Programing Languages
Transactions processing applications have conventionally been
written by professional programmers in high level programming languages
such as COBOL, BASIC, or FORTRAN. The end users access the programs and
data through menus, and they cannot modify the application without going
back to the programmers who wrote it.
As with hardware choices, current technologies are starting to
change conventional software development patterns. It is increasingly
possible to develop applications using the programming language or fourth
generational language of a database management system, which also can
allow end users relatively simple access to the data and flexible report
generation capability. This approach to development is very common in
small organizations or departments using microcomputers, which develop
applications using PC-based database management systems. It is becoming
more common in larger organizations which use minis, which choose to use
database management systems because they offer faster applications
development and more flexibility in accessing and manipulating data than
conventional applications.
Roles
The roles of key actors in organizations interested in transactions
processing are fairly standard. Top managers have a leadership and
mediation function, overseeing the establishment of priorities for
applications development, providing some of the authority for ensuring
that systems are implemented, and sometimes contributing to policy or
strategy decisions about automation. Middle managers, generally the
heads of the departments which are end users of the transactions
processing systems, act as advocates for the departments, initiating and
lobbying for automation. Professional staff, as well as managers, are
likely to use reports from the TP applications for management or policy
decisions. This group may include people within the end user department,
for example a property tax manager using information from his system to
monitor the work of his staff, as well as professionals in other data-
using departments, such as city planners using property tax information
to evaluate housing policy. Clerical staff are trained to use menu-
driven programs, enter and retrieve data, prepare materials for batch
jobs run by the DP staff, and handle other routine tasks.
In most conventional centralized systems, the DP professionals have
most of the technical and operational responsibilities, for systems
analysis, programming, management of hardware and systems software,
installation of new hardware or software, and training end users. If
anyone else wants access to the data or reports which are not written
into the program, it must be provided by the DP staff; neither clerical
users nor professionals interested in the data develop any expertise in
actually working with the system.
Training and Skill Development
The training required for the development and use of conventional
transactions processing systems is concentrated primarily in the DP
professionals. They receive formal training in programming and systems
analysis, usually in school. With the development of end user computing
tools and the widespread use of microcomputers, people who fill a DP role
are increasingly being trained on the job. In part this is because the
technology is too new to have been fully incorporated into the training
of computer professionals, and in part it is because these tools allow
people without a formal computer background to develop some of their own
applications without professional DP support. The clerical staff working
on transactions processing learn only how to carry out routine functions.
Professional and managerial staff do not need to receive any training,
since their involvement is typically limited to receiving reports
produced by other people.
Design Style
The design process for transactions processing systems has been set
out quite explicitly in formalized methodologies. It typically involves
an initial phase in which the DP staff interview the end user department
to determine what they are doing and how information flows through the
department. After this interviewing phase, the DP staff develop a
structured model of what is currently going on, which they translate into
the files and procedures required in the automated system. This is
further broken down into a set of programming tasks, which are carried
out by the DP staff. Once the whole system is written, it is implemented
on a trial basis, which is the users' opportunity to suggest
modifications or identify errors. After the test phase, it is considered
completed, and the DP staff do not plan on making further changes.
Data
The data used in transactions processing systems must be highly
accurate, detailed, and up-to-date. They are typically the basis for
real-time decisions or actions taken on a case-by-case basis, so they are
disaggregate rather than summary in nature. They are usually generated
internally through ongoing activities of the organization, rather than
coming from an outside source. Because they are generally the basis for
current activities, they tend to be cross-sectional rather than
longitudinal in nature, although of course this depends on the particular
application.
Effectiveness Objectives
Improving the effectiveness of managers and decision-makers in
performing unstructured and semi-structured tasks has been the major
objective of many management information systems and most decision
support systems in the West. This can involve different kinds of
strategies, depending on where the organization is in the evolution from
transactions processing to decision support. At the simplest level, it
may involve generating standard reports from transactions processing data
in order to stimulate interest in improving the effectiveness of decision
making. Further along in the organization's development, it will involve
development of systems which allow flexible access, manipulation, and
analysis of data. It can also involve pursuing an incremental
development path which allows the system to be modified as its users
change or refine their understanding of what they want to do with it. In
many respects the development pattern which characterizes such systems is
quite different from that of transactions processing systems.
Hardware and Software
The hardware and software configuration suitable for providing
information to support decision-making includes decentralized access to
computers, software, and data, and often distributed processing.
Hardware choices often differ across departments of an organization, so
each department can meet the needs of its users. Applications are
closely tailored to meet the needs of particular users or departments,
and to provide enough flexibility that users or system designers can
change them as needs change. The technology used to meet decision
support needs is changing very rapidly, and the needs of different users
are quite individual, so it is not possible to describe a precise
configuration that typifies this objective.
Programming Languages
Decision support systems use a variety of software tools. Some are
custom designed applications written in high-level programming languages
which have built in their own user interfaces and tools for end user
access to data. Others use database management systems, with fourth
generation language tools accessed directly by the end users. Still
others rely on special DSS packages which provide data access, analysis
tools, flexible reporting functions, and other utilities. Some of these
systems, particularly those using database managers and fourth generation
languages or other programming tools, rely on software tools which could
also be used for transactions processing systems, although they use them
in a somewhat different way.
Roles
The roles of key organizational actors in the development and use of
decision support systems are rather different from the transactions
processing case. The roles of top managers, middle managers, and
professional staff depend in large measure on whose work is being
supported by the system, and who decided that information technology
should be introduced to support that work. Typically such systems would
be introduced by the users, or by their supervisors. The supervisors--
whether they are top or middle management--would encourage use of the
system, provide some of the information which goes into its design,
perhaps set policy about how decisions are to be made and how information
technology will be used to provide decision support.
The users of the system, whether they are in operational departments
like the property tax office, or policy groups like a planning
department, work directly with the system to query or analyze data,
generate reports with which to provide information to other people, seek
answers to questions which arise in their work, and in other ways use the
system as a support tool in making decisions or managing operations.
They are actively involved in the design and implementation of the
system, working closely with its developers to determine what the system
should do, and to modify it as needs change.
Clerical staff play a fairly minimal role in decision support
systems. They may be users of the system generating reports to provide
information for professional or managerial staff, but beyond that they
are not likely to be major users.
Computer expertise and user support for systems to meet the needs of
managers and decision-makers are likely to be distributed through many
levels of the organization. The "conventional" DP staff may do some
applications development using fourth generation languages or other EUC
tools. Development of complex decision support systems involves
analyzing problems with the users to determine how information technology
could help, rather than formal systems analysis and programming. This
has often been done by outside consultants, because the in-house DP staff
are often more familiar with methodology and tools for developing
transactions processing systems than for providing decision support.
Many large organizations have created information centers which provide
general assistance to user departments which want to use EUC tools, or
purchase microcomputer hardware and software. User departments also
frequently develop their own in-house computer support staff, generally
people who have learned enough about the EUC and decision support tools
to help others within the department to figure out how to use them to
meet their own needs. Those individuals sometimes also serve as a
liaison with the DP department, and seem to play a crucial role in
bridging the gap between knowledge of the technology and knowledge of the
needs of the user department.
Training and Skill Development
The training and skill development associated with decision support
systems varies according to the individual. DP department programmers
who use fourth generation tools for applications development usually
receive formal training in school, although their exposure to the
particular languages may come on the job, since the tools are quite new.
Developers of systems to support decision-making are likely to have
acquired these skills on the job as well, because formal educational
programs to develop these skills are only beginning to be created.
Departmental computer support staff need to know how to work with
specific software tools and how to apply them to a particular set of
problems. They, too, are likely to develop their expertise on the job,
although increasingly students are learning to work with microcomputers
in school. End users of the decision support tools learn to work with
their systems through on-the-job training, informal training by
departmental computer support staff, and experimentation. The
opportunity to work with an existing system, and experiment in using it
to answer different questions, is crucial to their ability to help a
decision support system grow. It is the experimentation process that
enables them to refine their understanding of what they need from an
information system, leading to the evolution of the system as a whole.
Design Style
The design style and approach to systems development for decision
support is markedly different from that for transactions processing. The
design process is characterized by very close interaction between the end
users and the system developers, in which it is the end users rather than
the computer professionals who must determine what the system will really
do, and how. Moreover, development of a decision support system is an
ongoing, iterative process expected to last for the life of the system.
Unlike the transactions processing design process, users are expected to
identify new needs which could be met by the system for as long as they
continue to use it, so it must be designed to allow frequent and flexible
modification.
Data
The data required for decision support are also quite different from
those used for transactions processing. Many of the management or policy
questions likely to be asked call for aggregate rather than individual
data, and often for time-series rather than cross-sectional data.
Moreover, while some of the information needed to make decisions will
probably originate within the organization, much of it will come from
other sources, such as information on markets, competitors, or government
regulation. This means that while transactions processing data will be
of some use for decision support purposes, they must be manipulable so
that it is possible to aggregate them, identify historic trends, and
identify relevant subsets of the data. At some point it will certainly
be necessary to supplement TP data with additional information from other
sources, or with special data collection efforts.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OBJECTIVES
The movement from TP to decision support has generated conflict and
costs in the West, as organizations which began by setting up hardware,
software, and organizational structures designed for transactions
processing have begun trying to set up systems which will support
management and decision-making. Organizations introducing computers for
the first time in the late 1980s can choose a different technological
starting point from the Western organizations which encountered these
conflicts, and they can learn from the extensive experiences in the West
and the developing world which precedes them. This should allow Third
World organizations to avoid some of these costs by planning for both
transactions processing and decision support from the start.
Several particular sources of conflict have been important. First,
the hardware and software configurations typical of transactions
processing systems in the past are not well suited to decision support.
They are not interactive, and neither the hardware nor the software gives
end users an easy way to access or manipulate data. As a result, it has
been difficult to meet the growing interest in providing information
which meets the needs of managers and decision makers. With the
availability of mini- and microcomputers, this has frequently involved
the purchase of new hardware and the development of new software tools.
In some cases this has involved rewriting old transactions processing
systems to take advantage of database management. In others it has
involved a significant new investment in hardware and systems
development, because the existing systems could not be adapted to meet
the new need.
The hardware and software currently available can address the
technical dimensions of this problem. In small organizations,
microcomputers and PC packages provide a fairly flexible development
environment which can permit development of transactions processing
applications using software tools which will also allow flexible access
to data for professionals or managers. At a larger scale, minicomputers
which are fast enough for efficient transactions processing also support
applications development in a relational database environment which can
allow end user access to data.
A second source of conflict between transactions processing and
decision support systems stems from the different role played by DP
professionals in the two environments. The staff who developed
transactions processing systems were trained as programmers and managers
of centralized systems. They are oriented towards the need to maintain
the integrity of data and programs, in a context in which little is to be
gained from additional user control or access to data. As a result, the
flexibility, access to data, and user control which are essential in
systems which support decision-making--whether they are EUC tools, PC
packages, or specially designed decision support systems--run counter to
DP staff training and to the emphasis of much of their work. They
sometimes do not even know much about those tools, and they do not
encourage or support their use because they do not believe end users can
develop systems which will be up to DP standards of reliability and
security. As a result, introducing decision support objectives in
Western organizations has often meant working around the DP department.
End users have done their own systems development on micros, consultants
have developed decision support systems, or the organization has created
parallel DP support organizations, one for conventional transactions
processing and the other for EUC. This has caused conflict in the West.
As alternate structures have evolved the original TP support personnel
felt that their claim to control over use of IT, or the integrity of the
systems they had designed, was threatened by the new organization.
Several factors may contribute to resolving this problem. First,
with smaller, simpler transactions processing machines, organizations
introducing computers for the first time do not need the scale economies
provided by a large centralized system and rapid systems development in
order to justify the expense. Since the hardware can be less centralized
and less complex, the staff structure which supports it may also be less
centralized and more flexible. Second, the turf issues surrounding the
role of the DP staff may be alleviated if they are hired with the
expectation that the organization is interested in both kinds of computer
use, and that developing the ability of end users to make intelligent use
of flexible systems will be an important objective as well as
transactions processing.
Third, the data definitions and structures appropriate for
transactions processing pose problems when the organization becomes
interested in decision support. Transactions processing systems tend to
use and generate highly detailed cross-sectional data, which must be up-
to-date but do not necessarily include historical information. In the
West the initial attempts to provide information for decision-makers took
the form of printing standard reports from transactions processing data.
These reports often provided an unwieldy volume of highly detailed data
of no real use to managers, who might have preferred carefully-chosen
summaries with trends over the previous few years. However,
transactions processing data structures do not always permit isolation of
the information of use to managers. For example, transactions processing
property tax data will be separate for each year, and organized by
parcel, whereas planners using the data to analyze trends in housing
values might want to be able to trace the information by neighborhood
over time. At best, manipulating the data so they can be used by the
planners will be difficult; more often, it will be impossible.
This problem could be approached both through the use of current
technology, and through a systems design strategy that recognizes some of
the broader demands which might be placed on the data. Current database
management systems can allow computer professionals or decision support
users to manipulate data more easily than with traditional applications,
making it easier to generate summary statistics, trace individual records
over time, or otherwise access information of use to decision-makers.
Moreover, by involving the expected end users of the data in the system
design process, it may be possible to incorporate some of their data
needs into the design of the system, so that when they want to use the
information it will be accessible.
DEVEIDPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCES
The literature on use of information technology in the developing
world sheds light on some of the foregoing issues as they arise in the
introduction of computers in development projects. The literature
touches primarily on the management issues--training and the roles of
different actors in the process--rather than on technical questions. To
some extent the concerns raised in this literature are characteristic of
the consultant relationship in general, rather than specifically of
donor-funded projects in the developing world; in other respects they may
be particularly attributable to the impacts of foreign subsidies. Either
way, it will be important to bear them in mind in thinking about what to
look for in the Tunisian cases.
The literature consistently emphasizes the importance of leadership
support for the use of information technology, particularly when the
introduction of computers is part of a larger effort to change the way
information is used in management and decision-making. While it might be
possible to automate routine processing without high-level support, it
will not be possible to change how politically sensitive decisions are
made unless those with authority are in favor of it.
Institutionalizing the use of computers is also an important concern
in development projects. In too many cases information systems are used
for routine processes and to support decision-making while foreign
consultants are there, but after they leave the system slips out of use.
Institutionalizing computer use therefore involves establishing it as an
integral part of how work is carried out so that it will not be dropped,
and ensuring that top management will assume responsibility for the
ongoing costs and support required to maintain the system.
The development project literature emphasizes the importance of the
champion of automation, someone within the organization who is both
willing to put out his own efforts to implement the project, and has
enough influence to obtain top management interest and support. Usually
the consultants do not work directly with the top managers, so they must
be connected with a champion within the organization who does have that
much influence.
The experience with use of microcomputers in development projects
also highlights the importance of training different actors in different
ways, depending on their role in the system. Those expected to use
information to support their work, whether managers or professional
staff, must be trained in analytical techniques, and how to frame
questions which can be answered using the new information; it must not be
assumed that they know what to do with tools which could strengthen their
work. Clerical staff are found to play a more active in the use of PC
packages and decision support tools in development projects than in the
West. They therefore require more comprehensive training in the use of
the tools, and the presentation of information so it can be used in
decision-making. Their role also calls for the development of
compensation and paths for career advancement paths which may help to
keep them in the public sector.
AN APPROACH TO INTRODUCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
The experiences with information technology in both the West and the
developing world suggest that both transactions processing systems and
decision support tools will be important in addressing the management
problems of Third World cities. However, cities introducing information
technology for the first time in the 1980s face a very different
technological starting point from the organizations on which much of the
Western literature has been based. By effectively using technology which
allows both transactions processing and decision support, and learning
from Western experiences about the conflicts which can arise when
organizations move from one objective to another, Third World cities
should be able to move more quickly into using both kinds of systems, and
avoid some of the problems of the West.
This section describes an approach to information technology which
could meet these criteria. It is based on the patterns of computer
introduction observed in the literature, but is modified to take
advantage of current technology and a broader set of objectives than
characterized Western organizations which started using computers in the
1960s. While the most immediate goals in automating are still expected
to be transactions processing objectives, the long run objective of using
information to support decision making should mean that all information
systems are designed to ease rather than hinder access to information and
analysis tools.
Three general issues will be important in this approach to
introducing information technology. First, the objectives and overall
strategy of the organization must be oriented towards both transactions
processing and decision support. Second, those objectives should lead to
a hardware and software configuration which allows efficient processing
and interactive access to data. Third, the organizational structure
developed to support the technology must contribute to the objectives by
allowing access to information and an opportunity to learn from
experience with the software.
A related issue which runs through all three areas is how we know
whether Third World cities are learning from Western experiences.
Several kinds of evidence could suggest that they are familiar with and
have taken into consideration the experiences of Western organizations.
First, and simplest, is that people know about current technology;
microcomputers and minicomputers, networking, database management tools,
PC software packages, and so on. Second, they should be aware that
information systems could be used both to improve routine operations and
to strengthen their decision-making, and have some sense of the
technology needed to accomplish each of these goals. Third, and perhaps
most important, they should be aware of the conflicts over both
technology and management which have arisen as Western organizations
shifted from one objective to the other, and should be concerned about
looking for ways to minimize such problems.
Information Systems Objectives and Strategy
The objectives to be accomplished through automation are a key
element of an information systems strategy. Cities must be committed to
using information technology both to improve the efficiency of ongoing
operations and to strengthen their use of information for management and
decision-making. The applications they choose to automate and the way
they think about designing and developing those applications will follow
from the objectives, and must take both of them into account from the
start.
For this to occur, the people who are in a position to set city
policy must understand the need for this broad perspective on automation,
and fully support its implementation. The extent to which this occurs
will depend on who sets city policy, and whether they have the expertise
to understand and evaluate the options available to them.
In principle, IS strategy is set by the top leaders who actually
have the authority to make decisions for the organization. In practice,
they do not usually know a lot about the technology, and therefore ask
for advice in determining IS objectives and strategy. It is important
that they be able to use advisors effectively, evaluating and choosing
among the options proposed. Otherwise they will have to simply have to
go along with the advice they receive, and their choice of advisors may
determine the path they follow without their having been able to evaluate
the full range of options available.
Information systems advisors are in a position to have considerable
influence on municipal objectives and the IS agenda through the options
they offer to top leaders. Who those advisors are, what their training
and experience has been, and what their own interests are in introducing
computers, will therefore have a significant impact on the organization's
pattern of development. Their relation to the city leaders may also be a
determinant of the direction or extent of their influence. When advisors
have been hired by the city leaders, they can expect to have the support
of top management, and wield a lot of influence. If they were not hired
by those whom they advise--as in the case of foreign donors or city
employees advocating automation--they will need to garner that support in
order to ensure a serious commitment to information systems use.
If information technology is to be used to support management,
the objectives, applications choices, and more detailed technical
decisions which follow from them must be open to ongoing modification, in
order to take advantage of the experiences of end users (middle
management, professional staff) as they use systems designed to support
their work. The opportunity to learn from experience and modify the
systems is essential to the effective use of information technology in
supporting policy or management. Top leaders, advisors, or champions of
automation must anticipate this need for flexibility and anticipate that
the systems they implement will grow over time rather than being fixed.
Information systems strategy should include explicit consideration
of several general system design issues. The choice of initial
applications can be important in order to rally support for automation,
and for the use of information to support decision-making. This suggests
that cities should begin with applications which will generate quick
results, and which will effectively demonstrate both the ease and the
value of decision support tools. IS strategy should also address the
centralization or decentralization of both technical and organizational
features of the information systems to be developed. While the
appropriate structure will clearly depend on the particular applications
chosen, cities should recognize that features of the information system
needed for decision support--e.g. access to data and analysis tools, and
support and training for end user computing--will need to be
decentralized even if hardware and basic transactions processing
responsibilities are centralized.
Technical Choices
Information systems designed to meet both efficiency and
effectiveness objectives must satisfy two requirements. They must permit
development of rapid, reliable transactions processing systems, and they
must allow professional and managerial staff interactive access to
information so they can experiment and refine their interests as they
learn from experience. Three technical considerations in the pattern of
information systems development will contribute to meeting these
requirements. First, the configuration of hardware and software will
have important implications for the accessibility of data, the
expandability of the system, and the ease of use. Second, the choice of
software in which applications are developed will be important in the
ease with which transactions processing data can be manipulated and
adapted to other purposes. Third, the data structures and the process of
arriving at them will in large measure determine whether the data can be
easily used by managers and decision-makers.
Hardware and Software
In designing the configuration of hardware and software, several
requirements should be borne in mind. End user computing tools such as
fourth generation languages, database management systems, or PC packages,
should be available for whatever hardware is chosen. Although they are
easier to use on microcomputers than on larger machines, with all
configurations these tools provide the easiest and most direct route for
managers to access and work with transactions processing data. Their
availability should be a major factor in hardware selection. The
hardware configuration should also provide ready access to terminals or
PCs (as appropriate) for whoever is expected to make use of the system,
including those who will use information to support management or
decision-making.
Both the hardware and the software systems should be expandable, in
the sense that they are compatible with other tools which the
organization might want to use, and that the organization is likely to be
able to add on products which will be developed in the future. In terms
of hardware this involves setting up a system which, if not networked at
the start, can be networked or in other ways connected to other machines.
It also involves selecting hardware which can be upgraded, for example to
add more storage, more processing power, or more input/output devices.
Where possible it means purchasing hardware and software which are
"industry standard" or may be expected to be standard in the near future,
so that other products now available or being developed can be expected
to be compatible with the system implemented. This is of course very
difficult, as technology and standards are both changing; however,
developing enough awareness of the hardware and software industries to
have some sense of which technologies are likely to be long-lived is
important.
The designers of information systems which are expected to support
both transactions processing and decision support will have to think
fairly early about whether or how the organization should set in-house
hardware or software standards to ensure internal compatibility. This
involves trade-offs between ensuring data and software compatibility
among departments, and giving end user departments the flexibility to
purchase the tools that most precisely meet their individual needs.
There is no right balance here; however it is crucial that system
designers anticipate the problem and begin assessing the areas in which
compatibility is essential, and those in which flexibility is more
important.
Three types of hardware are likely to provide the information
systems building blocks in most organizations. Single-user
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microcomputers are inexpensive, and offer the advantages of extensive
packaged software. In the DOS environment they also offer an industry
standard for which hardware and software are likely to be designed; this
may change in the next few years if OS/2 becomes a new standard for which
software is developed. Networked together, microcomputers can also
provide relatively inexpensive and simple multi-user access to files.
Multi-user microcomputers provide inexpensive file sharing in relatively
simple machines. However, because there is no widely accepted industry
standard they do not offer the wealth of packaged software of micros, and
they are more difficult to manage than single-user machines.
Minicomputers offer much more power to large cities with too much data
for the smaller systems, and enough money to afford the more skilled
staff required to manage and develop software for a mini. They offer
some end user computing tools, although these are more difficult than PC-
based EUC tools; they can also be connected to single-user PCs for
decision support.
The particular hardware and software configurations appropriate for
an individual city depend largely on its size and how much commitment
city leaders want to make to automation. Cities may start with a single
machine, but over time they should think in terms of building a system
which will allow them to meet a mix of needs. The smallest cities will
clearly have begun with single-user micros and develop software in PC
packages, possibly networking their machines as they gain experience,
because any other configuration of hardware and software will require too
large an investment in hardware and skilled staff. The largest cities
will begin with minis, because any other kind of machine will be too
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small to process the volumes of data involved; at least in Tunisia
municipal governments are not large enough to need mainframes. They
could provide end user computing tools on the mini itself, or by
connecting it to PCs and using micro-based packages. The choices of mid-
sized cities will be more variable, depending on how much they want to
spend, and their attitudes towards end user access to computers.
Software Languages
To facilitate both transactions processing and access to data for
decision support, it is important that data be accessible to end users.
This could be accomplished in a number of ways, placing the application
at different points on the TP-DSS continuum. The most versatile approach
is through a database management system, which would allow both
applications development and flexible interactive access to data. On PCs
this will probably mean using end user computing tools to develop
applications programs, and giving the professional and managerial staff
access to the data through the same tools. This will, of course, require
controls to prevent undesired changes in the data, and may require some
manipulation of the data to generate the information of interest to end
users. It will allow end users to generate their own new reports,
extract data themselves, and in other ways work directly with the data.
Because the PC packages are fairly easy to learn and to program in, this
is likely to be a viable arrangement for most routine applications.
On multi-user machines this could be handled in two ways.
Applications could be developed using conventional programming languages
or using the dbms and fourth generation language capabilities of the
mini. In the former case the city would connect PCs to the mini and
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download data to give end users data access through micro-based analysis
tools. In the latter, end users could access data through the mini-based
database management software. However mini-based end user computing
tools are significantly more difficult to master than the micro-based
equivalents, which could deter end users from trying to make use of
information. The unfamiliarity of the tools may also create resistance
on the part of programmers accustomed to developing applications in
conventional programming languages. Cities using mini-computers will
have to consider at the start the best strategy for providing end user
access, and design their systems to ensure that it will be possible.
If developing applications in a database management system is beyond
the capability of new computer users, organizations can take intermediate
steps to make data available and encourage the use of information in
decision-making. These will include generating standard reports from TP
applications, incorporating report generators in the applications, and
making it possible to pull ascii (text format) data out of TP systems so
they can be accessed through other software packages. Such strategies
can stimulate interest in information, and minimize the difficulty of
accessing data once this is perceived as desirable.
Data Structures
Transactions processing and decision support systems have different
data requirements. TP applications require detailed current data,
whereas decision-makers are more likely to be interested in aggregate,
time-series data. However, because cities are not likely to invest in
new data collection before they automate basic processes, it is necessary
to base initial decision support efforts on TP data, because these will
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be the only automated data available. By working with TP data, decision-
makers will develop a better sense of what they really need, as they see
the limits of what they can do with the available information. This is,
therefore, an important part of the learning process for professional and
managerial staff.
By involving professional and managerial staff in development of the
data structures and coding for transactions processing systems, it should
be easier to use TP data for decision support. To the extent that it is
possible to identify the data needs of professionals or managers in
advance, it may be possible to design TP systems to meet their needs.
Participating in system design, and being forced to think about how they
may want to use data, can also provide a useful learning process for
decision support users, and should be explicitly used in this way.
Staff Roles and IS Support
Both information systems strategy and technical choices have
implications for who will do what in the organization, and how they must
be trained or helped to fill their roles. It is essential to avoid
creating the centralized roles and user support structures which have
characterized transactions processing in the West. Instead,
organizations should think in terms of allocating authority over
different tasks to different people, as warranted by the systems. In
particular, they must aim to develop a hierarchy of support for
information technology among both computer professionals and end users,
and they should consider who will be accessing data, what kinds of
training will be needed by people in different roles, and so on. This
will be an important part of the ability to develop an organizational
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learning path for the use of information technology to improve
management. The training needs of different actors will vary, depending
on how they fit in this hierarchy. The process of systems development
will be an important part of developing those roles.
Roles
Different actors in the organization will play distinct roles with
respect to use, support, and development of information systems. Top
managers should be strong supporters of automation. They may also play
an active role in mapping out strategy, encouraging (or even requiring)
use of information in decision making, or prioritizing new systems,
depending on the extent to which they have initiated computer use in
their organizations.
Middle managers, such as end user department heads, are likely to
initiate the introduction of transactions processing systems in their
departments. They may be champions of decision support as well. In this
case, they may encourage their staff to use decision support tools, and
may be direct users themselves. On the other hand, if middle managers
have not initiated the use of decision support tools, then the champions
of automation may need to develop strategies to convince them that the
technology is useful. This may encounter serious resistance, since
automation of decision processes may reduce managerial control, or permit
easier access to their data and therefore closer supervision of their
work.
Professional staff in operational or policy-making departments are
likely to be end users of transactions processing data and of EUC tools
with which they can analyze the data. They will be interested in
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improving the way ongoing operations are managed, and in strengthening
the information base of their decisions. They will also play a crucial
role in the systems design process, providing initial input into the
definition of data structures and coding systems, and contributing to the
ongoing refinement of decision support tools. This should involve
working cooperatively with DP department EUC support staff.
As they gain experience with the use of end user computing tools,
individual professional staff members may become departmental experts on
the use of information technology, providing assistance to other end
users, and serving as a bridge between end users and the professional DP
staff. This distribution of computer expertise between end users and
computer professionals has caused some conflict in Western organizations.
However, it seems to be an effective way to provide the range of
different kinds of support required for end user computing. The
potential for conflict may be alleviated if the organization anticipates
this wide range of DP roles and division of expertise from the start,
rather than trying to change it a few years into the process.
The clerical staff in end user departments will perform routine data
entry and retrieval tasks on transactions processing systems. In this
role they are likely to be concerned about losing their jobs because of
automation. This fear could create both staff resistance and political
opposition to automation, particularly in the Third World public sector.
This kind of opposition should be anticipated, and insofar as possible
deflected with explicit plans for relocating staff whose jobs are really
eliminated through the introduction of computers.
Clerical staff may also handle some of the report generation and use
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of EUC tools in departments where managers do not access the data
directly themselves. To the extent that they move into this role, it may
call for a change in their status and compensation, in order to encourage
learning about the technology and provide incentives to stay in
government service.
DP staff will have a combination of strategic, management, and
operational responsibilities. If they were champions of automation, or
have considerable expertise and influence, they may play an important
role in information systems planning, the process through which basic
questions about IS strategy can be resolved. Otherwise, IS planning may
be contracted out to consultants, or perhaps handled by top managers.
The DP staff will handle most of the management and development
tasks for transactions processing systems, and supervise outside
consultants contracted to develop TP applications. This is the
conventional role for DP staff. In addition, they will provide user
support for end user computing. This will involve training end users,
helping them figure out how to solve problems, advising on PC hardware
and software choices, and developing the department's strategies for
supporting EUC. It could be organized according to the Western
information center model, in which different individuals support TP and
EUC. This has the advantage of not requiring the same people to work in
two very different modes, one characterized by a strong concern for
control and system security, and the other by an interest in encouraging
end users to take control over their own systems. Cities which cannot
afford enough DP staff to divide the responsibilities may have the same
individuals taking on both roles. This organization might prove more
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difficult to manage, however.
Outside consultants or advisors may be brought in to handle
strategic and development tasks, particularly information systems
planning and applications development. Information systems planning
requires a thorough understanding of how to manage information technology
as well as how to develop applications. Regular DP staff are not likely
to combine this level of expertise with an interest in carrying out more
mundane operational tasks, so organizations may have to look outside for
assistance on strategy development. In this role consultants can exert
considerable influence on the overall direction followed by the
organization. It is therefore important that their role be defined in
such a way that DP staff or city leaders can learn from them, or can
compare the strategies recommended by several different consultants.
Consultants are likely to be hired for systems development when the
regular DP staff are overloaded, or are concentrating on overall
management of the IS operation instead of analysis and programming. This
role gives the consultants only limited control; it is only important
that city staff know enough about what is going on that they will be able
to maintain the system.
Training and Skill Development
Training and learning needs will differ according to the role played
in the introduction or use of information technology. Top managers may
need to be convinced that automation is a good idea. This would be done
through demonstrations that show how transactions processing systems can
improve routine operations, and how end user computing can support
management and decision-making. Education of top managers may involve
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demonstrations and hands-on experimentation to show them how easy and
useful end user computing is, to assuage fears that it will require
extensive computer expertise. This kind of education would be provided
by the advisors, or the champions of automation.
Middle managers may need some of the same general training as top
leaders, especially if they have not been the initiators of automation.
They will also need a general introduction to both transactions
processing and decision support, so that they can help design TP
applications and play a useful role in defining how access to information
can contribute to effective decision-making in their departments. If
they use EUC tools directly, they will also need more extensive practical
training in their use. They may also need instruction in the use of
statistical analysis tools, and will certainly need to learn how to carry
them out on the computer.
Professional staff who are end users of automated data will need
more extensive training. Initially, they will need an introduction to
how computers could provide them with useful information, so that they
will be able to participate in the systems design process. As EUC tools
and automated data become available, they may need training in analytical
methods such as statistics, spatial analysis, and model-building,
depending on their backgrounds. They will certainly need to learn how to
use those methods on the computer, and how to work with the available EUC
tools. They may also need some instruction in how to "package"
information so it will have more influence on decision-makers. As they
become more experienced computer users, they will develop a better
understanding of what kinds of data they really need, what can and cannot
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be done on their system or with available data, and what they might want
a system to do. This will be an ongoing process leading to further
development of the decision support tools. Professional staff who take
responsibility for departmental EUC support will also need to develop a
better sense of the tools available, and how to use them for their
particular tasks. They will probably learn this from experience with the
system, and from calling on DP support staff when they have questions.
Clerical staff will be trained by the DP professionals to run
transactions processing applications. If they are end users of PC
packages, they will need some formal training, although like professional
EUC users they will probably develop much of their expertise from hands-
on work.
DP professionals will probably receive much of their training in
programming and systems analysis through formal education, usually at the
university level. However they, too, may develop their expertise with
end user computing and decision support tools on the job, simply because
most formal education in computer science does not yet cover this
material. Because they have computer backgrounds, this learning will be
both easier for them, and in greater depth, than the training of
professional or clerical staff.
Design Style
As the previous discussion suggests, the process of developing new
applications will require many different actors. As in the standard
systems development process, the DP staff will work with the end user
department to analyze the processes to be automated and the existing
information flows. In addition, however, the end users of the data
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stored in the system, who might be in the same department or might be
elsewhere in the city, will also be brought into the process. They
should work with the system developers to assess how they will be
interested in using the data, and how they will need to be able to access
information in order to make use of it. The DP staff responsible for EUC
support will begin working with end users at this stage to assess their
software needs, and what they will need to learn to use the system.
Training of end users can begin while the system is being developed.
Once the system has been implemented, the transactions processing
portions may be regarded as fixed, but the needs of managers and
professional staff will change as they gain experience. They will
continue working with the EUC support staff to meet new needs, in an
ongoing iterative process.
CONCLUSIONS
This approach to automation could enable Third World organizations
to introduce information technology with the immediate objective of
improving the efficiency of routine operations, while facilitating the
transition into decision support as soon as the need is recognized. In
describing the details of what such an approach might look like, three
general issues are important. First, the overall information systems
strategy will be set in the initial determination of objectives and
applications portfolio. It is important to be aware of who is making
these choices, how, and why, because this will determine whether the city
follows a strategy which will allow both transactions processing and
decision support. Second, the technical decisions--hardware, software,
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and data structures--will follow from the overall strategy. They will be
a fundamental determinant of whether it is possible to use the system to
support both transactions processing and decision support. Third, the
roles of consultants and city staff at all levels of the organization
should follow from the previous choices, and must also support the
overall objectives and strategy chosen by city leaders.
The next two chapters provide background on Tunisian automation and
municipal government, and descriptions of the introduction of automation
in the six case study cities. The case discussions follow a
chronological approach in describing how information technology has been
introduced and used in the cities, how these key information systems
questions have been resolved, and the extent to which the cities have or
have not followed the approach described in this chapter. Chapter 6 will
then use the organizational structure provided by this framework to
evaluate the information systems experiences of the six cities.
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CHAPTER 4
MUNICIPAL STRUCTURE AND AUTOMATION IN TUNISIA
In order to evaluate the use of computers in Tunisian
municipalities, it is useful to begin with some general background. This
chapter discusses several issues. First, we look at the functions of
local governments, which will give us a sense of how information
technology may be valuable in improving management and planning. Second,
we look at how municipal governments are structured, which gives some
sense of distribution of responsibilities and how decisions are likely to
be made within the city. Third, we consider the relation between cities
and regional and national government, because this has important
implications for the flexibility with which municipalities can change
their own operations. Fourth, we present some summary information on
municipal revenues and expenses, and consider the role of the property
tax in operating revenues. Fifth, we consider the property tax itself in
some detail, to get a better sense of the procedures involved, and how
automation is likely to improve tax administration. Sixth, we look at
the some of the public and private sector actors involved in the use of
computers in Tunisia, since we will encounter them when we consider the
six case study cities.
Tunisia is a small country of about seven million people between
Libya and Morocco on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. (See map
in Figure 4-1.) About 52% of the population lives in the 169 officially
designated municipalities, most of them located in the northern and
eastern parts of the country close to the Mediterranean. The two largest
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cities, Tunis and Sfax, have populations of about 600,000 and 240,000.
The rest of the cities are quite small; eleven between 50,000 and
100,000, seventy five between 10,000 and 50,000, and the rest under
10,000.1
The six cities studied in this thesis were selected because they had
made a major commitment to the use of computers, typically by buying
their own machines, hiring DP staff and consultants, and automating
essential municipal operations. Not surprisingly, they are among the
larger cities in the country, including Tunis and Sfax, three cities
between 50,000 and 100,000 (Kairouan, Sousse, and Ariana), and one city
of 30,000 (Rades). They have all grown rapidly in population since 1980,
especially Ariana, which is a close suburb of Tunis and has borne much of
the brunt of the growth of the capital region.
FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
The rights and responsibilities of Tunisian municipalities have been
recently defined in the 1975 Loi Organique des Communes. According to
the law, city governments have two basic purposes. First, they are
expected to contribute to city economic development by implementing local
programs of the National Development Plan, promoting economic, social,
and cultural life of the city, and developing and implementing land use
plans. Second, the city government is responsible for managing municipal
affairs.
The specific responsibilities of municipal governments listed in the
law include provision of a number of basic public services. They oversee
1 Data from the 1984 national census, provided by USAID.
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the construction process to enforce compliance with building and
subdivision permits issued by the regional government, and to enforce the
building codes. They manage and collect the revenues from residential
and commercial properties owned by the national government, most of which
came into public hands in the 1950s after the revolution. They issue
licenses and collect fees for the so-called administrative authorizations
required for any incursions on the streets, including sidewalk cafes,
vendors, signs, kiosks, and so on. They provide an array of public
facilities and services including slaughterhouses and markets, garbage
collection and pest control, taxi licensing, public lighting, cemeteries,
kindergartens, youth centers, sports facilities, and parks. They also
maintain records of births, marriages, deaths, education, and other
personal events, known as the 6tat civil. Tunisian citizens must present
a summary of these data to carry out many official transactions such as
registering in school or obtaining a passport, and obviously maintaining
accurate data is critical, so this is a major responsibility of local
governments.
According to the law, municipal governments also must produce
several planning documents which are supposed to guide urban growth and
development. The Plan d'Am6nagement Urbain is a city-wide plan which
includes a report on anticipated demographic and economic trends, planned
projects, and their costs, a set of zoning maps showing road plans or
changes and land areas on which construction will not be allowed, and a
set of land use regulations describing categories of land use and the
conditions under which they must be used. This plan must receive the
authorization of the governor or Minister of Interior, and serves as the
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basis on which building or subdivision permits are approved or
disapproved. The Plan d'Am6nagement de D6tail is similar to the general
plan, but is more detailed and pertains only to a specified neighborhood.
It gives the use of each piece of land (type of construction, green
space, etc.), includes more detailed maps, and in some cases an economic
and financial analysis of proposed development plans. The Plan de
D6veloppement Municipal is a prioritized list of investment projects for
the next five years.
In practice, however, the cities have little responsibility for city
planning, growth control, economic development, or other general urban
policy functions. Although the law states that cities are responsible
for implementing local programs of the National Development Plan, in fact
they are no resources whatsoever with which to do this. Actual land use
planning functions are carried out at the national and regional levels,
as are the issuance of building and subdivision permits. The cities are
expected to ensure that new construction complies with the plans, and
that all projects have building permits, although in practice enforcement
is lax.
A number of functions which are handled at the local level in many
countries are not municipal responsibilities in Tunisia. These include
provision of water, gas, electricity, public housing, sewer systems,
industrial development, and transportation, all of which are the
responsibility of national public enterprises under the supervision of
the appropriate ministries. Primary, secondary, and university education
are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. Economic and
spatial planning are the responsibility of the Ministries of Plan and
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Interior, which also control the investment funds with which to implement
the plans.
INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF KUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
Tunisian municipalities are governed by a mayor and city council.
The city council is elected by the citizens, and the mayor is elected by
and from the council. The council rules on affairs of the city concerned
with the budget, investments, and actions in support of the objectives of
the national development plan. However their input is only advisory, and
most of their actions must be approved by the governor or the ministers
of interior and finance. The council may designate selected members and
civil servants to form commissions charged with studying or advising on
particular issues such as finance, administration, or in some cities,
automation. Municipal commissions provide advice to the mayor, but do
not have the authority to make decisions.
The mayor, who is an unpaid part time official in all cities except
Tunis, is legally responsible for administration of basic city functions.
Because mayors usually visit city hall only once a week on Saturdays,
they generally designate some of their responsibilities to other council
members or civil servants. Mayors work with the municipal bureau, a
group of council members and top city staff who meet once a week to
assist the mayor with ongoing management. The mayor of Tunis is
appointed by the President of the Republic, rather than being elected by
the city council, and has the status of a cabinet minister.
The secretary general is the highest civil servant in the municipal
administration. He, like other municipal staff, is a national government
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employee, who is recruited, selected, and hired by the Minister of
Interior. He works closely with the mayor, and handles the ongoing
management of all city operations. He is a member of all city
commissions, as well as of the municipal bureau, and is often the mayor's
official designee for many functions. In all of the cities studied the
secretary general has an important role in automation decisions, and in
several he led the support for computer use.
While the organizational chart of Tunisian municipalities is not
prescribed by law, the cities are fairly similar to each other (see
Figure 4-2). The mayor is at the top. Under him there are three
branches. First, the municipal bureau, city council, and commissions
comprise the political arm of the municipality. Second, the city may be
divided into arrondissements (zones or sectors), each of which is
presided over by a vice president chosen from the city council. Third,
the administrative arm is under the management of secretary general.
Within the administration, certain departments are typical of all
cities. Each city has a department of technical services or public works
which handles city planning and research, maintenance of public
facilities and services, and the control over building construction.
Each city has an administrative services department handling personnel,
budget, accounting, and other operations. Cities creating data
processing departments tend to put them under administrative services,
though this is by no means universal. Each city has a department of
social or communal affairs, which handles the etat civil, public hygiene,
and other related functions. The hierarchy within these departments
varies, as does the presence of other departments which handle functions
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FIGURE 4-2 Standard municipal organization chart
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such as legal services, economic affairs, and general oversight.
The authority structure of municipal government tends to be highly
centralized. The legal responsibility of the mayor or his designate for
internal decisions is taken quite literally, and staff do not have the
jurisdiction to make routine decisions based on fixed rules. For
example, since the law says that the mayor is responsible for meeting the
city's financial obligations and administering the property tax, either
he or his designate must personally sign all payment authorizations and
tax assessment notices - even when thousands are sent out at once.
REIATION OF MUNICIPALITIES TO OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
Tunisian municipalities exist under the tight control of the
national and regional governments. The Minister of Interior, legally
designated the tutelle, has authority over most city functions.
Municipalities are created by the Ministry of Finance, which also has the
authority to dissolve them, change territorial boundaries or names,
organize city elections, and dissolve the city council if it feels it is
warranted. Along with the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Interior
must approve the budgets and related financial decisions of cities whose
combined operating and capital budgets are greater than TD 350,000 (about
$437,500), and the budgets of all cities which showed a deficit in the
previous year. The two ministers must also approve any investment
greater TD 100,000 (about $125,000) prior to its inclusion in the
municipal budget.
The regional governorate (province) must approve the budgets of
cities whose combined operating and capital budget is under TD 350,000.
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The governor has authority over all local taxes, including approval of
property tax roles, and real property sales or leases over three months.
He must approve all investments over TD 50,000 prior to their inclusion
in the budget, and controls other general regulations and city council
actions.
In addition to the responsibilities it shares with the Ministry of
Interior, the Ministry of Finance controls all local government budgets
and expenditures. A local office of the Ministry of Finance, the recette
municipale, serves as the cashier, treasurer, and accountant for the
municipality. The director of the recette, the receveur municipal, is a
civil servant responsible to the Director of Local Public Authorities of
the Ministry of Finance. He is responsible for paying city bills,
handling billing and collection for municipal taxes (including the
property tax), and monitoring city expenditures relative to budget
allocations in monthly and annual reports submitted to the Minister of
Finance.
In addition to its control over finances, the Ministry of Interior
has authority over municipal personnel, as well. City employees are
considered to be part of the national civil service, and are hired
according to the same job classifications. The Ministry of Interior
approves the creation of new staff positions, and carries out the
recruiting and selection process for the cities. Because the municipal
organizational structures are a branch within the hierarchy of the
national ministries, a position with comparable responsibilities in the
municipal and national administration--e.g. a secretary general or
department head--would have a lower job classification and salary in the
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municipality than in the Ministry. Consequently, it is hard to recruit
competent professional staff to municipal government service, because
they would be paid more and have a higher rank in the national service.
The extent of this control over municipal functions means that city
governments can do very little autonomously. Just as municipal staff
refer all decisions to the secretary general or mayor, the top city
leaders have to refer any new proposals, innovations, or anomalous
situations to the regional and national authorities, because so many of
their actions require prior approval from above.
MUNICIPAL FINANCE
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 provide general information on the magnitude of
municipal budgets, and an estimated breakdown of receipts and
expenditures for all municipalities. Municipal operating revenues come
from a number of general sources. Of the six direct taxes, the
residential property tax is the most important. Both this tax, and a
less lucrative one on undeveloped land, are administered directly by the
TABLE 4-1 MAGNITUDE OF TUNISIAN MUNICIPAL BUDGETS
Total Operating Budget: # of cities:
TD 4,000,000 2
TD 350,000-4,000,000 36
TD 75,000-350,000 97
TD 20,000-75,000 35
< TD 20,000 0
TOTAL 170
Source: Assia Khellaf, "Finances et Gestion Municipales en Tunisie"
Unpublished paper of the World Bank, May 1987. Page 74.
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TABLE 4-2 BREAKDOWN OF MUNICIPAL RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
All Tunisian municipalities, 1984
REVENUES Percent of total Source
TITLE I - Operating Revenues
Direct Taxes
Property tax 10.45% p. 96
Tax on unbuilt land 0.30% p. 96
Tax on commercial establishments 9.95% p. 96
Tax on hotels, vehicles, drinking 1.91% p. 96
Total direct taxes: 22.60%
Indirect Taxes 15.83% p. 103
Share of FCCL 45.60% p. 118
Rents on public properties 4.70% p. 95
Fees for city services 11.26% p. 95
Total Operating Revenues 100.00%
TITLE II - Capital Revenues
Loans 36.79% p.1 4 1
Equipment subsidies from national govt. 38.98% p.1 1 8
Reserves from FCCL 24.23% p.1 1 8
Total Capital Revenues 100.00%
EXPENDITURES
TITLE I - Operating expenses
Personnel 61.19% p.1 58
Management 25.37% p.1 5 8
Other 13.43% p.1 5 8
Total Operating Expenses 100.00% p.1 5 8
TITLE II - Capital Expenses
Direct Investments 84.85% p.1 5 8
Loan payments and financing 12.12% p.1 5 8
Other 3.03% p.1 5 8
Total Capital Expenses 100.00% p.1 5 8
Source: Assia Khellaf, "Finances et Gestion Municipales en Tunisie"
Unpublished paper of the World Bank, May 1987. Page references
are as given.
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local government which keeps the revenues for its own use. The tax on
commercial establishments is administered at the national level and a
share of the revenue returned to the municipality, so the city
administration has no direct control over it. The other three direct
taxes, on hotels, animal-drawn vehicles, and drinks, are local taxes
which account for only a very small share of revenue, and so attract
little attention.
Indirect taxes are accounted for primarily by taxes on markets and
slaughterhouses, with another significant portion coming from tolls and
surcharges on shows and electric bills. Revenues from public properties
are the rents collected on municipally-owned residential and commercial
real estate, most of which came into public hands at the time of
independence from France in 1956. They account for only a small share of
total revenue, and are likely to be fixed over time, since cities are not
purchasing new properties. The payments for city services are more
important in the total, but they are split among many different services-
-reimbursements for road work, sewer charges, fees charges to furriers,
fees for provision of extracts from the etat civil, kindergarten charges,
etc.--which makes it difficult to concentrate on improving any particular
source of revenue.
The largest single source of municipal operating revenues is direct
grants from the national government Fonds Communs des Collectivites
Locales (FCCL), which accounted for 45% in 1984. FCCL funds are taken
from the revenues of a number of national taxes, including ones on
agricultural produce, commercial establishments, and petroleum products.
They are distributed to municipalities and governorates according to a
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FIGURE 4-3 Formula for allocation of FCCL funds
12% divided equally among
governorate seats
24% to the city of Tunis
Governate Municipal 8% to the governorate of
Councils Governments Tunis
14% 86% 24% for loans to municipalgovernments
32% to the National Sewerage
Office
10% divided equally among municipalities
45% allocated according to population
45% allocated according to average amount
collected on property tax and tax on unbuilt
land over previous three years
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formula which allocates some funds equally among cities, and some in
relation to the size of the city and its property tax receipts. (See
Figure 4-3 for a depiction of the FCCL allocation formula.) Portions of
the FCCL funds are reserved to support capital expenditures in the Tunis
region and in municipalities which are governorate seats. Although FCCL
allocations are in part related to property tax revenues, neither city
nor Ministry of Interior officials feel that this creates an incentive to
improve collection of the tax.
Municipal governments do not have a lot of control over their
operating revenues. Almost half of their revenue is from lump-sum
government grants, and almost 10% more from the nationally administered
tax on commercial establishments. Municipal governments interested in
increasing operating revenues are therefore likely to be interested in
improving administration of the property tax. Although it does not
account for that great a share of total municipal revenue, it is the
largest single source of revenue over which the city has any direct
control, so the city is more likely to be able to influence the revenues
from this source than from more important sources like FCCL. Moreover,
property tax revenues are more likely to grow over time and to be
equitably distributed across the municipal population than other revenue
sources which come under municipal control, particularly the revenues
from public properties. The overall tax base can be expected to increase
with growth as city populations increase, both through new construction
and through increases in property values. By contrast the revenues from
public properties will not grow, because the cities are not acquiring
additional real estate. The tax also offers significant opportunities to
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TABLE 4-3 BREAKDOWN OF DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1984
Category of Investment Percent
Lighting 8.4%
Roads and Sidewalks 21.9%
Sewers 1.8%
Housing 12.8%
Cleanliness 2.8%
Pulic buildings 28.8%
Purchase of buildings 2.9%
Expropriations 2.6%
Vehicles and equipment 9.4%
Miscellaneous 8.6%
Total 100.0%
Source: Assia Khellaf, "Finances et Gestion Municipales en Tunisie"
Unpublished paper of the World Bank, May 1987. Page 161.
increase total revenue through improved assessment practices, whereas
other taxes do not offer this potential.
Direct investments by municipal governments are of interest because
the investment in computer hardware is budgeted in this category. In
1984 direct investments accounted for 85% of total capital expenses;
Table 4-3 gives a breakdown of how they were spent. Computer hardware
comes under the "vehicles and equipment" category, which received 9.4% of
investment funds that year. Most city accounts do not yet include a
special category for computer equipment, and in 1984 none of them did, so
reliable uniform comparisons across all cities are not possible.
Computer purchases in the case study cities accounted for from about 3%
to as much as 15% of direct investment in the years in which they were
made, in amounts ranging from $8,500 for a microcomputer system to
$250,000 for an IBM System 38. These investments do not seem to
represent a serious hardship for the cities making them.
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THE TUNISIAN PROPERTY TAX
The Tax Base
The Tunisian property tax, or taxe locative, was created by a 1902
decree which describes the nature of the tax, its base, and the
administrative procedures to be followed in implementing it. Subsequent
decrees have changed tax rates, and made some minor modifications in how
it is administered, but in its fundamentals the decree of 1902 still
holds.
The tax is based on the rental value of residential properties. The
tax rate is fixed by law at 24% of the annual rental value of the
property. Of this 24%, 4% goes into a special national housing fund
(FNAH), and 10% does not apply to properties less than five years old.
For comparison with a capital-based tax, if we assume that the annual
rent on a property is 10% of its capital value, and assume 100%
assessment then the property tax plus FNAH come to a 2.4% effective tax
rate. The property owner is legally responsible for paying the tax. He
may shift 10% of the 20% to the tenant if this is written into the lease;
however this does not seem to be a common practice.
There is some question as to what the tax base really is or should
be. The decree of 1902 seems to imply that it should be the market
(rental) value of the property. However, both municipal and Ministry of
Interior officials are firm in their conviction that market values should
not be the base for the property tax. In discussions with many
officials, among them economists and lawyers as well as heads of
municipal tax services, the explanation that emerges for this view seems
to rest on a belief that a tax on market rents would be highly
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regressive. Tunisian officials feel that rents and property values are
artificially high because of the rapid population growth in Tunisian
municipalities. Because the tax is levied on property owners, public
officials assume that owners actually pay it; the question of whether it
is shifted to renters was not considered important by any of the
officials interviewed. They further assume that owners who live in their
properties tend to be poor, whereas owners who rent them are rich; the
economic position of renters is not an issue since tax shifting is not
recognized. Since they regard property values as artificially inflated,
taxing low-income owners on the market value of homes which they have no
intention of selling would constitute an unfair burden. On the other
hand taxing landlords on market values makes for a progressive tax, since
taxes are assumed to be borne by the landlords.
Although this view is based on a number of highly questionable
assumptions, it is consistent with assessment practices in all of the
cities studies. For properties which are actually rented, the tax base
is the market rent, determined by asking the tenant, landlord or manager,
or--more rarely--by seeing the lease. Determining the rent, or even
whether the property is rented, is difficult, because owners will often
claim it is not rented in an attempt to reduce their assessment. For
owner-occupied properties--or those for which no rent is paid, e.g. if
they are inhabited by a relative of the owner--the city assessors come up
with a value which may bear a loose relation to characteristics of the
property, although this is not always the case. In some cities
assessments are supposed to be based on some standard criteria, usually
number of rooms and type of dwelling. City officials are generally
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reluctant to talk about how assessments are done, however, and it is
widely acknowledged that if there are any rules they are not followed.
Assessed values are always much lower than the actual rents paid on
comparable properties. Tax service officials in several of the case
study cities estimated that the assessed value of an owner-occupied
property would probably run to about 10% of its rent if it were actually
put on the market. In Kairouan, the one city for which data were
available to compare the average assessed values of owner-occupied
properties with actual rents across several city neighborhoods, the
assessed values were about 20% of the rents. This creates a significant
incentive for owners of rental properties to pretend they are occupied by
relatives who do not pay rent. This is fairly easy to do, moreover,
since the parcel data collection process is not tightly controlled.
Although all of the tax service department staff interviewed felt
that the differential in tax base between owner-occupied and rental
properties was justified, many city tax service officials expressed a
wish for a more clear definition of the tax base. However, it is also
unclear who actually has the authority to define the tax base. Some
cities have ventured to do this on their own. However, many others
cities, as well as the computer vendors automating property tax
management, view this as a responsibility of the Minister of Interior,
and will not venture to define an assessment model on their own.
Tax Administration
Responsibility for administration of the property tax is divided
between two independent government entities. The municipal tax service
handles the assessment process and produces tax roles, under the
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authority of the Ministry of Interior. The recette, managed by the
receveur municipal and part of the Ministry of Finance, handles billing
and collection. As will be seen in the cases, this division of
responsibility has significant implications for the management of the
tax, and particularly for the ability of municipal governments to
increase revenue from the tax.
The municipal portion of the tax administration process involves
carrying out a triennial census of properties, estimating the rental
values, producing and distributing assessment notices, hearing the
appeals, and producing tax roles. (Table 4-4 provides a list of the
major steps involved in administering the property tax.) Most cities are
divided into three zones, one of which is censused each year. To carry
out the census, tax service agents visit every property--including
commercial, industrial, and vacant properties not covered by the tax--and
speak with the owner or resident to determine ownership, whether it is
rented, size, whether any additions have been built since the last
census, etc. Since census agents do not have the right to enter the
building, descriptive information is necessarily sketchy. The tax
service is supposed to carry out complementary censuses, in which they
visit new properties, during the "off" years; however not all cities
actually do this. The census takes at least four to six months, and most
cities hire extra staff to help collect data.
The census is the basic source of information about ownership
changes and new construction. When a property is sold the seller is
supposed to report the transaction to the municipality, so the change can
be entered in the property tax records. Often no report is made to the
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TABLE 4-4 STEPS IN ADMINISTRATION OF THE TUNISIAN PROPERTY TAX
City Responsibilities Description:
Print census forms
Enter census data
Correct data entry
Assess values
Print assessment
notices
Enter appeal requests
Print notification of
hearing dates
Change assessed values
after hearing
Print new assessment
notices
Produce tax roles
calculate tax owed
print tax roles
Enter prior data on data collection forms
Enter data from forms into computer
Review and correct the data entry
Assess properties based on census data
Enter data on assessment notices to be
distributed to property owners
Record challenges to assessed values
Notify owners about the hearing on their
appeal
Update assessed values
Tax is calcuated based on assessed values
and tax rate. Several copies of complete
tax role are required.
Recette Responsibilities
Print out first bills
Register payments:
update the account
print out receipt
Print second bills
Print third bills
Related Recette Tasks
Maintain receipt book
Maintain daily ledger
Monthly totals
List tax exemptions
Sometimes done by the tax service
In manual systems, payments entered on
recette property record cards which
are searched individually to determine
who receives second and third bills.
Bills written by hand.
Record of all payments by receipt #
Daily record of payments by type of tax
Monthly totals of payments for each tax
Produce lists of people granted extensions
for M. of Finance on property tax payments, for M. Fin.
------------------------------------------------------
Data Query Capabilities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard queries
Interactive queries
Generate routine data reports.
Access data interactively for analysis
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city, however, so the tax services must rely on ownership information
gathered in the census. New construction data also must come primarily
from the census. In some cities the building permit service does provide
information to the tax service about permits issued, however, this is the
exception rather than the rule. In any case much new construction occurs
without permits.
Property values are assessed by tax service staff; sometimes by the
census agents themselves, and sometimes by other employees. The owner is
then sent an assessment notice, with a return slip which on which he must
indicate either his acceptance of the assessment, or his intention to
appeal it. The extent of control over the estimates varies from city to
city. Under the best of circumstances, one set of tax service agents
estimates the values, and another set reviews them to make sure they are
reasonable before the notices are sent out. Under the worst of
circumstances, the census agent estimates a value, fills out the
assessment notice, gives it to the owner, and obtains the signed return
slip from him all in one visit; clearly this provides an excellent
opportunity for census agents to accept bribes.
The proportion of property owners appealing their assessments ranges
from 10% or 15% to as high as 50% or 60%. The reasons for appeal are
usually of two types. Some owners claim that some data were wrong, e.g.
that property is actually owner-occupied, not rented, and therefore
should have a lower base, or that it is in fact an uninhabitable ruin and
therefore should not be taxed as a residential property. More often, the
owners appeal on the grounds of poverty. In the former case, a census
agent can go back and verify the claim. In the latter case, tax service
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employees in all the cities studied indicated that basically everyone who
appeals gets a modest reduction in assessed value, on the order of 10% or
20%. The appeals hearings go on for two or three months, several
afternoons and evenings a week. Appeals are heard by a municipal
Commission de Revision, and must be attended by the head of the tax
service, the secretary general, and several city council members. This
is therefore a quite time-consuming process which leads to rather
predictable results; finding a way to decrease the number of appeals
would therefore be desirable.
Once the appeals process is completed, the tax service officials
must produce two tax roles, one of which is the master list of assessed
values, and the other of which is used by the recette to issue the tax
bills. The roles are sent to the governorate or the Ministry of Interior
for approval, depending on the size of the city. Once they are approved,
the municipal responsibilities for property tax administration are
completed.
The municipal property tax administration involves massive amounts
of manual processing which create serious time delays in most cities.
The assessment notices, second notices after appeals, and tax roles are
all written out by hand, a process which not surprisingly takes a long
time and is prone to error. At least in theory the mayor or his
designate must sign all of the notices by hand; some cities choose to
ignore this requirement, but some still conform to it. The notices are
usually hand delivered by tax service staff, since most cities feel that
the post office is not equipped to handle the task reliably. All of
these procedures may have been feasible when the cities were small, but
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with the rapid urban growth which has occurred in the past decade they
have become serious bottlenecks and led some cities to fall years behind
in the administration of the property tax.
Property tax billing and collection is the responsibility of the
receveur municipal and the recette staff. Based on the tax roles, they
produce an initial set of bills for all property owners. At least in
theory, the bills must be signed individually by the mayor, after which
they are distributed to the owners by recette staff or by mail. If an
owner is unable to pay, he may request the receveur to defer his payment
until the end of the year. By law the owners have ten days to pay, after
which they will receive a registered letter billing them for the tax owed
plus a fee for the registered mail. There is a fifteen day limit on
payment of the second bill, after which they will receive an order to pay
with includes in addition to the registered letter fee a five percent
surcharge for late payment. The orders are distributed by special
porters who are paid a flat fee plus a percentage of the revenues which
they collect. Three days after issuance of the order, the recette staff
are required by law to send out notifications that they will seize the
property. In the case of rental properties the renter is then required
to pay the tax, on the assumption that he will deduct it from the rent.
For owner occupied properties the receveur is to sell the property, take
the back taxes, and turn the remainder of the proceeds back over to the
owner.
The reality, of course, is somewhat different from what is required
by law; automation may change this, but no city has yet implemented the
automation of the recette. The first bills are sent out after approval
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of the tax roles, but the time deadlines for distribution of second and
third bills are never met. The recettes maintain manual card files for
each property owner, on which they record the tax owed, and each payment
made. Ten days after the first bills go out they begin going through
these cards to determine who should receive second bills, which are then
written out by hand. This process takes two to three months in most
cities. Once the second bills are out, they begin again for the payment
orders. They almost never seize properties to collect the unpaid taxes,
so there is no real way to enforce payment. There is a five-year statute
of limitations on back taxes after which they no longer bother to
maintain the information about non-payment.
Tax recovery is very low. Table 4-5 provides information on
recovery rates for the six cities in this study for the years 1979-86
(where available). The tax payment data for each year reflect the amount
of money collected in that year, not the amount paid against that year's
taxes. Consequently, if the first bills were sent out late, the recovery
rate appears very low; however the actual amount collected for that year
could actually be higher. Recovery rates also fluctuate widely depending
on when the census was conducted, whether the city does complementary
censuses, and whether they census the same portion of the city's parcels
each year or divide the city into three unequally sized zones. Rarely
does tax recovery exceed 50%, however, and more often it is around 40%.
These data tell us little about the impact of automation on tax recovery,
because most of the automated systems have not been in place long enough
to have had an effect by 1986.
The division of responsibility between the municipality and the
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TABLE 4-5: RECOVERY RATES FOR THE TUNISIAN PROPERTY TAX, 1979-1986
Blanks indicate that data were not available.
SFAX
Tax owed
Total receipts
Rate of recovery
KAIROUAN
Tax owed
Total receipts
Rate of recovery
RADES
Tax owed
Total receipts
Rate of recovery
SOUSSE
Tax owed
Total receipts
Rate of recovery
TUNIS
Tax owed
Total receipts
Rate of recovery
(1) Only includes
ARIANA
Tax owed
Total receipts
Rate of recovery
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
739,989 754,315 856,964 933,386 1,244,836 1,404,285 1,127,082 1,441,468
359,023 358,597 404,596 494,932 600,890 708,297 670,929 767,248
48.52% 47.54% 47.21% 53.03% 48.27% 50.44% 59.53% 53.23%
11...............................................
57,041 57,041 57,041 82,828 82,828 185,901 185,901
18,225 20,587 16,863 40,049 58,760 95,648
31.95% 36.09% 20.36% 48.35% 31.61% 51.45%
II............................. ........ o---------- o-------------
11
184,058 184,058 184,058 236,765
35,310 50,319 59,868 104,479 136,788 114,615 108,619
56.76% 74.32% 62.27% 45.88%
-----------o------------ o - ------- o---------------------- o--------
357,876 375,069 402,419 534,669 650,644 677,853 851,436 900,494
158,617 168,141 226,272 217,562 270,060 291,630 323,283 386,647
44.32% 44.83% 56.23% 40.69% 41.51% 43.02% 37.97% 42.94%
--------------------------------------------------- o-------------
113,180,912 3,485,899 3,757,002 3,887,252 5,084,174 5,782,715 6,046,410 3,339,489 (1)
112,465,097 2,023,976 2,228,517 2,578,026 2,365,784 3,043,936 2,745,473 3,567,324
|| 77.50% 58.06% 59.32% 66.32% 46.53% 52.64% 45.41% 106.82%
values for sectors one and two of Tunis. (Sector 3 is the largest.)
|| 215,666 405,419 367,501 468,718 843,586 1,092,654 1,038,689
|| 109,023 110,210 222,233 230,886 305,937 328,202 714,755
| 50.55% 27.18% 60.47% 27.37% 28.00% 31.60%
---- --- --- --- -.. ---- --- --... -----... ---- ----... ---- --- --
SOURCES:
Tax owed - values calculated by staff of the recettes municipales from data in the tax roles.
Total receipts - Chapter I Article I of the Comptes Financier or 13eme Bordereau de ComptabiLite,
reports submitted by the receveur municipal to the Direction Generale de la Comptabltite Publique.
Rate of recovery - Total receipts divided by tax owed.
NOTE: These data do not differentiate between payments of back taxes and current taxes. The
figures for total receipts include both. The rates of recovery, therefore, while useful for
purposes of comparing across cities or over time, should not be taken as accurate indications
of current tax collection.
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recette is an important cause of the low tax recovery. From the
municipal perspective, this tax is the most important source of revenue
over which they have any control. However, the recette has little
incentive to invest much time or effort in the property tax, because
their evaluation in the Ministry of Finance will be based on their
performance on tasks which affect that ministry rather than the Ministry
of Interior. Consequently, it is in the municipal interests to send
their own staff to help the recette with the property tax. The municipal
tax services usually produce the first bills, and where property tax
automation efforts include the recette, it is always at municipal
expense. This option is limited, however. Since the receveur is
ultimately responsible for property tax collection, he cannot actually
allow the municipality to take over control of the task, but can only
allow them to help out with some of the larger manual operations.
Potential for Automation
The property tax provides a rich case for looking at how a wide
range of kinds of computer uses could be introduced based on a single
application. At the simplest level, computers could handle all of the
time consuming tasks which now cause major bottlenecks; printing
assessment notices, tax roles, and tax bills, as well as searching
through payment records to identify those who should receive follow-up
bills. They could also make it possible to standardize and improve the
accuracy of the base data, and avoid the errors which occur with manual
records.
At a somewhat more sophisticated level, automated models could
replace structured decisions like property assessments, which would
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improve the uniformity of the tax. This would, however, raise a
difficult set of political problems, as the burden of the tax shifted
from the current incidence patterns. Automated assessments may therefore
be expected to generate opposition from wealthy people who live in
valuable residences and will consider themselves at risk in any change in
tax administration practices.
Information systems could also provide the information to address
unstructured tax management problems like designing effective enforcement
strategies, or developing a way to reduce the time spent on the appeals
process. The data in a property tax system may also be useful elsewhere
in the city, in areas such as improving the control over building
construction, managing the administrative authorizations, observing urban
growth or housing trends over time, and so on. By taking advantage of
technology which will permit transactions processing, structured
decision-making, and flexible access to the data to address unstructured
management or policy questions, cities could address their overwhelming
efficiency problems at once, while making it possible to begin work on
the less structured management and policy questions as soon as they are
ready to work on them.
USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN TUNISIAN MUNICIPALITIES
Centre National de l'Informatique
The national government plays several roles in municipal automation.
Most of its impact is through the Centre National de l'Informatique
(CNI), a public agency created to provide information systems support to
the national government. When initially created CNI was viewed as
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analogous to a "national DP department" which would provide mainframe
time sharing, systems analysis and programming, and other basic computer
services to the ministries. They worked on a contract basis, and were
expected to cover their own costs through the fees charged for their
services. They have provided a wide range of services on this basis,
although by the 1980s the level of computer use in many ministries had
grown so much that they decided to develop their own DP departments
instead of relying on CNI.
CNI has several key roles in the area of municipal automation.
First, and perhaps foremost, CNI authorization is required in order to
purchase most computer hardware except for modest upgrades to existing
systems and single microcomputers. In order to receive that
authorization the municipality must develop an information systems plan
which sets out what it expects to automate, and what kinds of hardware
and software will be required. This requirement forces the cities to
take a planned, structured approach to automation, rather than purchasing
hardware without knowing what they will do with it.
CNI staff have prepared these IS plans for several cities, including
three of the case study cities. Because they must eventually receive
CNI's approval, city leaders are inclined to contract with CNI for IS
plans, since this essentially guarantees approval of the plan and the
hardware purchases. Some cities have also contracted with CNI for
systems development for the property tax and other applications. The CNI
staff who develop both IS plans and automated systems are trained in
systems analysis and programming rather than IS strategy or management.
Their focus therefore tends to be on technical rather than organizational
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issues. Although in some cases they have looked carefully at the
experiences of both European and Arab countries in developing
recommendations for Tunisian cities--CNI officials took a group of Sfax
officials to France and Saudi Arabia to look at municipal automation and
Arabic software--they have looked abroad only for technical information,
not for guidance in IS strategy or objectives.
CNI's regulatory authority over municipal automation has also taken
other forms. In 1983 the Ministry of Interior formed a special
commission to investigate the possibility of standardization in municipal
hardware and software. The members came from CNI, the Ministry, and
SIGMA, a private systems development firm that worked for the city of
Ariana (discussed in Chapter 5). Two major results emerged from the
commission's work. One was an unsuccessful attempt to induce mid-sized
cities to purchase the same hardware as each other, and a requirement
that their systems had to be capable of working in Arabic. At the time
of the commission Sfax and Ariana, both in this size class, were in the
process of choosing hardware. Ariana was asked to defer its decision
until Sfax was ready to make a choice, and was eventually required by CNI
to purchase a specific minicomputer because of its Arabic capability.
However Sfax did not buy the same system, and the attempt at coordination
failed.
The other, more influential, outcome of the commission was the
initiation of a CNI project to develop PC-based software packages for
standard municipal government operations. These packages are designed to
meet the needs of cities with populations under about 50,000, which
account for more than 90% of Tunisian municipalities. They began with
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the property tax, which was implemented in the town of Rades in 1986, and
are currently doing the pilot implementation of a payroll application.
The packages are written in BASIC, and are designed for cities small
enough to be using a single XT for all of their municipal operations.
Eventually CNI programmers expect to link related applications, so that
data will flow directly from a building permit program into the property
tax program, and from the property tax system into the budget system.
This is down the road a few years, however.
CNI has recently joined forces with the Ministry of Interior to
market these packages to municipal governments. The two agencies worked
together to prepare a schedule of applications for development, and to
target which cities were likely to be interested in which applications
(on the assumption that the smallest cities would want only a subset of
the packages). CNI is to move ahead on the programming, while the
ministry invites small groups of city officials to Tunis for introductory
presentations of the software and hands-on experimentation with
microcomputers. The ministry is working to smooth the way for the cities
to purchase XTs, ensuring that they receive the budgetary and foreign
exchange authorizations required without delay. There is talk of bulk
hardware purchases, and seeking permission to purchase PCs without
tariffs, although this has not yet happened. These kind of strategies
will provide a fairly easy route for small cities to move into computer
use, even if they do not have any experience with the technology.
CNI also offers short training courses on information systems
issues. CNI's courses, which last a week or two, are on programming
languages, PC software, or general introductions to organizational uses
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of information systems. Such courses are readily available from other
organizations, including the Centre Bourguiba du MicroInformatique, a
public agency training people to work on micros, and various private
schools.
Service Bureaus
Several service bureaus and time sharing operations are providing
municipal governments with access to data processing. The first group to
offer access to its mainframes was the Institut National des Statistiques
(INS), a public agency which began providing programming and data
processing in the 1960s when it needed to cover the cost of excess
capacity on its computer. Since the creation of CNI, INS has largely
moved out of this business, although they still do the data processing
for Tunis's property taxes. CNI offers a variety of time-sharing
services, including custom software development on its hardware, and use
of standard programs such as INSAF, a personnel management system used by
Tunis as well as by many national ministries.
The most important service used by municipal governments is provided
by Informatique et Gestion (I&G), a private firm which has specialized in
meeting the data processing needs of small cities. Using their own
hardware and software, they handle the major manual processing tasks
involved in administering the property tax: producing assessment notices,
tax roles, and bills. They also do some custom programming on contract
to individual city governments. I&G claims that they are providing data
processing to some sixty or seventy cities; CNI officials put that number
at closer to thirty or forty. Either way, this firm has been the major
route through which small cities have made use of computers. The
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introduction of the CNI software may change the picture somewhat, but
this remains to be seen.
IS Planning and Development Firms
A number of private firms offer information systems planning and
development services on a consultant basis. Some firms, such as
Burroughs and the International Computer Company, market both hardware
and custom software development as a package; others, such as SIGMA, do
planning and software development, working on the machines of its
clients. The programmers working for these firms have been trained in
programming and systems analysis, usually in Tunisia, although sometimes
in France. Virtually all of these firms are based in Tunis, although
some limited computer services may be purchased in secondary cities such
as Sousse and Sfax.
Private firms working on contract to municipal governments face a
different set of regulations from public contractors like CNI. The
private firms contract at a fixed fee for the completion of a specified
task. If the task runs over the expected time--whether through the
actions of the consultant or the client--the consultant is still
obligated to complete the task without additional payment. By contrast
when CNI takes on a project, the contract is for a set number of person-
months, rather than for a product. If the project runs over the
anticipated time the city must continue paying by the month if they want
the project completed. This policy is part of a general Tunisian
encouragement of public rather than private sector enterprise, and makes
some private firms wary of competing with CNI for municipal automation
projects.
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Purchasing Computer Hardware
Computer hardware and software are available from a variety of
private sources in Tunis. At least a dozen vendors sell PC hardware and
software in Tunis, carrying equipment from IBM, Apple, Olivetti, NEC,
Sharp, Victor, and other manufacturers. They provide standard services
to their customers including service contracts, repairs, some software
support, and so on. A number of computer manufacturers have offices in
Tunisia, including IBM, Honeywell-Bull, Burroughs, and NCR. Almost all
of these vendors are based in Tunis, which creates some problems for
cities far from the capital.
The prices of computer hardware in Tunisia are significantly higher
than in the West. A single-user PC system, including an IBM PC-XT with a
20-megabyte hard disk and a dot-matrix printer costs about $7,000. With
a clone instead of IBM equipment, it would cost about $4,000. By
comparison, an IBM clone system in this configuration would be available
for under $1,500 in the United States. The same system with an AT
instead of an XT would cost $8,000-10,000 for IBM equipment, and $6,000
for clones in Tunisia, as compared with $2,000 for a clone in the United
States. A minimum configuration IBM-compatible PC with two floppy disk
drives and 256K of RAM costs about $2,500. A 10-megabyte hard disk costs
about $1,250, and a 20-megabyte hard disk runs to $1,875, whereas in the
United States 20-megabyte hard disks are advertised at under $300, and
10-megabyte disks are no longer even sold. Networking hardware is
estimated by one of the major PC vendors in Tunis to cost about $1,500
per workstation, including cards, cables, and labor; comparable systems
in the United States might run $400-800 per workstation. Software prices
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are also higher in Tunisia than in the United States. Lotus 1-2-3 sells
for about $800, and dBase III for $1,500, as compared with under $400 for
either of them in the United States.
The differences between Tunisian and Western prices for computer
equipment may be attributed both to tariffs and other government
regulation, and to the limited demand which makes it difficult for
vendors to place bulk orders. There is a 25% import duty on computer
equipment, and a 75% duty on telecommunications equipment, which includes
modems, network cables, and other communications lines. These
regulations are justified on the grounds that these are luxury goods.
Other government restrictions include the foreign exchange authorizations
required of computer vendors before they can import computer equipment.
The authorization process can create major time delays, as orders are
held up pending receipt of the foreign exchange with which to pay for
them. In addition, because the Tunisian market is fairly small and a
wide range of hardware options are available, no one product is bought in
large enough quantities to permit significant bulk discounts.
Training
The training of computer professionals in Tunisia is concentrated in
two areas, applications programming and systems programming. Eighty five
percent of the students in the field are in applications programming.
Their course of study can last for two, four, or six years. The two-year
degree trains them as programmers. The four-year degree covers
programming and systems analysis, while the six-year degree gives them
the title "engineer" and qualifies them to take more responsibility for
managing a computer center.
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The course of study is entirely technical, with no general
consideration of information systems strategy or management. The history
and development of Western experiences with changing information
technologies, therefore, is not addressed at all in this training. In
1987-88 for the first time the curriculum will include the use of
database management packages and fourth generation languages; this may
improve understanding of technical aspects of Western experiences,
although not of the management and organizational issues involved.
Information systems training is available from the national
universities in Tunis, Sfax, and elsewhere, and from a number of private
schools. The universities offer the best, and most prestigious
education; private schools are more expensive, and are generally attended
by students who are not accepted in the university. Even in the best
schools, however, resource constraints are a problem; students typically
do not have adequate access to computers, so although they write programs
they often are unable to run them. A small number of Tunisians have
pursued similar courses of study in France; they are among the best
qualified and most highly paid computer professionals in Tunisia.
Although their training is still strictly technical rather than
managerial, they do have more exposure to use of current technologies
than their counterparts in the Tunisian universities.
CONCLUSIONS
Several issues emerging from this discussion will be important
themes in the cases. First, the structure of municipal government--
particularly the division of responsibilities between the city and the
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recette, and the important role played by regional and national
authorities--will be important determinants of the kinds of automation
projects the cities undertake, and their effectiveness. Second, the
description of the property tax gives us a framework in which to evaluate
and compare the applications developed in the six cities, as well as the
services offered by the service bureaus, and to observe the objectives of
the Tunisian cities in introducing computers. Third, CNI is of some
interest as a model for other countries; the cases will provide further
insights into how such an agency can effectively promote and support
computer use in local governments.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE DESCRIPTIONS
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the use of computers in the six case study
cities. Each city's experiences are described as a history, following
similar case structures insofar as possible in order to highlight
parallels across the cities. Because the six cities have followed quite
different paths, however, keeping the structure similar is not always
possible. To facilitate comparisons among the cases, the summary chart
and time line in Chapter 6 (Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1, pp. 242-244) may be
useful in showing the development of information systems use in each of
the six cities.
The order in which the cities are described reflects, for the most
part, the order in which they implemented (or are likely to implement)
in-house automation of the property tax. The case order is also intended
to suggest the development of approaches to automation as they have
changed from city to city. Thus Sousse is first, because the city
introduced the simplest automated system in 1978. Kairouan follows,
because the property tax system set up there was quite simple, and was
the next implemented. The Kairouan system formed part of the basis on
which the Rades system was designed; Rades therefore is discussed third.
Sfax, whose system is larger and more complex than Kairouan or Rades
comes fourth. Ariana and Tunis, whose integrated systems are more
elaborate than any of the previous ones, and are still under development,
are treated fifth and sixth, respectively.
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The research for these cases was carried out between February and
May 1987. The field work involved a series of structured interviews
conducted with officials in the six cities, and in the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, CNI, the National Statistics
Institute, and other national, regional, and private organizations.1 The
city interviews covered the history of automation in the city, the
objectives of automation, what hardware and software each city has, how
the property tax application works, and the roles of different actors in
the city. In all of the cities, interviews were conducted with the
secretary general, the DP director, the head of the tax service, and the
receveur (tax collection official)2 . Additional people interviewed
depended on the size and structure of the city, but they typically
included assistants to the secretary general, programmers, clerks in the
tax service and the recette, and finance service staff. The interviews
in the national, regional, and private organizations were used to develop
background information about Tunisian municipal structure, property
taxation, and automation. They also provided details about strategic
planning, software, and data processing services offered by outside
vendors.
The focus of the interviews shifted somewhat over the course of the
field work. This is unavoidable in this kind of research, where
interviews serve both to define the important issues and to find out how
they were addressed. The initial interviews must be used to fill in
background information, and develop a clearer sense of the issues. It
1 Appendix A provides a list of all the people interviewed.
2 Except Sousse, where the receveur refused to cooperate.
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was important, therefore, to begin by identifying respondents willing to
put up with some ambiguity on the part of the researcher, and prepared to
help sort out the issues. This role was played by specific individuals
in USAID, the District of Tunis, CNI, and particularly the city of Tunis.
With the background provided by these people--individuals to whom it was
possible to return with further questions as needed--the interviews in
the other five cities could be conducted with a better sense of which
questions would be most important. Nevertheless, the interview questions
varied from city to city, depending on the strategy followed by the city,
and the issues of importance in each place. The strength of this
methodology is in the richness and clarity of understanding that can be
gained by examining cases in depth.
On the other hand, ensuring the reliability of the data collected
through such a research process is clearly a matter for concern. While
it is not possible to be completely sure of the validity of interview
data, and each person interviewed will obviously give his or her own
perspective, a few steps were taken to deal with the subjectivity of the
responses. Wherever possible the same questions were asked of several
different people, so that it would be possible to compare responses. For
example, in each city the same questions about the property tax software
development process would be asked of the DP staff, the tax service
staff, the receveur, and the secretary general, in order to see whether
the responses were the same. When responses differed the question would
be addressed to more people. Frequently the differences are related to
the position of the interviewee in the organization; for example, tax
service staff almost always felt they were not involved in systems
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development, whereas DP staff always thought that tax service staff were
involved. In evaluating the comments of each interviewee, it is also
necessary to form an impression of the reliability and understanding of
the respondent, based both on direct observation and on what other
interviewees said about the person. Therefore despite the fact that it
is not possible to present entirely objective data in this kind of
research, we have been able to strengthen the reliability of our
interpretations by cross-checking information and asking many people the
same questions.
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CASE 1: SOUSSE
Sousse is a city of about 80,000 people about 100 miles south of
Tunis along the Mediterranean coast. The city is a tourist center
because of its medina and beaches, and a major port. The city introduced
computers much earlier than most municipalities, and has therefore had
the opportunity to go through several different stages of development in
its information systems use.
Initiating Automation: The Tape-Driven Machine
Automation was first introduced in Sousse in 1977, with the purchase
of a tape-driven accounting machine which handled payroll and property
tax roles and bills. This was done at the initiative of the secretary
general at the time, who was interested in automation as a way to improve
routine operations of the municipal administration.3 The city bought a
Burroughs machine, and contracted with Burroughs for the development of
software to carry out the two applications. Burroughs also provided
ongoing hardware and software support in their office in Tunis.
The city used this system until 1982, by which time the volume of
property tax records had risen beyond the capacity of the machine, and it
was breaking down with alarming frequency. The tax service was dependent
on the system, and had to make frequent trips to the Burroughs office in
Tunis for repairs. The secretary general from 1980 to 1983 was not
particularly interested in automation, however, so for several years
nothing was done about the system. By 1983 the city was a year and a
3 The secretary general responsible for the initiation of automation
in Sousse, Mohammad Saad, is the same person who in a later job with
the Ministry of Interior pushed for the USAID project to develop the
property tax application used in Kairouan. See Kairouan case.
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half behind on property tax because of machine failure. That is, on the
annual cycle of carrying out the census and sending out bills, they were
still dealing with the bills from two years before, instead of the
current ones.
Upgrading the System: The Microcomputer
By 1982 something clearly had to be done. The city decided to buy
their own microcomputer, in order to resolve the problems which had
arisen with the mechanical machine and move further into automation.
Their interest in upgrading was in developing transactions processing
systems, not in using to make information available to support management
or decision-making. In 1983 they bought an 8-bit SANCO machine with two
disk drives and 64K RAM. They purchased a SANCO because it was cheap,
and was readily available on the Tunisian market. With it they bought a
BASIC compiler, since they expected to use BASIC for all software
development. The machine was kept in the DP department office. City
leaders were unaware of the existence of PC-based packages which they
could have used on more standard brands of microcomputers to develop
their software--as they still were when this research was conducted in
1987.
This time they decided to develop their own staff to do the
programming, because going up to Tunis every time they needed software
support was inconvenient. In 1982 the head of the Administrative and
Financial Service, Mr. Ben Hamimi, asked a programmer who had been
trained in Germany on an exchange program supported by the city of
Sousse, Mr. Kamoun, if he would consider coming to work for the city.
Kamoun was then at CNI, and an arrangement was made to send him to the
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city on detail as a programmer/analyst. Shortly afterwards Ben Hamimi
became the secretary general, so the city had two people in key positions
who were interested in and committed to automation. After two years
Kamoun left CNI entirely and became a the DP director for Sousse.
City officials wanted Kamoun to develop an application for the
property tax which could be implemented on their micro as quickly as
possible. They sent him to a 2-week training course in BASIC, and then
assigned him to write the tax application. Because they were so far
behind in the tax billing and collection, they were more concerned with
getting something up and running quickly than they were about taking more
time to design a more complete system. Development of the software and
initial data entry took about six months. By the start of 1984 the city
was ready to send out assessment notices for the censuses of 1982-84.
Property Tax Description: The Microcomputer System
The program that Kamoun wrote is menu driven, and allows the user to
carry out only a limited set of routine functions. One can enter or edit
ownership or address information about a given parcel, and print
assessment notices, tax roles, and first bills. The tax rate is
determined by the program based on age of the parcel and whether there
was a building permit, and is then used to calculate tax owed based on
assessed value. Assessed values are estimated manually, and the parcel
descriptions are not automated.
Given the time constraints under which it was written, it is not
surprising that this system is somewhat limited in scope. Although it
handles the major manual processing tasks in the municipal part of the
process, it leaves out many important things. It also has some annoying
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errors which result from the inexperience of the its designer and the
haste with which it was developed. It does not estimate property values,
and cannot be used to print the census data collection forms. When
printing out tax roles, if the printer jams or the machine crashes in the
middle of a job (one section of the tax role) one must begin over again
from the start, because it loses the cumulative totals to be printed at
the end of each page. The DP director and other city staff are well
aware of the desirability of correcting this, but for the time being they
are willing to put up with it.
Perhaps more importantly, this system does not cover any of the
responsibilities of the recette except for printing the first round of
bills, and consequently cannot have a major impact on tax recovery.
Initially the collection process was omitted at the preference of the
receveur, who was afraid of losing control over his own responsibilities
(and perhaps data) if his tasks were automated in this system. Since he
is not part of the municipality, the city could not compel him to
cooperate with the project. However, at present the head of the tax
service and the DP director regret this omission, and are anxious to
correct it.
In order to carry out any operation the user must know the
identifying number of the parcel in question. The numbers are sequential
along the street, so if the owner inquiring about his property does not
know his number, it is necessary to search through an alphabetical list
of streets until the parcel is identified. In order to permit the
inclusion of new buildings or subdivisions and still keep the number
sequential, the identifiers change each year rather than being unique to
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a parcel permanently. Consequently, the data structure does not permit
the DP or tax service staff to trace a single parcel over time. Should
the city become interested in using these data to assess city growth or
development over several years, this will be a very serious limitation.
This program also does not permit any access to the data other than
the menu-driven data entry, updating and printing operations. The city
does not have any statistical software or other analysis tools, so the
only way to use the data would be to write special programs to retrieve
information from the base file and perform the desired analyses. While
the DP director indicated that he would write such programs if the mayor
or secretary general asked him to, he did not anticipate that anyone
would ask. If anyone else were interested in using the data, the
secretary general or mayor would have to authorize their use of it, and
request the DP director to write programs to perform any analyses for
them.
The system is used by one clerk in the tax service. Working with
the menu-driven program, she enters and edits new data, looks up
individual records when people come in with questions, etc. She handles
the annual printing of assessment notices, tax roles and bills, each job
taking about two weeks. She was hired by the city in 1978 to work on the
mechanical system, for which she had had formal training before she came
to the city. She was trained on the job to use the microcomputer
program, but the training required was minimal. She does not consider
this training to be transferable elsewhere, since it pertains only to
using a specific program, not to more general computer issues. Although
she would be interested in learning more about computers, she does not
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feel that her experience so far will lead to any broader options in the
field.
This system has significantly reduced the time required for routine
processing. From being a year and a half behind in 1984, the city is now
able to go through the census, assessment, and tax role process in the
appropriate year. The limited scope of their system suggests that they
could be substantially more efficient still, but on the municipal side of
the process they do seem to have resolved the worst of their problems.
This system does not resolve the time delays on the recette side, and
recette staff do not use it to record payments or produce follow-up
bills, so the tax collection process is still as inefficient as before.
The system has not had a discernible impact on tax recovery. Data
on property tax revenues relative to the amount owed from 1978 through
1986 show that the collection rate stabilized somewhat relative to the
earlier fluctuations after the microcomputer was introduced in 1983, but
did not increase (see Table 4-5). It is important to remember, however,
that these data reflect tax collected during the given year, not payments
attributed to that year's taxes; thus the collections in a given year are
often for previous years' taxes, especially when the bills are sent out
late. The stabilization may therefore be due simply to getting the bills
out every year at the same time, rather than being as far behind schedule
as the city was before they introduced each of the automated systems.
Moreover, since the recette is not covered by the system, it is not
surprising that tax recovery has not increased.
Upgrading the System: The Multi-User Micro
By 1985, the city was interested in broadening their automation
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efforts. They exchanged the PC for a SANCO 7400 multi-user micro. They
were able to this without CNI approval, and therefore without preparing
an information systems plan, because the purchase was put through as a
series of upgrades to the existing system, none of which exceeded the
amount for which approval was needed. The new system is an 8-bit machine
with three terminals, 256K RAM, and 40 megabytes of storage on two hard
disks. It cost about $17,200, plus 10% annually for hardware
maintenance. The three terminals are kept in the tax service, the
personnel office, and the DP department.
The SANCO micros are a product of a Sanyo subsidiary in France. The
operating system, BRI-DOS, is a proprietary system for which the company
has developed some software, but which cannot run standard DOS-based PC
packages. The city has set up this system with dumb terminals, but it
could also be set up with PCs emulating terminals, to be able to run
micro-based analysis packages as well as the BASIC applications software
developed for the property tax. According to the system's vendor in
Tunis, it is also possible to network PCs to the SANCO multi-user micros,
and use the SANCO as a file server, with its operating system controlling
the multi-user access to data; however Sousse officials are uninterested
in (and apparently unaware of) this possibility.
Because it does not support most commercial software packages, this
choice of hardware will make it somewhat difficult to shift into use of
data for decision support, if the city should become interested in this
in the future. Data could be accessed by using PCs and modems instead of
terminals and setting up software to download data from the SANCOs, or by
using the SANCO as a file server on a network. Since the data are stored
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in a format understood by the transactions processing applications but
not the PC packages, they would still have to have two copies of the
data, one for the applications themselves, and the other for the PC
software.
City officials seem to be unaware of the limitations of this system.
In part this is because at present they are not interested in accessing
or analyzing their own data. In addition, they are unaware of the
existence of PC packages. Neither the secretary general nor the DP
director knew of the existence of Lotus 123, for example. When it was
described to them they immediately saw how useful it could be for
developing a budget application if it ran on their system. Similarly,
they are unaware of other standard PC packages, and assume that data
analysis would require custom programming by the DP director to carry out
each inquiry. This suggests that they are making hardware and software
decisions based on incomplete information about the relevant
opportunities.
The city shifted the old property tax software over to the new
system, without changing it. Since it was designed for a single-user
machine, it cannot be used by more than one person at a time because of
the potential for conflicts over write access to files. Because the
current property tax application does not automate the recette portion of
the property tax administration, this limitation does not pose serious
problems; however city officials are adamant that any future property tax
system must be designed to run on a multi-user machine so that the tax
service and the recette can access the data simultaneously.
The city also contracted with the SANCO vendor for development of an
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application in BASIC to manage the city's rolling stock. The intention
was to place two terminals in the city warehouse, and connect them to
city hall via modem. The city has run into problems getting the modems,
however, so this has not yet happened.
Information Systems Planning
By 1986 the city wanted to purchase another multi-user system, so
that they could further expand their automation efforts. For this they
had to have CNI approval, and therefore had to prepare an information
systems plan. They contracted with the regional office of CNI in Sousse
for the services of a consultant who spent about four months in the city
drawing up a plan. He worked out of the DP department, but was
essentially on his own.
The other city managers were not involved in the planning process,
and had little or no input into the plans made or priority given to
automating their departments. Ben Hamimi said of them that they all want
their departments to be automated, and in any case they have no choice in
the matter; they are told what will happen, not asked. At times some
staff have been concerned about losing their jobs to the computer. This
apparently has not been a problem, however, partly because the city is
committed to not fire anyone, and partly because most departments have
work which has gone undone to which people can be shifted if their jobs
are automated.
The plan describes the major applications which could usefully be
automated; these include property tax (improving the existing system),
building permits, electoral roles, etat civil, inventory and rolling
stock, management of city owned properties, personnel, and finances. For
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each application the plan diagrams the steps involved and estimates the
volume of data to be stored, entered, or printed annually.
It then estimates the cost of two development scenarios. The high
cost option assumes that the city will develop custom software for all of
the applications. The lower cost scenario, which is the one recommended,
assumes that the city will use software packages and put off automating
the 6tat civil, the records of births, deaths, and other personal events.
Because the 4tat civil requires by far the most space, must be written in
Arabic rather than French, and is extremely sensitive to errors, putting
it off significantly reduces the cost of the entire automation effort.
In suggesting the use of packages instead of custom software, the
plan implies--though this is never stated explicitly--that the city will
purchase the PC-based software being developed by CNI for use in local
governments. However the CNI packages, although written in BASIC and
therefore recompilable on any machine, are not designed for multi-user
access. Therefore they will not meet the city's requirements for new
software, at least for the property tax, because the tax service and the
recette would still be unable to share files.
The plan was approved by CNI, and authorization given for purchase
of a second multi-user microcomputer. The city bought a second SANCO
system in 1986, this one a 16-bit machine with 51 megs of hard disk
space, 512K RAM, one high-density floppy drive, a tape drive, a 193 CPS
printer, and two terminals. This was purchased at a cost of $17,700 plus
the 10% hardware maintenance contract. It is faster than the earlier
system, and can be expanded to support more terminals, but is not
otherwise significantly different.
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Sousse officials are quite frank about having contracted for the CNI
information systems plan in order to receive authorization to purchase
more hardware, rather than because they expected to follow its
recommendations. The city is rather offhand about the whole planning
process. Kamoun claimed not even to remember the name of the CNI
consultant who spent four months working in the city, and did not know or
care which packaged software the plan was actually referring to in the
low cost development scenario. Both Ben Hamimi and Kamoun make it clear
that they do not consider themselves obliged to follow the plan's
recommendations. Moreover, they are somewhat wary about working with
CNI, apparently fearing that the national organization will try to take
control over their IS operations out of their hands.
Property Tax Description: The CNI System
Improving the property tax application was high on the priority list
of the IS plan, and in 1986 Sousse began investigating the possibility of
adapting the CNI package for use on its multi-user system. The city
wanted to buy the package and modify it themselves, but CNI would not
release the source code. After some problems, CNI did manage to compile
a version which would run on the Sousse machine, and proposed to sell the
single-user version to the city; however the city was not willing to
consider any property tax software that did not allow the recette to
enter payment information directly from a terminal in their office. In
May 1987 the city finally negotiated with CNI for them to modify the
package for multi-user access. Obviously this will cost substantially
more than the package would cost for a single-user system, or than the
CNI consultant had budgeted in the IS plan.
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The CNI system should substantially improve Sousse's property tax
operation. It is much more complete in its coverage of the municipal
portions of the tax administration process, picking up all of the major
and most of the minor omissions of the Sousse system. It also covers the
tax collection process. Since Sousse expects to run it on a multi-user
machine with a terminal in the recette, this should make it easy enough
for the recette that they will actually use the computer to determine who
has not paid and to print follow-up bills. This should save a lot of
work for the recette staff, who otherwise spend months each year going
through their card files to determine who should receive second bills,
and then writing out those bills by hand. The CNI system also has a
module which can be used to estimate assessed values. Although the IS
plan lists automated assessment as one of the objectives of an improved
property tax application, city officials have expressed no interest in
using this module. The CNI system will not improve the city's ability to
access data for analysis.
Future Automation in Sousse
After the CNI plan was completed, a city planner in the Service
Technique approached the secretary general and DP director about setting
up a land information system which would help address problems of rapid
urban growth. He had worked with microcomputers in a previous job, and
was interested in their potential to provide an information base with
which to work on illegal settlements, land use management, and other
planning problems. Kamoun and Ben Hamimi were thrilled that someone on
the staff was initiating an information systems proposal, and placed it
ahead of the budget application which had been the next slated for
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development.
They are pursuing this project in accordance with a policy which is
based on their experiences since Kamoun has been in the city. Rather
than doing systems development in-house, they have decided to contract
out for studies, systems analysis, and programming, so that Kamoun can
concentrate on managing the automation process. Since each application
is a relatively short-term undertaking, they feel they are better off
contracting with specialized firms than trying to develop the staff in-
house. The decision not to develop their own programming staff may also
result from the flaws in their property tax system, which were partly
attributable to Kamoun's inexperience as a BASIC programmer.
The Tunis-based firm doing studies for the land information system
is concentrating on three applications; the maps required for the Plan
d'Amenagement, subdivision planning, and enforcement of building permits.
They expect to link these three, and to connect them to the property tax
data base at some point in the future. Rather than carrying out their
own cadastral survey, which would be prohibitively expensive, they hope
to obtain 1985 base data from aerial photographs taken by the national
Service Topographique, and are getting price estimates for additional
specialized aerial photography to help them with the next census. They
recognize that their current hardware is inadequate for this application,
because they have no graphics screens or digitizers, and are looking into
purchasing these as well.
Summary: Automation in Sousse
Sousse's approach to automation has been characterized by
significant evolution over time in response to changing experiences and
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environment. City leaders have avoided developing a structured plan with
clearly stated objectives, and even when forced into it by CNI
requirements, they clearly do not consider themselves bound by it. The
secretary general and DP director are enthusiastic about the technology,
and seem eager to experiment with using it in new and interesting ways.
This may explain their willingness to drop the more conventional plan to
automate their finances in favor of developing a land information system,
especially when encouraged by another person excited by the potential of
less routine uses of the system. They are also resistant to outside
influence on what they do with the technology. This surfaces in their
attitude towards CNI's IS plan, and in an expressed wariness of what they
fear as attempts by CNI to take over their leadership in the city's IT
use.
This approach clearly has costs and benefits. On the one hand, the
city is more flexible in its approach to automation than other cities,
and is more interested in trying out new and unfamiliar options which
could prove very worthwhile. They are more willing to learn from their
experiences, and despite the creation of transactions processing systems
which do not lead to significant skill development, when staff come in
with ideas about automation the city is happy to encourage their
initiative. On the other hand, learning through experience can be
costly. The city has gone through three different property tax
applications in ten years, and has had to live with some significant
flaws and breakdowns in their systems.
The Sousse strategy has clearly led them to learn certain kinds of
things from their own experiences. They have come to appreciate some of
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the tradeoffs between single and multi-user systems, and have developed a
better sense of what is required from a reliable transactions processing
system. Their decision to contract out future systems development
suggests that they have come to recognize some of the limitations of the
current in-house computer skills, and the desirability of hiring people
with more technical training for certain tasks. On the other hand, they
have not been able to learn from Western experiences about the costs of
shifting from transactions processing to decision support. They do not
even know about the existence of end user computing tools on the PCs,
much less about the problems likely to arise as they develop more
interest in working with data. This may be due more to limitations in
the sources of information available to them, however, than in their
strategy for seeking help.
The objectives of automation in Sousse may be changing somewhat
because of their experiences and their relative openness. At the start,
neither Ben Hamimi nor Kamoun had any interest in the flexible access to
data which would permit decision support. In part this was certainly due
to the magnitude of the manual bottlenecks which prompted them to move
into automation in the first place. It may also be due to lack of
knowledge about PC software which could make data access much easier.
Their interest in developing a land information system suggests that
their conception of what can be done with computers may be growing as a
result of their experiences, although this will really remain to be seen
once more work is done on that system. If they are developing a broader
sense of what they may want to do with computers, they will soon begin
paying the price of their investments in SANCO hardware and BASIC
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programs, as they recognize the lack of EUC tools, and they have to
change much of their existing system to permit more flexible access to
data. Their DP staff structure will also have to change to permit this
kind of work; their openness to initiatives from city planner suggest
that they may be willing to make this kind of change.
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CASE 2: KAIROUAN
Kairouan is a town of about 70,000 people situated in an
agricultural plain about one hundred miles south of Tunis. It is a
pilgrimage town, a center of religion and learning, and a major tourist
attraction.
Initiating Automation: The USAID Project
Computers were introduced in Kairouan as the test case for a USAID
project to develop a PC-based property tax application in dBase II. This
project was initiated by people from AID, the Ministry of Interior, and
Research Triangle Institute (RTI), the North Carolina consulting firm
which developed the software. Mohammad Saad of the Ministry of Interior
was interested in automation as a tool to improve the administration of
the property tax. He had formerly been the secretary general of Sousse,
and it was at his prompting that the city had introduced its first
automated system for processing property tax data. The RTI consultants
were interested in developing a management information system using dBase
which could be adaptable to many different applications. When AID came
up with funding for the project, they combined forces to produce a
package which would handle the property tax administration process on an
XT.
The software development was done in 1983-84, in North Carolina.
Saad provided information to the consultants, which they used to design
and write the system. They did not actually work with any Tunisian tax
services on the systems analysis, so of course the end users had no
involvement at all in the design of the system. They did bring a
programmer from CNI out to North Carolina for two weeks to train him in
170
dBase and the use of micros, and to teach him about the workings of the
program so that he could provide user support.
In the fall of 1983 Saad and RTI began looking for a city in which
to implement the system, and a different city for a test run and training
session. A number of criteria went into the choice; size, interest in
the project, effectiveness of existing management, proximity to Tunis,
and so on. However, Kairouan was chosen primarily for political reasons,
because the mayor had strong contacts in the Ministry of Interior. The
system was designed for a city with no more than 10,000 parcels, and
Kairouan had about 15,000, so this choice caused some problems.
Kairouan had no in-house experience with automation prior to this
project. They had been using the services of Informatique et Gestion for
some of their property tax processing, however, and were very much
interested in moving their operations in-house. The Informatique et
Gestion services are somewhat limited and rather cumbersome. City
officials bring photocopies of all of the census data collection forms to
I&G in Tunis, for the firm to enter information about owner, parcel
address, assessed value, and tax rate into the system. After a series of
error checks I&G produces the assessment notices. After the appeals
process they produce new appeals notices, and then tax roles and first
bills. After the payment period the recette provides lists of who has
paid, which are the basis for printing second or third bills. This
process is time-consuming, because every interaction with I&G requires a
trip to Tunis to pick up or drop off forms or printouts. .Kairouan also
claimed that I&G frequently missed its deadlines for the processing,
causing the city to fall behind schedule on the census and the tax
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collection. Kairouan officials were also not completely comfortable
about turning all of their property tax information over to a private
consulting firm. I&G's services cost them about $12,500 a year, and they
expected in-house automation to save most of those costs. For all of
these reasons, they were quite eager to participate in the AID project.
A test implementation of the system was carried out in the town of
Hammam Lif in December 1984, using a single XT provided by AID. The test
involved officials from both Kairouan and Hammam Lif, as well as one CNI
programmer (although not the one who had been in North Carolina, who
subsequently left CNI for the private sector). Several issues arose in
the training session which could have implications for future automation.
First, and simplest, the trainees realized very quickly the importance of
typing skills. Second, through exercises entering data and then
performing searches to identify certain types of parcels, they came to
appreciate the importance of uniform and well-thought-out coding systems
in the ability to analyze data. Third, considerable problems arose in
obtaining parcel characteristics from property owners. For purposes of
the training session, the participants eventually entered information
about their own houses so they would have data to work with; however this
suggests that the ability to collect detailed parcel data may be a
problem in the future.
In the spring of 1985 the XT was moved from Hammam Lif to the tax
service in Kairouan, and work begun on entering the data. The initial
data entry was contracted out to I&G, since the city did not have a
typist available to handle this task. They entered back data, plus the
data collected in the 1985 census. In early 1986 these data were
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transferred onto the city's machine, and the system went into operation
for production of tax roles and bills. The director of the city's tax
service, Jemaa Troudi, is its main user.
Property Tax Description: The RTI Application
The system developed by RTI is a vast improvement over the services
of I&G, but its coverage of the tax administration process is not
complete. It automates the production of assessment notices, second
notices, tax roles, and first bills. It keeps track of payment
information, but does not produce second and third bills. It also does
not produce the initial data collection forms, which means that all
parcel information must be copied from the previous census forms to the
new ones by hand during each census, increasing the processing time and
the chance of errors. It naturally allows retrieval of individual
records, although because the database is so much larger than the system
designers expected, it is painfully slow, taking twenty minutes to locate
a specified record. It also allows use of the boolean operators in dBase
to locate all the records satisfying specified criteria. Aside from the
reports required for routine property tax administration, there are no
statistical or analytical reporting functions built into the program.
The system does not include a mass appraisal module, but it does include
files to store descriptive information about the properties. The
system's designers envisioned this as a way to facilitate and encourage
analysis of the link between property characteristics and assessed
values, as a first step towards improving the assessment process.
By the spring of 1987, Kairouan had used the system to print one set
of tax roles and generate one set of bills. The city was working out an
173
arrangement with the recette by which payment information would be
entered into the system. There is no thought of the recette staff using
the system themselves to replace any of their manual processing; the
recette is several blocks away from city hall, and the two offices do not
work together closely enough for this to be a possibility. The recette
has agreed to make a list of each day's payments for the tax service,
which Troudi will enter into the system himself. Initially this list was
written out by hand, with many errors in copying the parcel
identification numbers as a result. Troudi wants them to write the
information on carbon copies of the bills, which the tax service will
provide, but the recette staff have been reluctant to do so.
The recette does not view this as being of any use to them. The
system will not replace any of their manual records, and although it
could be used to determine who receives follow-up bills, they do not
expect to have the tax service do this for them. The issue here is one
of responsibility and control. Tax collection is under the jurisdiction
of the recette, and they are not willing to let the tax service take any
real responsibility for improving the process. The difficulty of
involving the recette in system use suggests that the impact on tax
recovery may not be significant; however it is too soon to know for sure.
In its implementation of the system so far, Kairouan has not
collected the data required for the parcel characteristics file. They
expect to do this in the 1989 census, although they do not plan to use
the data to change their assessment methodology because this would be
politically very difficult. For that census they plan to double the
number of data collection agents, and make a special effort to educate
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them as to the importance of actually collecting accurate information.
DP Support: Role of In-House Staff
The director of the tax service, Jemaa Troudi, has been the only
user of this system for most of the project's life. (In 1986 the city
hired his daughter, whom he is training to use the system.) He is a
draftsman by training, who had no prior experience with computers. His
training on the system was provided by RTI, in the training session in
Hammam Lif, and later in sessions conducted in Kairouan. The city has
not hired any DP professionals to work on the system or provide general
support. Their direct exposure to people who know much about information
technology has therefore been limited to their contacts with RTI; they
have had little opportunity to learn more about how the technology could
be used.
Moreover, Troudi's knowledge of the system is fairly limited. The
programs are in compiled dBase, and the users do not need to know
anything about dBase to use this application. This was explicitly the
intention of both Mohammad Saad and the RTI consultants, i.e. to create a
turnkey system which did not require any knowledge of microcomputers,
database management, or other broader issues. Troudi's training,
therefore, was only in the use of the property tax application itself.
He does not know any dBase--in fact, he does not even know what dBase is,
or that he is using it--nor does he know any DOS, or anything about
microcomputers in general. Nonetheless he is regarded as the computer
expert in the city, since he knows more than anyone else there.
DP Support: Outside Assistance
With the rather low level of Troudi's knowledge, finding adequate
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software and hardware support is quite important. This has not been
resolved satisfactorily. Initially, the expectation was that the city
would purchase a hardware maintenance contract on the XT, and that CNI
would provide software support. The RTI consultants investigated the
maintenance contract options, but the city decided not to purchase one,
because they would have been paying one third of the replacement cost of
the system each year, and they felt that this was too much. The apparent
reason for the high cost of a maintenance contract, given than they are
usually 10% of the purchase price in Tunisia as elsewhere, is that
Kairouan has an IBM machine, but the replacement cost would be for a
clone. The city has not officially set aside the funds for a
replacement; however Troudi claims that they have inflated their budget
item for office furniture by enough to cover the cost of a new computer
if one is needed.
CNI's role on this project has been somewhat ambiguous. Initially
they were expected to provide software support, and to disseminate the
package to other municipalities. The first programmer assigned to the
project, who was trained in North Carolina in 1983, left CNI shortly
thereafter. The second programmer assigned to it, trained at the Hammam
Lif session in 1984, was expected to put some portion of his time into
learning the software and learning to work with micros, so that he could
support this project. The project budget included funds to purchase a
share of his time from CNI for this purpose. However CNI declined to
take the funds, and the programmer never received any clear authorization
to put his time into learning the skills required to support the project.
CNI never formally stated that they did not want to be involved, however,
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so their position remained unclear. Since they then began working on
their own packages to meet the same need, it appeared that they wanted to
back out of the Kairouan project, having learned what they could from
that experience and from the software which RTI developed. Since then,
they seem to have lost touch with the project, and in 1987 claimed that
the RTI software was no longer being used in Kairouan.
The result was that Troudi does not really have anyone to turn to
when he has problems. On several occasions he contacted RTI in North
Carolina with questions, well after the project was completed as far as
the Americans were concerned. More recently he has gone to CNI with
questions, although he does not seem to view this as a sure source of
information. So far he has not had any hardware problems, so the
question of hardware support has not arisen.
Role of End Users/Professional Staff
Although Troudi has not learned how to use dBase directly, the RTI
software package does allow the users to retrieve selected information
interactively by using the boolean operators of dBase. Troudi is using
this capability extensively to provide information to other city staff
about particular types of properties, in order to improve their ability
to manage other city functions. For example, he has provided information
on commercial properties to the department handling administrative
authorizations, in order to help them improve collection of the fees on
signs, street vendors, etc.
In the process of doing this, he has developed a much better
understanding of the issues involved in coding property tax data. He has
come to recognize the need for clear coding rules for addresses, the
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purposes for which properties are used, parcel characteristics, and other
variables entered in the system. As a result of this experience he is
recoding certain variables so that he will be able to identify property
uses more clearly, distinguish between rented and owner-occupied
properties, and answer other questions about his data. Although he was
not initially interested in these aspects of the system, the fact that
the querying capability is available has set him on a path of asking
questions about what he can do with the system, and developing a better
understanding of what he can do with computers as he tries to answer his
questions.
Troudi is severely limited in his ability to use his data by the
fact that he has only been trained to use the RTI application, not to use
dBase. With dBase he could use the arithmetic functions, which are not
written into the RTI package, and perform other more complex queries. He
could probably also do some simple modifications on the RTI system, and
produce reports for other city officials based on the data. However,
neither he nor anyone else in the city has any clear idea of what dBase
is, or even that the city is using it, much less how they stand to
benefit from knowing it better. The secretary general did propose
sending Troudi for additional training so he could write other programs
for the city; however they wanted to train him in BASIC, not dBase.
Future Automation in Kairouan
The ignorance about the existing system seems to be part of a
broader attitude in Kairouan towards the future of computing in the city.
The property tax project was initiated, implemented, and paid for by
people outside of the city; AID, the Ministry of Interior, RTI. At no
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point has the city itself had to make a significant commitment either to
this project or to automation in general. Because they did not pay for
their own system, they have not had to prepare an information systems
plan, or receive CNI permission to purchase hardware.
City leaders express some interest in further automation projects,
but their plans are not well thought out. In interviews they indicated
an interest in automating the payroll, and at times spoke both of
purchasing the CNI package, and of contracting for a payroll program with
a private consulting firm. They would probably need to expand their
hardware if they had more applications running; however they have no
concrete idea of how they would do this. Instead, they intend to ask the
American embassy for further hardware support when the need arises. They
feel that with additional applications they should create a DP
department; however, rather than hiring a computer professional to
manage it, they expect Troudi to become the DP director and his staff to
be the only end users of the PC even as other departments are automated.
This seems unwise given the skill level of these people, and threatens to
create significant bottlenecks on municipal operations if automation
becomes widespread. Because of their inexperience with centralized
information systems, however, they do not perceive this to be a
significant risk.
Summary: Automation in Kairouan
This case has several interesting implications. First, while
foreign support for automation projects is not a bad thing, Kairouan's
experiences suggest that it can present problems if not implemented with
an eye to how the project relates to a broader automation effort on the
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part of the city. Although the application itself is still running, and
the users are very happy with it, the automation effort has not grown in
the way it could have after the initial project was completed. Some of
the problems are simple ones which could have been prevented had the
consultants taken a somewhat different approach. For example, the
training provided did not give city staff enough skills to expand on the
system they have, and no one was identified to provide in-country
software support. No one involved has enough experience with information
systems to see the costs of centralizing future information systems
activity in the current tax department, which is also likely to cause
difficulties for the city.
Other problems are more subtle, however. Because they were not
making the commitment involved in laying out their own funds, the city
has been able to avoid taking full responsibility for hardware
maintenance, and more broadly for their future use of computers. The
city leaders seem to have concluded from this experience that they will
be supported by the US government in whatever they decide to do next.
Generally it seems, therefore, that the foreign aid approach did not give
sufficient attention to sustainability beyond the continuance of the
individual application.
On a more positive note, this case points out clearly how the
availability of user-friendly software can stimulate interest in end user
computing and use of information to support management. Neither Jemaa
Troudi, nor the other officials to whom he is providing information, nor
the city leaders, would have described this kind of access to information
among the requirements of a property tax application. However, the
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simple availability of the tools has stimulated interest in using them,
and enabled people to learn more about what is actually involved in using
information and computers to support their work.
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CASE 3: RADES
Rades is a town of about 30,000 people in the suburbs of Tunis, a
half hour train ride from the center of the city. The town has grown
somewhat in recent years, as the capital region has expanded, but it has
still been relatively unaffected by the urbanization which has had
overwhelming impacts on other Tunis suburbs.
Initiating Automation: The CNI Packages
Rades' interest in automation began in 1981 when the current
secretary general, Ali Challouf, came to work for the city. At his
initiative the city considered two different approaches to computerizing
their operations. Like many other municipalities, they investigated the
possibility of contracting out the production of assessment notices and
tax roles to Informatique et Gestion, a service bureau in Tunis which has
specialized in providing data processing service to city governments.
When Challouf first came into office, I&G offered the only viable option.
However, in the context of the Tunisian "Year of Informatics" in 1981-82,
city officials began discussing their interests with CNI officials. When
CNI made plans to develop their PC-based packages, the city decided to
wait for CNI rather than going with Informatique et Gestion. They chose
the CNI approach because it offered the city the possibility of a
comprehensive in-house system which would eventually handle a wide range
of applications. The service bureau, by contrast, only automated the
major manual tasks on the property tax and payroll applications.
The CNI option also promised to be less expensive than
subcontracting with Informatique et Gestion. The CNI property tax
package costs $2,500, plus about $10,000 for the full hardware setup
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required to run it. I&G processing would probably have cost about
$10,000 per year; thus the initial investment required for the CNI route
would be covered in less than two years by the savings on I&G processing.
Information Systems Planning
As the test city for the CNI software, Rades was never required to
prepare an information systems plan in order to get permission to
purchase their hardware. As a result, city leaders have never explicitly
defined their objectives or prioritized the applications they wished to
develop. Challouf has expressed concern about speeding up municipal
operations and reducing the amount of manual processing. He wanted to
begin with the property tax, out of concern about low tax returns and a
lack of control over tax administration, as well as because increased
returns might overcome the city council's reluctance to incur the costs
of computing. The fact that CNI had already decided to begin with the
property tax, and that the city had no choice about their starting point,
may also have helped to do away with any doubts.
The decision to use CNI's software effectively allows CNI to decide
what the city will automate, when, and how. Until CNI has developed and
tested a full set of applications, the cities using their software cannot
decide which applications to do first. They also cannot define and work
towards their own objectives, or decide how they want their applications
to work, because they are limited to what the CNI applications will do.
This decision also means that the city is not likely to look beyond CNI
for strategic advice on information systems; this may limit their
opportunity to get a broader perspective, particularly one rooted in
Western experiences with information technology.
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Property Tax Description: The CNI Package
The property tax software was completed by the CNI programmers in
early 1986, and they set it up on an XT in the Rades tax service that
winter. The system is fairly complete, automating all of the major
manual operations of the property tax. It allows the user to print
census forms, enter or modify data, keep track of appeals, calculate the
tax owed, print roles and bills, record and monitor payments, and back up
the data. The entire system is menu driven; no tasks are left to be
performed at a command line by DP staff.
The CNI package is designed to include a model for estimating
property values based on parcel characteristics, but it has not been
fully developed. The model is basically a linear function of square
footage of the property, with additions or subtractions for various
characteristics such as neighborhood, housing type, and specific
amenities or disamenities. The coefficients for these variable would be
a political decision, i.e. one made by a municipal commission susceptible
to pressure from individual city counselors and their constituents,
rather than a reflection of the market values of actual properties. To
be implemented, such a model would have to have the approval of the
Minister of Interior, which CNI has not sought. The model's structure
would be the same for all cities, but the coefficients could be changed
by the city if they chose. Since the model is not based on local market
data about property sales or rental prices, the possibility of a uniform
model across the country is not as unreasonable as it would be if each
town were trying to predict actual market value. Rades officials say
they want to use this at some point, but certainly are not taking any
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steps in that direction.
This system does not allow any access to data other than the menu-
driven programs. The programs are written in BASIC, and although they
were supposed to include a set of routine statistical reports, most of
these have not in fact been implemented. The CNI programmers who wrote
the software did begin writing the statistical routines, but did not
complete them or include them in the package. They have now gone on to
other work, and do not expect to finish this part of the property tax
system; it is not considered important enough to warrant delaying the
development of new applications. Because the system is in BASIC, and CNI
will not release the source code, the city is not in a position to
develop such routines if they should want them. Thus this system, though
well designed for improving the efficiency of existing operations, will
not enable city officials to access, manipulate, or analyze their
property tax data in order to provide information to support management
or policy decisions.
DP Support: In-House Staff and Outside Assistance
CNI markets their software packages as turnkey systems which require
no trained information systems staff, and can be operated entirely by the
clerks already working in the city government. When the system was first
set up in Rades, a city typist began doing the entry of census data.
However city officials felt that this did not work well because she did
not know enough about what she was actually doing.
In the spring of 1986, therefore, the city hired a full-time
computer operator, Fethi Sighary, with two years training in computer
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programming after his baccalaureate.4 Their decision to hire such a
person reflects their skepticism about CNI's belief that unskilled
workers could be trained to run the packages; the city was afraid of data
losses, mistakes, and unauthorized access to the data. Sighary was
trained by Mr. Ben Zachour, the CNI programmer who wrote the package, in
use of the menu-driven programs. Since this was a pilot version, Sighary
and Ben Zachour have interacted a good bit in the implementation of the
system. The actual training, however, was quite simple, since the system
does not allow any command level use, modification of reports, or
interactive access to data. Sighary's reliance Ben Zachour for
assistance on the property tax system dropped considerably once the
software was installed and the initial data entered.
Sighary is the only person permitted to use the Rades machine. He
does all of the data entry, produces all reports, and contacts CNI or the
hardware vendor when software or hardware problems arise. In keeping
with their initial concern about many people having to learn to use the
computer, the secretary general has decided that Sighary will be the only
computer user for all the systems they set up. Thus when the payroll
application was implemented in spring of 1987 only Sighary learned to use
it.
Since the number of records and amount of data updating required for
most of these applications is quite small, this strategy has so far been
feasible in terms of Sighary's time. However, the decision to centralize
all data processing in a single individual has to cause serious problems
in the near future. As soon as several packages are running, Sighary
4 About the equivalent of an associate degree.
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will become the key person on whom several departments are dependent for
their routine operations. This strategy could make Sighary quite
powerful, and the city quite vulnerable should anything happen to him, or
should he decide to take a new job. It seems likely that once his time
has become a constraint and the city is more accustomed to automation,
they will relax this requirement, and begin training people in more end
user departments to work on the computer. In the meantime, however,
neither Sighary nor the secretary general sees this staffing strategy as
a problem; their unconcern suggests their lack of familiarity with the
bottlenecks created by centralized DP departments elsewhere. CNI
officials were concerned that only one person was being trained, but
still felt that it was not necessary for the city to hire anyone, and
that instead several clerks from each user department should learn to use
the software.
With the purchase of their software, CNI provides three years of
unlimited software support. At present Ben Zachour, the programmer
writing the packages, is the only person providing this support. He has
worked fairly closely with Sighary in setting up the system and solving
problems. After those three years are up, however, the city will not
have anyone else to turn to for help; at least at present CNI does not
plan to offer service contracts on their software after the initial three
years. Moreover, although CNI is actively marketing the software to
other cities, they have not yet developed any user support staff beyond
Ben Zachour. Since he is currently writing and implementing additional
packages, he will not be able to keep up with increased demand for user
support. This support structure is adequate at present for Rades, but
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it, too, is likely to become a bottleneck in the next few years. The
problem here lies more with CNI than with the city, though, especially if
these are really intended to be turnkey systems which do not require
specialized staff.
Implementation
The property tax system was set up using the data from the 1986
census. The data entry process caused that year's tax roles to be
produced late, so by spring 1987 they were just finishing them; this
explains the decline in tax recovery in 1986 seen in Table 4-5. The 1987
bills are to be produced on the system as soon as the city is ready.
Although the system is designed to store payment information and produce
follow-up bills, Rades officials have not yet figured out how they will
use this feature. Since there is only one PC, which is kept in the tax
service office across the town square from the recette, having both
offices access the system directly is not feasible. The city has
developed a manual form on which the recette will provide regular payment
information to the tax service for them to enter in the system. However
this has not yet been implemented, and the receveur does not anticipate
that it will replace any of his manual records. It is not yet clear
whether the system will actually be used to identify those who have not
paid and produce follow-up bills. The impact of this system on the
efficiency of the tax collection process may therefore be minimal.
Rades received its own PC in February, 1987. (Previously they had
been borrowing one from CNI.) They bought an XT clone with a 10-megabyte
hard disk and a dot matrix printer for about $9,000 from a vendor in
Tunis. They have purchased a hardware maintenance contract at a cost of
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10% of the purchase price per year. Sighary does not do anything with
hardware; if anything at all looks wrong he calls in the vendors who take
care of the problem.
In the meantime, CNI has just begun implementing their payroll
software in Rades. This will run on the same PC, since they are not yet
short on space. In the future the city anticipates increasing the hard
disk storage to 20 megabytes, but they do not expect to buy any
additional machines. As with their single-user policy, this seems likely
to become a bottleneck once their are enough applications running that
machine time is in short supply.
Summary: Automation in Rades
The Rades strategy will have mixed impacts on city operations. On
the one hand, the CNI software will make it possible for them to automate
a number of applications rather quickly, for far less money than they
would have to spend using any other strategy. For small cities
interested in improving efficiency the CNI software development project
is an excellent opportunity to move rapidly into in-house automation, and
we may expect many cities to follow Rades' example.
On the other hand, the design of the CNI applications, and the
marketing strategy being followed, looks like it will limit the impacts
of this project. CNI officials are interested in transactions
processing, and in improving the efficiency of routine operations through
an automation strategy which they feel will not require any specialized
skill development in the city. Since they are not concerned about
providing the ability to use the data to support management or decision-
making, they have no reason to develop software which permits interactive
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access to the data. They are not using database management tools which
would make such access relatively simple, and since their applications
are written in compiled BASIC there is no way for the users to extract
the data themselves for analysis purposes. Moreover, since they assume
no skills on the part of city staff, nothing would be accomplished by
releasing the source code for their applications. As a result, the
cities using the CNI software will not be able to use it as a stepping
stone to a more sophisticated use of information systems. Both
technically, and in terms of the learning possible from this system, it
is not readily expandable into a system which could be used by managers
and decision-makers as well as those responsible for day to day
operations.
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CASE 4: SFAX
Sfax is the second largest city in Tunisia, with a population of
232,000. It is an industrial port city located on the eastern coast
about 200 miles south of Tunis. Because of its size and because it is a
commercial center, the city has somewhat better information systems
resources than most cities outside of Tunis; CNI has a regional office
there, and some consulting firms are providing data processing and
systems development services. The city has a reputation as a serious
place; Tunisians consider Sfax residents to be more diligent and hard-
working than people from the rest of the country.
Initiating Automation
City officials began planning the introduction of computers in 1980,
in response to pressure from the regional office of CNI. At that time,
data processing for the payroll and other small applications was
contracted out to a local service bureau, but there was no in-house
computing. The city council was initially rather hesitant about
automation. Since CNI would prepare a feasibility study for free, they
agreed to have it done, but they did not do anything with it for over a
year. The study suggested that in-house computing would be better than
relying on a service bureau for data processing, and gave an overview of
the applications which could be automated.
In 1982 the new regional director of CNI in Sfax, Mongi Triki,
renewed pressure on the city to proceed further with automation. The
city signed a contract with CNI for the development of a statement of
objectives, which was completed in October 1982, and a Plan Informatique
completed in spring of 1983. They created a municipal Commission
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Informatique, and in early 1983 hired Ridha Louati, a programmer/analyst
with four years training in information systems and management from the
University of Tunis, to set up a DP department which would report
directly to the secretary general.
Information Systems Planning
The preparation of the IS plan was carried out by Triki and one of
his engineers. Unlike many CNI officials, Triki was strongly committed
to involving user departments in the introduction of automation; his
atypical attitude could be a result of his nine years of study in Paris.
He and his assistant gave a series of seminars for city officials on the
use of computers to improve operations. They were anxious to involve the
user department heads enough that they, instead of CNI, would ultimately
convince the secretary general and city council to go ahead with
automation. This concern arose both from their general approach to the
role of users in IS development, and from a desire to dispel the city
leaders' view that the interest in automation came only from CNI, rather
than from within the city.
This strategy seems to have been quite effective in some respects,
and less effective in others. Some of the department heads, particularly
the heads of the tax and finance services, eventually took an active role
in the automation of their offices. On the other hand the receveur, who
participated in the meetings in Sfax but did not go on a city-funded trip
to Lyon to see how computers were being used there, felt excluded from
the process and claimed that he would have nothing to do with municipal
automation efforts. Louati has been less concerned about participation
than Triki, which eventually brought him into some conflict with the user
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department heads trained by Triki.
The information systems plan describes and prioritizes the
applications which could be automated. The priority was set by city
officials in a series of meetings held with the mayor, the Commission
Informatique, the secretary general, and the heads of the user
departments. In general, their interest was in applications expected to
have financial returns, and in structuring the applications development
process so the city would not be taking on too many projects at once.
The property tax was placed first, because the improvements in tax
recovery were expected to cover the start-up costs of automation. When
the process began the head of the tax service was opposed to automation,
but he was replaced in 1983 by Frej Belel, a young man who had studied
computers for two years and was very enthusiastic about their application
to municipal management. The other applications chosen were management
of public properties, finance and accounting, personnel, rolling stock,
electoral roles, and 6tat civil. (Payroll had already been automated by
the service bureau, and so was not on the list.)
After the IS Plan's approval by CNI in April 1983, several efforts
began at the same time; hardware selection, systems analysis for the
property tax, and development of an assessment model to be incorporated
into the property tax application. Louati was detailed to CNI for six
months for training in their systems analysis methodology, and to work
jointly with Triki on hardware selection and development of the property
tax system.
Hardware Selection
The hardware selection process involved developing a set of
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specifications, followed by issuance of a RFP in August 1983. The
specifications were based on the volume of data and anticipated number of
transactions for all of the applications listed in the plan. It was
assumed that the city would purchase a single centralized mini-computer
with terminals placed in the user departments, rather than a more
distributed system. It was also assumed that the city would purchase
enough hardware capacity for all the applications listed in the plan,
rather than making purchases incrementally as they were ready to use the
increased capacity. End user computing was not included in the
specifications, and all software development was to be done in COBOL.
The responses were received in October, 1983, and a report
evaluating them according to a standard systems of points and weights
developed by CNI was issued in March 1984. However at that point the
city was held up by a national commission of representatives from CNI,
the Ministry of Interior, and other organizations, which was looking at
cooperation and compatibility in municipal computer systems.5 The
commission, motivated in part by political concerns, insisted that the
specifications had to include Arabic language capability as a requirement
rather than a preference. As a result, Sfax was required to go through
the RFP and hardware selection process again. To learn more about
municipal automation and Arabic systems, a group of city and CNI
officials visited computer facilities in several other countries,
including ones in France and Saudi Arabia. These trips apparently did
improve their understanding of some of the technological issues facing
5 This is the same commission that was involved with hardware
selection in Ariana. See Ariana case.
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them, but did not broaden their perspective on management and
organization questions.
The second hardware review, issued in September 1984, ranked the
offers using a system of points and weights assigned to hardware,
software, and service features, e.g. CPU, memory, I/O devices, operating
system, compilers, database software, technical support, training, and so
on. Six minicomputers were considered; IBM System 38, Matra 8600, NCR
9300, Honeywell Bull Mini 6-54B, DEC VAX 11-730, and Burroughs B.1990.
Based on the ratio of total point score to price, the city chose the IBM
System 38. The System 38 does not actually use Arabic at a low level,
but did come with an interface which permitted programmers to use Arabic
screens and store data entered in Arabic. This was considered adequate
by CNI officials in Tunis, so the city went ahead with the purchase.
IBM's bid was $200,000, about twice the estimates in CNI's early
studies. In addition, the city paid CNI another $70,000 for preparing
the plans and doing systems analysis for the property tax. The expense
did not seem to be a source of concern to city officials, who expected to
pay for the system over a three-year period using increased revenues from
the property tax. They did not consider taking a more incremental
approach to hardware purchases, and felt that this system reflected their
long-run needs and so was a worthwhile investment. They view it as their
final computer purchase, and do not expect the system to grow over time.
Property Tax Description: The CNI System
Systems analysis for the property tax was carried out by Mongi Triki
of CNI. The process was an extended one, involving Frej Belel, the head
of the tax service, as well as several student interns of Triki's from
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the university in Sfax.
The reports analyzing the automation of the property tax give
several different objectives. These include improving the estimation of
property values, simplifying the administrative tasks of the tax service
and the recette, reducing the significant time delays which plagued the
manual operation, improving the rate of tax recovery, and developing a
data base on land use. Although it does not accomplish all of these
objectives, the system is among the most complete of the municipal
property tax applications under development in Tunisia. It has been put
in use for the first time for the 1987 census, and will be used for the
1988 billing process; therefore it is too early to fully assess its
impacts.
The program, which is written in COBOL, covers almost all the steps
of the process. Parcel characteristics data are entered into the system
after the census, and the system estimates property values using a
formula developed by city officials (discussed in detail below). The
system is used to store information about appeals, generate new
assessment notices after the appeals process, calculate tax owed, and
print out tax roles and bills. The entire payment process is also
automated, and the recette will be able to use the system directly from a
terminal to be placed in their office.
The programs accessed by the end users are menu-driven, and allow
standard functions like modifying data, entering information about
appeals or tax payments, printing receipts, or checking the status of an
individual record. Infrequent or large scale tasks are handled by the DP
department rather than by the end users. Census data entry and error
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checking are done by DP clerks, and large printing jobs--assessment
notices, tax roles, bills--are done on the DP department's high speed
printer. The DP staff also run certain programs in batch mode, such as
calculating the assessed values. Thus the DP department plays an active
role as a user of the system, although end users will carry out certain
tasks interactively.
This system makes a serious attempt to facilitate use by the
recette. The city will be putting a terminal in the recette, and the
software allows recette clerks to enter payment data interactively and
print out receipts. It can also do some of the routine reporting
required of the receveur, including daily and monthly totals of payments.
However, the receveur did not believe that he would actually get a
terminal, or expect that use of this system would save his office any
work or replace any manual records. In part this is because there will
still be reports which depend on records not automated by the system, so
using the system could actually involve updating manual as well as
electronic records. Also, the receveur is unwilling to have all his data
depend on the city, and seems to have felt left out of the development
process because he was not sent to Lyon with the municipal officials.
This system does not include any way for end users to access data
except through the menu-driven programs. It is designed to include a set
of routines to calculate standard statistics. Some of these were
written, but the rest probably never will be, since the DP staff have
gone on to other tasks. The existing routines must be run by the DP
staff, since they are not written into the menus accessible to end users.
It does not produce any standard reports on the data, nor does it include
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any report generation capability. If anyone wants other access to the
data they must go through the secretary general, who will request that
the DP staff write routines to produce the desired reports. Since the DP
staff are already overcommitted, they are not likely to have time to
respond to very many such queries.
Development of the Assessment Model
The decision to include a mass appraisal module in this system
indicates Sfax officials' willingness to overcome the political obstacles
which typically limit rationalization of the assessment process in
Tunisian municipalities. It grew out of an earlier effort to improve
property appraisals which began in Sfax in 1980. For the first time the
city introduced a census data form which required that uniform
descriptive information be gathered about each parcel, including number
of rooms and the type of house. In 1982 the city introduced a new
assessment methodology, which took into account the type of house, its
size, the neighborhood, and indicators of infrastructure and level of
services provided by the city. When the model was introduced city
officials were concerned about individual values rising too much, so they
fixed the maximum increase at 50%. The number of appeals per year rose
with this model, from about 1,700 a year to 3,000, out of about 13,000
parcels censused each year.
The assessment model introduced with the automation of the property
tax was developed by a Commission de Revision consisting of
representatives from the city council and the municipal staff, including
the head of the tax service. The complete model is set out in Table 5-1.
It does not use market data to estimate property values, because Tunisian
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Table 5-1: Municipality of Sfax Rental Value Assessment Model
Base Value:
1. Covered area in square meters
Category of Dwelling:
2. Several families sharing
3. Apartment
4. Villa (detached house)
General characteristics:
5. Lodging is on paved road
6. Running water
7. Street lighting
8. Lights in front of lodging
9. Sewer hookup
Special Features:
10. Central heat and A/C
11. Swimming pool
Bonuses for good maintenance:
12. Exterior presentation
13. Area outside walls is clean
14. Garden condition good
15. Cistern to trap rain water
16. Concierge
17. Maintenance contracted for
coefficient set each
year by special
commission
- 30% of base value
+ 20% of base value
+ 70% of base value
+ 20%
+ 10%
+ 20%
+ 10%
+ 10%
of base value
of base value
of base value
of base value
of base value
+ 20% of base value
+280% of base value
Villas & Houses
- 1%, 3%, or 5%
- 3% or 5%
- 1%, 3%, or 5%
- 2% or 4%
N/A
N/A
Apartments
- 5%
N/A
- 1%, 3%, or 5%
N/A
- 5%
- 8%
authorities do not generally see market property values as a fair basis
for levying taxes. As a result, its design did not require much
knowledge of local housing markets or the theory underlying mass
appraisal systems, nor did it require any understanding of the extensive
Western literature on mass appraisal models. The formula developed uses
square footage to determine a base value which is increased or decreased
by fixed percentages to account for various amenities and disamenities.
The coefficients used were the outcome of political negotiations, as well
as some manual tests on sample data to see how great the changes in value
would be with different coefficients, which were carried out before the
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system was automated. As before, the Commission agreed that no parcel
would go up in value more than 50% from one census to another. It took
the commission a year and a half to agree on the model, which is being
used for the first time in the 1987 census.
Although the model does not reflect market values, it is likely to
help standardize assessments. The model will be printed on the back of
the assessment notices, enabling the owners to easily determine whether
their value has been calculated correctly; this will at least ensure a
uniform upper bound on assessed values, since owners will certainly
object if their assessment is above what the model would indicate. It
also serves to draw attention to the services which taxpayers are
receiving, providing a form of advertising which municipal authorities
hope will improve the image of the city government.
Implementing this model will require major changes in census data
collection, because it requires new data which have not been collected in
the past. Moreover, because the data are now to be used in a rigorous
way to estimate values, they must be accurate. This means that the
census takers must be much more thorough and conscientious than in the
past. This will be difficult to accomplish; city officials are already
concerned about the need to provide additional instructions and training
to the census agents for the 1987 census. On the other hand, the model
will not require any new skills of property assessors, because it
completely replaces the process rather than providing additional insight
into a decision to be made on a case by case basis.
The use of the new assessment model in the 1987 census is regarded
as a testing period, after which the Commission de Revision may decide to
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modify it. After this round of modifications, it will be submitted to
the full city council for final approval. Once approved it will be
considered finished and would require city council permission for further
change. The model is hard coded into the property tax system, because
the city sees it as something which will be fixed as soon as the right
coefficients are determined. As a result each change requires the DP
staff to recode and recompile the programs. This creates a significant
deterrent to experimenting with the structure and coefficients of the
model. Such experimentation would be critical if the model attempted to
estimate actual market values, since it would be necessary to reestimate
the coefficients and possibly change the model's structure to reflect
changes in local housing markets. Since it does not estimate market
values, the lack of flexibility will not be as much of a bottleneck as it
could be, however.
Implementation
In 1985, once systems analysis for the property tax was carried out,
the city hired two programmers who did most of the actual coding. Like
Louati, they were detailed to CNI for training for their first six months
with the city. They wrote the property tax programs on CNI hardware,
because the city had not yet received its own machine. Louati and the
two programmers also spent three weeks at the IBM office in Tunis in
early 1985 receiving training on the hardware and operating system of the
System 38.
In May, 1985 the city's own machine arrived, and was installed in a
room which had been specially prepared for it. Development of the
property tax system continued on the city's hardware, and it was ready
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for use early in 1986. The DP department hired three more staff members,
two data entry clerks and an operator, and began entering back data for
the property tax.
The new system automates two key operations which had been carried
out manually by the tax service, writing out assessment notices and tax
roles, and estimating assessed values. The tax service has ten regular
staff members, plus three to six temporary workers hired each year to
help out with the census. Automation might allow the tax service to stop
hiring the temporary workers, presumably by shifting some of the regular
staff from the former manual tasks into data collection. This would be
politically unpopular, however, and Belel indicated that he probably
would probably try to find tasks to keep the temporary workers employed
rather than allowing them to feel that they had been replaced by a
computer.
So far there has been very little training of end users, because the
terminals have not yet been set up in the tax service and the recette.
One tax service clerk is currently being trained to use the system, but
Belel suggested that the census agents might learn to enter and access
their own data. The receveur said that if they receive a terminal one
person in the recette would be trained to use it, rather than each clerk
entering his or her own information. There is no need for broader
training of end users, since there is no other way for them to use the
system.
It is too soon to assess impacts on tax recovery. If the recette
cooperates in the use of the system, the billing process should be
greatly speeded up, which is likely to improve recovery significantly.
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There is also some expectation that printing the assessment model on the
back of the bills will increase recovery, because people will regard the
tax as more fair, and therefore be more willing to pay it. Beyond this,
the impact on tax recovery will depend on how effectively the recette
staff can use the information in the system to identify the worst tax
offenders and design strategies to ensure that they pay. The
inaccessibility of data in the system works against the ability to do
this; thus the design of the software may make it difficult for the city
to achieve its stated objectives. The standard roles of the recette
staff may also make it difficult for them to use the system to improve
tax recovery; they are typically responsible for collecting money,
posting payment information on cards, and writing bills, not designing
tax enforcement strategies.
Future Automation in Sfax
CNI involvement in the city's automation efforts ended once the
hardware was purchased and the property tax application written. Louati
and the two programmers have continued developing applications, adapting
the payroll programs originally written by the service bureau to run on
the System 38, and beginning work on finance applications. They are
following the information systems plan very closely, rather than
evaluating at each point what would be the best step to take next.
Deviating from the plan is out of the question; both Louati and the user
department heads give it almost the force of law, and Belel said that if
they changed their plans they would have to have permission from the
national commission which approved it in the first place.
The systems development process is beginning to cause some of the
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same problems observed in such centralized organizations in the West.
The three staff programmers are not able to develop new systems as fast
as anticipated, because of the time required for modifications and
maintenance of the existing systems. The possibility has been raised of
contracting out some of the applications development to private
consultants or to CNI. This has received active support from end user
department heads, CNI, and DP staff. Some department heads have come
into conflict with Louati over his view of the role of users in the
systems development process, and they seemed to welcome the opportunity
to work with other systems analysts. Mongi Triki felt that CNI should be
brought back in to help out, because the city's DP staff were not ready
to take over such a large undertaking. Surprisingly, Louati also felt
that outside help should be brought in, although he favored private
consultants over CNI.
The secretary general has decided, however, that the slow pace of
development is acceptable, and the city will neither contract out for
systems development nor hire additional DP staff. The reasons for this
decision are not clear. The secretary general said he did not want to
ask the city council for approval of the funds to hire the consultants,
and that working more slowly on one application at a time was adequate.
The general reluctance to stray from the terms of the IS plan may also be
a factor. What is clear is that only the secretary general has the
authority to make decisions like this; end users who are frustrated by
working with the DP staff have no way to take matters into their own
hands and improve them.
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Summary: Automation in Sfax
Sfax has followed a highly structured, centralized approach to
automation which suggests that city leaders are not familiar with the
problems that this development pattern has caused in the West. In terms
of both hardware and applications development, the city has committed
itself to a growth plan which it expects to follow without modification
for about ten years. The strong commitment to the IS plan means that it
will be difficult for city leaders or DP staff to learn from their
experiences and modify their strategy as they go along. The decision to
purchase enough hardware to meet all of their anticipated needs means
that if they become interested in a different kind of system, or if new
hardware or software is developed which might better meet their needs,
they will be unable to come up with the investment capital to move in
that direction.
The system being set up in Sfax is likely to meet the city's
objectives as currently defined, especially insofar as they pertain to
improved efficiency in operational processes. Two related problems in
accomplishing municipal goals have arisen so far, the bottlenecks on DP
staff time and the conflicts over the role of end users in systems
development. The decision of the secretary general to proceed slowly
rather than contracting out for some of the systems development is
frustrating to everyone involved, and does nothing to alleviate either
problem. However, once systems are developed they promise to be very
comprehensive, if the property tax is any indication.
The programs being developed in Sfax will not facilitate the use of
data for analysis and decision-making. Because the property tax system
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is designed only to provide centralized transactions processing, and does
not allow any exploratory access to data, it does not constitute a land
data base which could be used for other purposes, which was one of the
stated objectives of the system. Once completed the property tax
database will contain a wealth of information about housing quality, land
use, property ownership, and other issues which could be of considerable
interest to city planners. However unless they can work with it
interactively, they are not likely to make much use of it, and the system
is not design to permit that type of use.
The city's hardware choices and DP staff support will also limit
their ability to use their data to support decision-making. End user
computing tools are not readily available for the System 38, and the
machine is not designed to work efficiently on a network. Technically
the best option for permitting end user access to information would be
connecting PCs to the System 38 using modems, and downloading selected
data which could be analyzed using PC software tools. However neither
city leaders nor the DP staff are likely to be interested in this
possibility, given their focus on developing more transactions processing
systems rather than encouraging use of the information in existing
systems to analyze policy questions. Although Mongi Triki of CNI was
very much interested in user participation in the introduction of
information technology, Louati is not, and he does not give high priority
to allowing users to access data. As a result, potential end users are
not learning enough about computers to develop any sense of what they
might want to do, and there is no momentum developed to move further in
the direction of using computers to support management.
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CASE 5: ARIANA
Ariana is a large and rapidly growing city immediately to the north
of Tunis. It has been the recipient of much of the population influx in
the Tunis region, and is home to many powerful national officials. Its
population is a matter of some question. The 1984 census put it at
98,000, but city officials estimate the population somewhere in the area
of 250,000 to 300,000. Wherever it actually stands now, population
growth has clearly been the dominant issue in city management over the
last ten years. The current city government is more suited to a small
town than to a large and rapidly growing suburb of the capital, and city
officials feel ill equipped to deal with city's population,
infrastructure problems, rapid housing construction, and other signs of
growth.
Initiating Automation and Information Systems Planning
The first interest in automation in Ariana arose in 1981, when the
city hired a private consulting firm, SIGMA (Societe d'Informatique de
Gestion et de Mathematiques Appliquees), to prepare a study of
administrative reorganization and information systems for the city.
Since most of the professional staff now in the city were not there then,
it is not clear exactly what prompted them to hire SIGMA, i.e. whether
the firm approached the city, or the city recognized that it needed help
dealing with its management problems. However, it is known that someone
who was then on the city council had worked with SIGMA before, which is
why the city began working with this firm rather than any other. The
SIGMA programmers are better trained than most Tunisian computer
professionals, all of them holding advanced degrees in applications
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programming and systems analysis from French universities.
In early 1982 SIGMA presented a plan in which they recommended a two
part strategy for systems development. Their plan stresses the
importance of changing the ways in which information is used in municipal
management and decision-making, rather than emphasizing improvements in
routine operations of the city government. One part of the project
involves the development of an integrated urban database (the Banque
d'Informations Communales, or BIC) which covers the two basic resources
over which the city has jurisdiction, citizens and land. The BIC has one
component organized around parcels as the basic unit, and a second
component organized around people, with links between them to indicate
relations like property ownership, addresses, and requests for building
permits. City functions which involve managing these resources will
share this integrated database; for example, property tax, building
permits, administrative authorizations, 6tat civil, and electoral roles.
The BIC is also designed to include a module for producing social and
economic statistics. The second part of the SIGMA strategy is directed
towards internal management of the city. It involves the development of
four applications; personnel, control of city vehicles, inventory, and
budgeting. Information is to flow between them as needed, but they do
not share an integrated database.
This system could provide an outstanding database for analyzing city
development, policy, and planning. However, as designed it is not likely
to be as effective for this purpose as its designers hope. All of the
software is to be written in COBOL, rather than storing the data in a
database management system. SIGMA programmers said they considered using
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a database manager, but felt that it would be cheaper to write the
software themselves. A set of statistical query routines are to be
written which are intended to provide information to support management
decisions. These are designed to provide a set of fixed reports, e.g. a
distribution of housing types by district, or a breakdown of the
population by socio-professional category. The system does not allow
flexible queries by non-DP staff, nor has there been any consideration of
downloading some of the data to PCs for end user analysis. The system
will therefore be limited in its ability to provide the data needed to
support ongoing management or policy decisions.
The 1982 plan placed primary attention on development of the BIC and
of two of the internal management applications, personnel and budgeting.
It placed the applications which depend on the BIC, particularly the
property tax, in a secondary position, since their development logically
should follow creation of the basic data structures. This was in clear
opposition to the CNI strategy of always beginning automation projects
with the property tax. The emphasis placed on the BIC also stemmed from
a conviction that it was an essential tool for helping the city to get a
handle on its own management problems, and so warranted priority over
other more routine applications.
The plan focuses on the requirements of the automated system:
software, hardware, data to be processed, personnel, and financing.
However it is based on an assumption, stated explicitly, that in parallel
with SIGMA's development of this system the city would work directly on
organizational, management, and information flow problems without which
the computer system itself could not have much impact. The plan mentions
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that this system need not function in Arabic, because it would be too
expensive, and would significantly slow down system development.
The plan also indicates that the city is expected to be work on the
data collection required to complete the BIC. Unlike most Tunisian
automation projects, the BIC does not depend on data which must already
be gathered in order to keep existing systems operational. Rather, it
assumes a major investment in special data collection on both land and
people. It also requires close collaboration on data coding with other
local and national agencies, in order to permit incorporation of data
from other sources into the system. Although the plan makes only passing
references to the importance of data collection, in conversation SIGMA
officials estimate that this will involve at least four years of work.
The plan sets out budgets for the hardware and software investments
needed to create the system, and for the annual operating costs which the
city could expect to incur. The hardware configuration is assumed to be
completely centralized; they propose a mini with five terminals, 160K of
RAM, and 80 megabytes of disk storage. The plan does not consider any
other hardware configurations. However, since it was prepared in 1981,
when micros were not yet a viable option, this should come as no
surprise. It calls for hardware investment of about $80,000, plus about
another $60,000 for the portions of the software development to be
carried out by SIGMA. With initial data entry and other charges, they
estimate the total investment at just over $150,000. The annual
operating costs, including staff, hardware maintenance, and supplies, are
estimated at about $32,000.
The SIGMA plan also calls for a significant reorganization of the
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structure of the city government, including the creation of a more
complex organizational hierarchy and strengthening of middle management
and professional staff. The existing tax service is expected to take
over responsibility for management of the BIC, including data entry,
database management, and production of statistics upon request. Since at
present the tax service consists of eight clerks reporting directly to an
assistant to the secretary general, with no director, no professional
staff, and no experience with computers or data analysis, managing the
BIC will be a formidable task for them. The finance service, the
technical services department, and the recette are to be responsible for
their own applications. A DP department was to be created with
responsibility for general management of the hardware and software and
development of some of the applications.
Implementation
This ambitious plan has proven extremely difficult to implement.
After it was completed, the city began the hardware search process. In
November, 1982, they issued an RFP for the hardware system. Four firms
responded; Burroughs, Honeywell-Bull, IBM, and NCR. After an analysis of
the four proposals, in which they were scored using a system of points
and weights, the city came down in favor of the IBM proposal, as
technically the best. They notified CNI of their choice, seeking the
authorization. However CNI evaluated the proposals themselves and
preferred the Honeywell option because it was the cheapest.
At this juncture the Ministry of Interior, in a largely unrelated
move, created a commission composed of representatives from the Ministry,
SIGMA, and CNI to look at cooperation in hardware choices among Tunisian
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municipalities, especially Tunis, Ariana and Sfax which were all then
engaged in hardware selection.6 They asked Ariana to hold off on a
hardware decision pending the results of this commission. Two main
outcomes emerged; first, that hardware and software must be designed to
work in Arabic, and second, that Ariana and Sfax should coordinate their
hardware choices. In 1983-4, therefore, the city repeated the hardware
selection process with the new Arabic requirement. The Honeywell-Bull
proposal was the only one which permitted full use of Arabic software and
terminals, so it was chosen because CNI would not approve any other
choice.7
In April 1984 for the first time the city signed a contract with
SIGMA. They agreed that SIGMA would prepare software for the BIC and
three of the applications (personnel, inventory, and rolling stock) and
the city programmers (still to be hired) would do the financial
application. The contract was for a flat fee of TD 45,000 ($56,250).
Although initially the city had agreed that development of the BIC should
be undertaken first, the secretary general in office in 1984 put the
three applications for personnel, inventory, and rolling stock ahead of
the BIC. The SIGMA programmers completed the three applications working
on the Ministry of Interior mainframe, since the city did not yet have
its own computer.
6 This is the same commission which held up hardware selection in
Sfax. See Sfax case.
7 Much to the annoyance of Ariana officials, Sfax managed to get
around the restrictions and purchase an IBM system which could use
Arabic only by means of a software interface between the operating
system and the applications. This may have been possible because
Sfax was working with CNI, rather than with a private consulting
firm as in Ariana.
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The city signed a contract with Honeywell for the purchase of a
Mini-6 in June 1984, and the system arrived in May 1985. The system has
80 megabytes of storage space on two disks, 160K memory, and three
terminals now connected. All of the terminals are currently in the DP
office with the computer, although the plans call for terminals to be
placed in some of the end user departments.
The three SIGMA applications were completed when the computer was
installed, but the city had still not hired its DP staff, so the finance
application was not ready. In 1985 Ariana hired a programmer away fr~m
SIGMA to be the city's DP director. She installed the personnel
application on the Mini-6, and a clerk already working for the city was
trained to be the operator for that program. The other two applications
were never used, however, because they depended on setting up a terminal
in the municipal garage. After two years of waiting, the PTT still had
not installed the telephone lines to connect this terminal to city hall.
Because of conflict among the city staff, the staff in the garage were
never willing to come to city hall to use the system there.
In 1986 another new secretary general took office. Concerned by the
lack of visible results from five years' investments in automation, he
decided to put development of the property tax application ahead of the
BIC. The contract with SIGMA was once again renegotiated, this time to
put the development of a property tax application ahead of the completion
of the statistical query and reporting functions of the BIC. Enough of
the file structure was completed that the applications dependent on the
integrated database could be developed, so the SIGMA programmers agreed
to go ahead with the property tax. They were not pleased with this
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decision, because they disagreed with the prevailing attitude at CNI and
among municipal officials that the property tax should be the starting
point for all city automation efforts. Nevertheless they agreed to it,
although they were increasingly impatient with the city's frequent
changes of priorities. The city's DP staff were expected to develop the
statistical module at some point in the future. Until such time as they
do this, there will be no way to retrieve data from the BIC in order to
support public policy, city management, or municipal decisions.
In the winter of 1987, however, the one programmer/analyst whom the
city had hired away from SIGMA left the municipality. As of the spring,
the city was--at least in theory--looking for two people to replace her.
When these people come on board, they will be expected to continue
developing applications based on the BIC, develop the independent budget
application, carry out the data collection effort needed for the BIC, and
take responsibility for the ongoing management of the existing system.
Property Tax Description: The SIGMA System
SIGMA is still working on development of the property tax
application for Ariana, to be based on the integrated data bank. As of
spring 1987, they had mapped out the plan for this application, but not
begun any of the coding. They were doing this in the SIGMA office, with
virtually no participation from the city's tax service.
Nevertheless, the system they are developing promises to be very
comprehensive. It covers all of the routine processing by both the
municipal tax service and the recette, and will include a terminal in
each of those offices to permit interactive data entry and retrieval. It
is also expected to include a module for assessing property values.
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SIGMA has been working on a general structure for the assessment module,
and expects to bring in the city to participate in the selection of
coefficients for the independent variables. However, some city officials
do not expect this model to be used, and feel that SIGMA is wasting their
time in developing it. At least one Ariana official described
assessments as very corrupt and political, with renters regularly listed
as owners, values regularly decreased for politically powerful people,
and the city unable to afford any serious effort to enforce the law.
Because these practices would be curtailed with such a model, he was
confident that politically powerful citizens would see to it that it was
never implemented.
The SIGMA property tax application differs from those of other
cities in that it includes several functions not automated elsewhere.
First, it is designed to cover the tax on unbuilt land as well as the
property tax. The two taxes are exactly parallel except for the tax
rates, and the properties are visited in the same census, but other
cities have not incorporated their administration into a single automated
system.
The SIGMA system also covers a number of recette functions not
covered by other property tax systems. The recette is required to
generate a series of daily and monthly totals of taxes collected, and to
provide the Ministry of Finance with regular reports on tax collection
and municipal finances. The SIGMA system does the calculations for all
of the property tax parts of these reports. Although this is still only
a small part of the recette's responsibilities, the hope in including it
is that if the automated system covers everything related to the property
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tax there will be no reason for the recette to stay with their old manual
record system. The SIGMA programmer designing this system had spent five
years working for the Ministry of Finance developing systems to automate
public accounting systems, so he was very conversant with the reporting
requirements of the recettes. This probably explains why this is the
only system to venture this far into automating the recette as well as
the tax service. Unlike most other cities, the receveur of Ariana does
expect this system to eventually replace the manual records, so there is
some hope that it will have a significant impact on tax recovery.
DP Support: Working with the Private Sector
Ariana has sought all of its outside help from the private sector
rather than from CNI. City leaders are quite comfortable with this
approach, and feel that it is more flexible and less expensive than
working with CNI. They also feel that SIGMA's plan for a comprehensive
integrated data bank will be more valuable in the long run than what they
view as CNI's short term approach. There seems to be a certain wariness
about working with the public sector, especially since they feel that CNI
forced them to buy a computer which they did not want, by refusing to
grant authorization for any other machine.
SIGMA is much less positive about the experience than the city is.
They have lost a lot of money on this project because of the time delays
caused by the city's changes of leadership and priorities and their
inability to recruit DP staff. When public sector organizations like CNI
carry out such projects, the contractor can charge the client more if
they run past the anticipated completion date. Since national law does
not permit private organizations to do the same, SIGMA has absorbed the
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loss as the project has dragged on for years, the city has not kept up
its end of the contract, and city officials have changed their minds
about what they want. As soon as the tax application is done SIGMA will
pull out of the project. As far as they are concerned working with
municipal governments is a dead loss, and they have no interest in trying
the experiment again.
CNI officials also have their views on this collaboration. They are
highly skeptical about the project, viewing it as much too ambitious for
any municipality, much less one with as many problems as Ariana. They
describe the project as a failure, and do not entertain any of the hopes
of city officials about the long run benefits to be gained from the
integrated data bank. They do not seem interested in being called in to
"rescue" the city; rather, they seem to feel that Ariana's problems
illustrate the effectiveness of the CNI approach.
Summary: Automation in Ariana
SIGMA and Ariana have clearly had a lot of problems carrying out
this plan. Two related factors seem to have been at work; the city's
management problems, and the ambitious nature of the SIGMA proposals,
which called for strong leadership in implementing major changes in city
organization and management.
Ariana has a reputation for bad management, which seems to have been
borne out by their experiences implementing this project. The city has
very few professional staff; out of 400 employees in 1985, only two had
university degrees. Between 1980 and 1987 the city had five different
secretary generals, which meant that it would have been extremely
difficult to carry out the changes in organizational structure on which
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the SIGMA system depends, or to maintain the consistency of focus and
priorities required to keep the project moving. Although there is
supposed to be a hierarchy of city departments, in fact the
organizational structure is flat, with most of the bottom-level
departments reporting directly to the assistant to the secretary general,
and no department heads in middle management positions. This same
assistant, who is a lawyer by training, has served as the liaison between
SIGMA and the city government since 1984, although he knows only as much
about computers as he has learned by negotiating contracts with SIGMA and
Honeywell.
These general management problems have kept the city from carrying
out its direct responsibilities for implementation of the SIGMA plan. It
is very hard for them to attract and retain good professional staff,
which is one reason why they have not been able to create their own DP
department or provide the training called for in the plan. They have
also been unable to begin the massive data collection effort required to
make the BIC a functional system. City leaders appear to be unaware of
the amount of time and level of sophistication required in order to carry
this out, and it seems unlikely that the city will be able to find staff
with sufficient skills.
On the other hand, SIGMA staff could also be viewed as rather
simplistic about the difficulty of making the management and
organizational changes which they expected would accompany their system.
This is a highly complex project which depends on very good management
and coordination to keep all parts moving together and make sure all
participants kept up on their responsibilities. The SIGMA programmers
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who designed this system are probably among the most highly skilled in
Tunisia, most of them holding French doctorates (troisieme cycle) in
computers and management. However they are trained as systems analysts
and programmers, and at SIGMA they are doing systems development; they
are not experienced in dealing with the difficult management problems
involved in implementing such a system and making the organizational
changes required to support it. This experience highlights the
importance of effective management in implementing ambitious information
systems projects in a city with problems as broad as those of Ariana. A
technically sophisticated information system alone will be insufficient
to effect major changes in the management and information use of such a
city.
The SIGMA strategy might work well in a city with some automation
experience, a competent professional staff, and an interest in investing
a lot of resources (especially time and training) in creating this kind
of system. Ariana probably is not the place to try this experiment. It
could be argued--as the assistant to Ariana's secretary general does--
that the city's problems are so great that a very ambitious project
designed to address them on a broad scale is necessary. However the city
may be unable to implement this project, and might be more able to
address their problems through more incremental changes in organization
and management, and less ambitious information systems.
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CASE 6: TUNIS
Tunis is the capital of Tunisia, situated on the Mediterranean
coast. With a population of 600,000 it is by far the largest city in the
country, and by all estimates it is growing rapidly. Municipal
management in Tunis differs somewhat from other cities because it is the
capital. The mayor is selected by the president of the republic rather
than elected by the city council, and has the status of a cabinet
minister. In many respects city policies are considered to be national
as well as local concerns, and city management faces even more national
and regional scrutiny than is the case elsewhere in the country. Because
Tunis is so much larger than other cities, its automation is both more
complex and more diverse than those of small cities. Many opportunities
are open to Tunis which could not be considered elsewhere, while many
routine steps require considerably more thought and planning than they do
in smaller cities.
Initiating Automation
Automation began in Tunis in the 1960s when the Institut National
des Statistiques (INS) approached the city offering to automate the
processing of the payroll and property tax on its mainframe. At that
time INS had the only computer in the Tunisian government, and was
seeking customers for its programming and processing services in order to
cover the costs of excess capacity on their system. Although the
programs they set up are very limited by today's standards, they are
still in use.
Property Tax Description: The INS System
The INS system handles only a few of the major tasks in the property
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tax administration. The city has about 80,000 properties, which are
divided into three zones for property tax purposes. Prior to the census,
INS prints out a data collection form for each site to be visited. The
forms identify the owner and the parcel, but do not include property
characteristics. The census agent visits the parcels with these forms
and the similar completed ones from the previous census. After the site
inspection the parcel description are hand copied from the old forms to
the new ones, with changes made as appropriate. Assessed values are then
estimated manually by one set of census agents, and reviewed by another
set. The assessment notices are completed by hand and distributed to the
owners. From the start of the census to the distribution of the
assessment notices the process usually takes about six months. Tax
service staff estimate that about two thirds of the owners appeal their
assessments each year; the appeals take another two to three months.
Almost all values are lowered after appeal, usually by 10 to 20%. Once
the appeals are over, the census agents calculate the tax owed on desk
calculators, applying different tax rates depending on the age of the
parcel. The census forms with the tax information are then returned to
INS, where the data entry staff enter changes in the data and new
assessments. INS prints out a first version of the tax role, which must
be verified by the tax service and then corrected by INS. This step can
involve major time delays. Both INS and the city are scheduling their
work around each other. If one group misses its deadline for returning
materials to the other, then the whole process is delayed, as happens
often. As a result, the tax roles often go to the recette well after the
end of the census year, so the tax collection process begins behind
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schedule.
After correcting the data, INS prints out the tax roles and the
first bills, as well as data entry cards on which the recette records
payments. The recette provides payment information to INS, which enters
it into the system and uses it to produce second bills. This system does
not work well in practice. The recette forwards payment information to
INS at least once a week, but INS often falls behind in entering it.
There is usually a fifteen to thirty day time lag between the INS cutoff
date for entering new payments and the printing of second bills, so those
bills are frequently inaccurate by the time they are sent out. Moreover,
the recette does not provide INS with information about payment
deferments authorized by the receveur, so second bills will be sent to
many property owners who have actually received permission not to pay
their taxes until the end of the year.
This system is clearly inadequate to handle the current volume of
property tax activity in Tunis. The fact that it is still in use
highlights some of the difficulties which the city has had in making a
commitment to automation and deciding how to cope with its management
problems. Although the city has made a variety of attempts to map out an
information systems strategy, and in 1987 was nearing completion of both
an IS plan and a much more comprehensive property tax application, there
has been a history of false starts and studies which got caught up in
politics and led to little action.
Information Systems Planning: The Early Studies
In 1976 a private consulting firm approached the city proposing to
study the automation of the 6tat civil, the records of births, deaths,
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marriages, and other personal information maintained by municipal
governments. The 6tat civil was a logical target for automation efforts,
because it is a highly conspicuous function on which all citizens are
dependent, and on which delays and errors are very visible. The study
identified a number of problems involved in automating it, particularly
that for political reasons the records would have to be stored and
printed in Arabic, and that the laws regulating the 6tat civil only give
final legal authority to original paper documents, not to data stored
electronically. Nothing came of this study at the time; ten years later
the city was still considering suggestions about how to automate the 4tat
civil.
A second major study was undertaken in 1978-9, by a different
private firm. This one was supposed to review the city's major
administrative functions, determine how automation could address the
problems in the manual operations, and assess the costs. The first two
steps were carried out, but then the study came to a halt. Fethi
Enneifer, the Director of Technical Services at the time, was designated
by the secretary general to review the work of the consultants and
determine why it had bogged down. Enneifer is an engineer, who spent
many years studying and working in France, and is familiar with current
information technology and the use of end user computing in the West. In
his view the problems in municipal operations were tied to fundamental
management problems, particularly a lack of communication between
services which should have been linked, and political pressures to allow
some functions to be operated in a very lax fashion. The consulting firm
could not propose automation strategies until the city addressed the
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management and information flow issues.
Enneifer renegotiated the agreement with the consulting firm,
arranging that instead of completing its study it would develop a few
small, stand-alone applications not tied to the city's essential
operations. They developed an application to monitor payments for land
and services in a World Bank squatter settlement project. It ran
initially on hardware in the Ministry of Interior, and later on the
machines of the national housing finance association, which was involved
with the World Bank project. This application was viewed by city
officials as a demonstration project to convince city officials of the
utility of automation. However there is no evidence to suggest that it
has had this effect; in fact, even now the city's DP staff seem to regard
it as something quite apart from everything else they are doing.
In 1979 Fethi Enneifer created a Department of Organization and
Methods within Technical Services charged with investigating the
management and information questions which were delaying the introduction
of computers. This department came out with a report on automation in
the city which defined a set of principles which they hoped to follow in
all future automation. These included delegating as much as possible of
the systems development work to private firms rather than doing it in-
house. They also included developing a system which would permit routine
operations to take place without the involvement of top managers, while
providing aggregate data which would permit supervision of ongoing
operations and provide information to support management at different
levels. The report is quite emphatic about the difficulties of improving
city management under the "paternalistic policy of control" of the
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national government and the rigid bureaucratic procedures which the city
is obliged to follow. Automation, therefore, must be undertaken in the
context of a broader effort to reduce the environmental constraints on
municipal operations.
By 1982 the city was ready to make a somewhat greater commitment to
automation. They contracted with CNI for the preparation of a
preliminary IS plan, and for the half-time services of one of CNI's
systems analysts, Moncef Hadj Salah, to work on it. The preliminary
plan, like most such studies in Tunisia, was a list of the applications
which already existed, and those which the city hoped would soon be
developed. Unlike the earlier reports it gave priority to developing
applications which did not involve integrated databases or significant
management changes, rather than to making the major changes required for
the more comprehensive automation.
DP Support: Activities of the DP Department
In 1983 the city turned the Department of Organization and Methods
into a DP department, to work for the entire city rather than just for
technical services. Hadj Salah became it director, and its activities
were overseen by Fethi Enneifer. In addition to Hadj Salah, the
department's staff consisted of three engineers and two technical
assistants. At the department's formation none of them were trained in
computer science. One engineer with a background in statistics received
training as a systems analyst at CNI, and several others with only
secondary school educations took courses in specific programming
languages. Several years later the department hired two programmer
analysts each of whom had two years of computer training after their
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baccalaureate. No on in the department has a background in information
systems strategy or management.
Also in 1983, the city made two hardware investments, an Apple II PC
and a SANCO multi-user microcomputer with two terminals. The SANCO came
with a ten megabyte hard disk, 64K of RAM, and two printers, and cost the
city about $25,000. Two years later they bought a seventy megabyte hard
disk and five more terminals, for an additional $25,000. The SANCO
micro, the same type as is being used in Sousse, is manufactured by a
French firm under contract to the Sanyo Corporation. It runs a
proprietary operating system called BRI-DOS, which is related to Unix.
The city purchased a COBOL compiler with the SANCO, and has been
developing its software in COBOL. Because the system architecture is
proprietary, no one has enough information to develop commercial software
for the SANCO systems except the manufacturer. Tunis is therefore
committed to developing all of its own applications in high level
programming languages, rather than using database tools, accounting
packages, or other tools which could simplify systems development or end
user access to data.
The new DP department began working on several projects. They moved
the World Bank squatter settlement application to the SANCO, and
developed a stand-alone application on the Apple for managing the
collection of rents on city-owned buildings; both of these were
implemented without significant problems. They set up the city's
personnel records on CNI's mainframe, using INSAF, a program designed by
CNI to provide personnel data processing to national ministries. A
terminal in the city personnel office allows department staff to check on
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the status of particular employees, but all data entry and processing are
done by CNI staff. The DP department also designed and implemented an
application to keep track of the administrative authorizations, the
licenses and fees required for all incursions on the city streets,
including signage, vendors, sidewalk cafes and restaurants, and so on.
Other applications have caused more controversy. The DP department
staff began work on a budget application, beginning with the capital
budgeting process. They completed the software development, and after
some problems set up a telephone line so the finance office could work on
the SANCO from a terminal in its office. However the finance department
refused to use the system, because its director was convinced that only
trained programmers could work directly on a computer. Because the main
pressure for automation was coming from Fethi Enneifer, not from the
secretary general, no one involved had the authority to require the
finance department to use the automated system, and it remains unused.
The DP department also began working on an application to automate
the overseeing of building construction and compliance with building
permits. This application got caught up in a larger political conflict
about whether the control of construction should be handled out of city
hall, or out of the eleven district offices around the city. The process
had been carried out at the district level, but it was centralized in
1982 after a city study found that this would reduce the time required to
process construction applications and reduce the opportunity for illegal
builders to bribe the inspectors. The DP department began work on a
centralized application to monitor the process, but it was never
implemented because the city succumbed to political pressure to go back
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to a decentralized system. They then contracted with a private firm for
development of a decentralized application. They ran into a lot of
problems with the firm, with the city accusing the firm of not doing the
job, and the firm accusing the city of making the job impossible because
they did not know if they would centralize or decentralize the process.
Eventually the firm turned its work over to the DP staff, and terminals
were set up in three district offices to test it. However substantial
work remains to be done on the software, so it has not yet been
implemented.
Information Systems Planning: The CNI Plan
Hadj Salah also began working on a full information systems plan for
the city. This progressed very slowly, because he was only working for
the city half-time, and was also responsible for managing routine DP
operations. The city wanted him to come on board full time, but CNI
would not allow it, because they did not want to lose his involvement in
their other municipal projects. In 1985 Fethi Enneifer left the city to
work for a national urban reconstruction agency, and work on the plan
came to a total halt. Enneifer's departure made it painfully clear that
he was the highest level city official really committed to automation;
the mayor and secretary general did not feel any pressure to keep things
moving in his absence. After a year away he came back to the city, this
time as the head of the mayor's cabinet. This is not a civil service
position, which meant that he had somewhat more autonomy, but less
authority within the official city bureaucracy. On his return, Enneifer
promoted one of the DP department programmers to be its director, so that
Hadj Salah would have time to finish working on the IS plan.
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The Tunis IS plan, which has still not received official
authorization from CNI, takes a much more sophisticated approach to using
current information technology than is typical in Tunisian cities. It
proposes an ambitious program of integrated and stand-alone applications,
to be developed on a network of PCs, multi-user micros, and a mini. The
mini, which will be kept in the DP department, will be used for two large
integrated databases, one of parcel-based data, and the other of personal
data for the 6tat civil. Microcomputer workstations in nine user
departments will provide access to these systems. The property tax
application will be part of the parcel-based data system, as will
building permits, control of construction, administrative authorizations,
and other applications which come under the jurisdiction of technical
services. The decision to use microcomputers rather than terminals for
user department access to the mini was an economic one; dual disk drive
IBM PC clones cost less on the Tunisian market than terminals. The mini-
based applications are to be written in COBOL or FORTRAN, and will not
store data in a database management system. Brands of hardware are not
specified in the plan; this will be determined after soliciting bids from
hardware vendors.
The IS plan calls for the development of independent applications on
single or multi-user micros in nine user departments. Some of these
applications will be linked to the central system or to each other; for
example the micro-based budget system will receive data from the
centralized property tax program. Others are stand-alone applications;
although the micros will be networked to the DP mini, this connection
will not be essential to run the applications. The micro-based
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applications will be written in COBOL, rather than using database
management software, spreadsheets, or other PC packages. The plan does
cite the availability of such packages as one of the advantages of using
micros, but does not say anything to suggest how they will be used.
The Tunis IS plan differs from others in that it explicitly
considers and estimates the costs of several different hardware and
software configurations, gives arguments for and against each, and
explains why this one was chosen. The two other options considered were
a completely centralized system where all the applications ran on a
single machine in the DP department, and a distributed system in which
all applications ran on stand-alone micros in the user departments. The
centralized system was seen as a good way to handle integrated
applications and databases, and to simplify management by only requiring
user support for a single machine. However in case of hardware failure
the entire system would go down. The costs of data transmission could
also be high, especially since municipal offices are located all over the
city. The decentralized system eliminates the data transmission
problems, and reduces the risk of a system crash which could bring the
whole city to a halt. It also offers the opportunity to spread the
hardware and software investments out over time, rather than requiring
one very large lump-sum investment at the start. However it makes data
sharing more difficult, and requires duplication of data in what would
otherwise be integrated files. The decision to go with a "mixed" system
is an attempt to have the best of both approaches; allow the capability
to develop large integrated databases and applications where they are
appropriate, but give smaller applications the flexibility of standing
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alone in their own machines where feasible.
In this consideration of hardware configuration, the plan does not
take software availability into consideration in any significant way.
Beyond a few somewhat oblique references to the availability of PC
packages, there is no mention of any apparent intention to use any
standard software tools, 4gls, and so on, on either micros or mini.
Since this plan was developed in 1987, this cannot be because the
technology was not available. Moreover, such packages are available in
Tunis, and the plan's designers are clearly aware of them. Given their
plan to develop applications in which data on the mini are fed routinely
into micro applications, and from micro to micro, the emerging database
packages which allow the same 4gl programs to run on a micro or on a
mini, and allow the user to access data from either machine, could be of
particular use in Tunis; however the plan does not evaluate the
possibility of using them.
The plan is also out of date in the hardware options which it
considers. Although they expect to use microcomputers quite extensively,
the plan proposes using dual disk drive PCs and XTs, with no more than
256K of RAM and ten or twenty megabytes of hard disk space. Where a
single XT is considered insufficient, they propose to go to multi-user
micros like the SANCOs, rather than to larger single-user micros
connected to each other on a network. This means that although data
transfers will be possible across all of the machines, the single and
multi-user departments will be incompatible with each other, and the
multi-user departments will not have available to them the range of
packages which could be used on the PCs. The two types of departments
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will not be able to share learning and information as they gain more
experience using computers, nor will the DP staff be able to concentrate
on supporting one or another type of hardware and software. The simpler
management, as well as the broader range of hardware and software which
will be available in the future, suggest that networked micros might be
preferable to multi-user systems for larger departments.
More generally, although the plan does pick up on some of the themes
in the 1982 report about the need to design applications which can meet
the needs of people at different levels of the information systems
pyramid, in fact the system which it proposes addresses few needs above
the bottom level. The applications described in the plan are all
operational ones. The system does address the need to improve
information flows across applications by creating the mini-based
integrated databases for land-based information and for 6tat civil. It
makes one brief reference in describing the objectives of the undertaking
to the need to be able to provide tables and statistics at any time which
could support decision-making. However the detailed descriptions of the
individual applications do not indicate how this capacity will be
provided, or suggest that there will be any software tools provided which
will allow professionals or managers to access information directly.
Presumably such information requests will have to be processed
individually by the DP staff, which will necessarily make them the
exception rather than the rule as a management tool.
The Tunis plan does give a detailed breakdown of the functions of
each of the city departments, including the staff in each. What is quite
striking is how bottom-heavy the pyramid is. The staff descriptions list
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very few people who could be considered mid-level managers. The property
tax service is typical; with forty-one employees, it has a director,
three secretaries, and thirty seven undifferentiated census agents. Only
a few departments have any professional staff: the health department has
a biologist and a few health technicians; the city planning department,
with all of four people, has two urban planners; the building
rehabilitation department is staffed with engineering assistants and
technical agents. Given this staffing pattern, it is not surprising that
the information needs of managerial and professional staff are not given
high priority in the IS plan; there are no such staff.
On the other hand, some officials identify the lack of managerial
staff as one of the basic problems in city management, and feel that the
city could do well to reduce its unskilled labor force and bring in more
mid-level people. Clearly this would have to be addressed as part of a
broader agenda on municipal management, not in an information systems
plan alone. However, if it is on such an agenda, then providing the
information systems tools to support middle managers would be an
important component of the IT strategy. In preparing the IS plan Hadj
Salah and Fethi Enneifer have clearly given substantial attention to the
city's larger management and information needs. It would seem worthwhile
to consider in more detail how these needs could be better supported by
the systems they are designing.
Role of End Users/Professional Staff
Tunis officials have been interested in using microcomputers for
several years. Since 1984, when the Centre Bourguiba du Micro
Informatique (CBMI) was created, Fethi Enneifer has sought to stimulate
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professional staff interest in learning more about the technology. He
has invested some city funds in general microcomputer training at CBMI
for professional staff interested in the area, even if the training did
not have immediate application to their work. After his return to the
city in 1986, he had the city purchase several micros; a Victor and later
two MacIntoshes. These purchases did not require CNI approval, because
they were below the price limit for which authorization is needed. The
machines are being used primarily for word processing, although Enneifer
is experimenting with graphics and spreadsheets as well. He hopes that
they will stimulate further interest in using computers, and particularly
that they will convince reluctant department heads that a degree in
computer science is not required to work on a micro. This hope was
articulated in particular in the context of the financial services
department, whose head has refused to use the capital budget application
developed by the DP department, and who is convinced that using a micro
would be too difficult for him or his staff.
Enneifer is very excited about microcomputers, and in discussions he
suggested that the plan to use them on a large scale in the city is
partly to encourage end user computing. This conflicts somewhat with the
description in the plan, which makes only oblique references to using PC
packages, and does not figure software costs in the budget estimates.
Possibly the absence of references to end user computing in the plan
reflects CNI's approach to computing, which tends to be highly
centralized and controlled. It could also be that Enneifer expects city
leaders to balk at end user computing, so he hopes to introduce this less
conspicuously once the hardware has already been purchased.
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Property Tax Description: The CNI System
In addition to working on the information systems plan, Hadj Salah
is working on a new system to automate the property tax. Although this
system will be linked to the broader integrated system discussed in the
plan, it is being developed before the plan is completed, because it is
viewed as too urgent to wait for the whole system to be implemented.
Hadj Salah is developing the system on the CNI mainframe, where it will
run until the city buys its own mini. Once the city's own hardware is up
and running, the application will be brought in house, and eventually
integrated with the systems to be developed for building permits,
administrative authorizations, and other applications keyed to parcels of
land.
The system will cover all of the basic functions of both the census
and the tax recovery, automating all of the routine processes which are
currently performed manually. Terminals in the tax service and in the
three neighborhood offices of the recette where tax payments are made
will allow some interactive access to the system, particularly for
entering payments and registering changes in property ownership. The
recettes will have printers to produce receipts when tax payments are
made, but the major printing jobs will be handled in batch mode at CNI,
as will the major data entry tasks and many of the programs. The system
is being designed to include an assessment module, but Hadj Salah did not
expect it to be used because it would be too politically sensitive.
Although this system is expected to replace much of the current
routine processing carried out in the tax service and the recette,
neither of those offices felt that they had anything to do with its
235
creation. The receveur had some vague recollection that Hadj Salah had
come to speak to him at some point, and the tax service staff had an
equally vague sense that at some point they had been told this would
happen. However it was clear that none of them had actively participated
in development of the system, and that they were passively waiting for it
to happen to them. The tax service staff are not afraid of losing their
jobs because of the system; its potential impact on the office does not
seem to be clear enough for this fear to materialize. (In fact, they
will not lose their jobs, since the city is committed not to replace
anyone with a computer, but they probably do not know that either.)
This system offers the potential to address many of the current
operational problems, especially if the integration with the other land-
based applications is implemented successfully. Moreover, because Tunis
already has a functioning DP staff, the city has a core of management
staff to work on its implementation. As with all the applications
described in the IS plan, however, it does not provide any way for end
users to access their own data and analyze them in order to develop
strategies for resolving management problems. This will become essential
once the routine processing of the property tax has been automated, and
the city wants to concentrate on improving recovery rather than simply
getting the reports out.
DP Support: The Development Directorate
In order to strengthen the position of information systems in the
city, Enneifer is also proposing that the current DP department become a
"development directorate" directly under the authority of the secretary
general. Creating such a department and hiring a strong leader for it is
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necessary, because city support for use of information systems is not
strong enough. Finding a qualified director may be difficult, but it
will be important for the effectiveness of the new directorate. So far
most initiative for automation has come from Enneifer, but as the head of
the mayor's cabinet he does not carry enough authority to implement all
of his ideas. The current DP director, is too low level and received his
computer training on the job, so he does not have the authority or
expertise to run the new directorate. Hadj Salah is still a CNI
employee, and Enneifer is interested in reducing the role of CNI in city
automation once the plan is approved. Enneifer still expects the city to
contract out systems development rather than developing in-house capacity
to develop all the software in the plan. The city has trouble hiring
good programmers, and in any case he does not want to build up a large
permanent staff of programmers who might have nothing to do once the plan
has been implemented.
Summary: Automation in Tunis
The Tunis experiences with automation are interesting for a number
of reasons. The city has been involved in the area for much longer than
any other city in the country, and in some ways represents both the most
obsolete and the most up-to-date approaches to automation seen in
Tunisian municipalities. The INS property tax system is inadequate and
out of date. The fact that it is still in use may be attributed first to
the city's size, which may make it harder to change course as quickly as
could be possible in a smaller city, and second to the lack of strong
leadership support for automation. Fethi Enneifer's control over
automation in the city results from his interest, intelligence, and
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initiative, not from his actually having the power and authority to
influence city policy in the area. As became very obvious when Enneifer
left for a year, the mayor and secretary general are not providing strong
leadership support for introduction of the technology.
On the other hand, Tunis's new information systems plan is one of
the most up to date proposals for municipal computer use in the country
so far. It is the first one which recognized that choices were being
made about hardware and software configurations, and that good arguments
could be made for a variety of different approaches. The option chosen
indicates a clear understanding of the tradeoffs between centralized and
distributed systems. Although the hardware and software chosen are still
somewhat out of date by western standards, they show significant movement
towards more current technology, and are evidence that the Tunisian
information systems community as a whole is broadening its awareness of
the options available.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS OF THE TUNISIAN CASES
OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK
In the framework we described two important objectives for Third
World cities introducing automation; improving operational efficiency
through transactions processing systems, and improving the effectiveness
of management and decision making through decision support systems. In
Western organizations, these two objectives evolved sequentially, leading
to many conflicts as organizations shifted focus from one to the other.
Because the technological starting point is different now from when the
stage models of information systems growth were developed in the West,
and because new computer users have the opportunity to learn from Western
experiences, we suggested that Third World cities would be able to plan
for both objectives at once, and so bypass many of the conflicts which
arose in the West.
We described an approach to automation which could allow cities to
work towards both objectives. It involved following important tactics in
three general areas. The first area is the overall objectives and
strategy for introducing information technology. It is essential that
the city recognize the importance of both transactions processing and
decision support from the start, and that its plans incorporate both of
these objectives. The developers of information systems strategies and
plans for the cities will have a very important influence on their
development, so who they are and how they have been trained will be very
important. Second, the technological choices--applications design,
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software, and hardware--will follow from the objectives, and determine
whether it will be possible to smoothly introduce both transactions
processing and decision support. The framework described the
technological requirements that could permit this kind of development.
Third, the roles played by all the actors in the city will be
significantly influenced by both the objectives and the technology
choices. These roles must allow end users as well as DP professionals to
learn about computer use if both sets of objectives are to be met.
TUNISIAN CITIES
The case studies in six Tunisian cities clearly show that the
different technological starting point has been inadequate to bring about
this pattern of development. Tunisian cities have had little opportunity
to learn from Western experiences, and instead of pursuing a broad range
of objectives we see them following a general development path which
looks very much like the historical growth of information systems in the
West.
They begin with objectives and strategies that are similar to those
of Western organizations in the 1960s. This sets them on a similar
growth and learning path, in terms of the types of application they
automate, their objectives, their system designs, and the roles of
computer professionals. Cities progressing along that path learn from
their own experiences implementing different kinds of computer systems.
They also learn from the experiences of other cities, which they hear
about through CNI officials, from contact with their colleagues elsewhere
in the country, or third hand from people who have seen the systems
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elsewhere. However, no one is using the experiences of the West directly
to formulate their idea of the potential of automation other than via
vendors of Western equipment. The different technological starting point
influences their hardware choices, particularly in the use of personal
computers and multi-user microcomputers, but it is not accompanied by the
familiarity with Western experiences which would encourage them to define
their objectives more broadly or take advantage of the full potential of
the hardware they are using. Nor is it accompanied by significant
management demand for information, or by a full understanding of the
software tools available on their computers.
As a result, it is clear that if Third World cities are to be able
to make full use of the options available to them, they will need more
than simple access to new technology. We need to determine what else is
missing from their information systems environment, and develop a set of
strategies for how they can modify the key variables in order to
introduce a more comprehensive approach to the use of information
technology.
OVERVIEW OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter analyzes the Tunisian cities in the context of our
framework and suggested strategy for introducing information technology,
in order to discern why they are following the approach they have chosen,
how this will cause them problems, and how the constraints limiting their
actions could be eased. Table 6-1, and the associated Figure 6-1,
provide summary data on automation and property tax systems for the six
cities, as well as a time line for their introduction of information
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TABLE 6-1 COMPARISON OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AUTOMATION AND PROPERTY TAX SYSTEMS
ALL currency conversions are performed at
Blanks indicate data not available.
the 1987 exchange rate, TD 1,000 = $US 1.25
CITY: || SOUSSE | KAIROUAN | RADES SFAX ARIANA TUNIS
1984 Pop.
# of Staff
Tax Servi
DP Dept.
# of Parcel
Expenses 19
Operating
Investmen
Hardware
System
RAN
Hard disk
Terminals
Printers
Other I/0
Software
Op. Syste
DBMS
Compilers
Arabic
|| 83,509 | 72,2
cel 13 1
s | 23,564 | 14,5
8611 |
|| $4,574,750 1$1,730,1
t || $3,765,960 | $691,7,
---------------------
11(b) |
|ISANCO 7500 IIBM PC-XT
11256K 1512K
1140 megs 120 megs
||3 In/a
113 |okidata
||tape drive, Ino
Ildiskette drv|
1--------------------
m |IBRI-DOS IDOS 2.0
1|no |dBase II
|IBASIC, COBOLIno
||no |no
Initial Cost ||
Hardware I
Software ||n/a
Date boughtI1985
||
f17,200
(a)
IUSAID-exa
Ivalues N/I
11984
|1
54 I 30,218
3| 4
01 1
88 I 5,213
02 $1,011,925
28 I $207,535
| . .. . .. .
IPC-)
1512K
120 m
(a) In/a
Idot
Ino
T
egs
(a)
matrix
IDOS
Ino
IBASIC?
no
ct | $8,750
A| $2,500
11986-87
|1
II
Ii
p
I |
231,911 | 98,655 |
20 8
41 1|
39,311 | 11,082 |
| |
$9,411,914 | $3,164,827 |
$3,265,041 | $1,219,417
I I
IBM Sys. 38 IBull Mini 6 |
516K 1160K I
!x30O megs 180 megs 1
16 1
596,654
41
8
85,098
$25,904,631
$6,385,852
SANCO 7500
80 megs
7
Apple II PC
Victor PC
Macintosh PC
12 12 12
I jtape drive,
I | 11.2 meg floppy drive
I I I
I II
|System 38 |Bull |BRI-DOS
IPart of OS Ino Ino
|COBOL ICOBOL IBASIC, COBOL
ISoftware jyes Ino
I interface I
I I I
$241,046 | $110,000 | $62,162
$30,250 1 $56,250 In/a (a)
IRec'd 6/85 IRec'd 4/85 11983
| | 1
Applications |IProperty tax|Property tax|Property taxlProperty tax|Payroll |Property tax contracted
running or ||payroll I IPayroll IPayroll I Ito INS, payroll to CNI.
in process ||stock | IParts of IData bank, ISmall applications for
1 I IIbudget jproperty taxiloans & public buildings
II I II& stock in lare in-house. New ptax
I I I Iprocess Isystem and integrated
11 I I Isystem under devt.
NOTES:
(a) Data not applicable - either because I/0 device is not appropriate for that city's hardware, or beca
there was no one-time initial investment in software.
(b) Hardware description for Sousse is for the multi-user micro on which the property tax application is
run. They also have a SANCO 9251 with 512K RAN, 91 megs hard disk storage, 2 terminals, 1 printer,
and a tape drive, purchased in 1986 at a cost of $17,700.
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TABLE 6-1 COMPARISON OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AUTOMATION AND PROPERTY TAX SYSTEMS, continued
Blanks indicate data not available.
CITY: 11 SOUSSE 1KAIROUAN I RADES SFAX ARIANA I TUNIS
PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM
Census:
Print census forms: || no
Enter census data: || yes
Correct data entry: || no
Assess values: || no
Print assessment || yes
notices: ||
Enter appeal requests:|| no
Print notification of || no
hearing dates: ||
Change assessed values|| yes
after hearing: ||
Print new assessment || yes
notices: ||
Establish tax roles: ||
calculate tax owed:I| yes
print tax roles: || yes
1I
Recette Tasks: ||
Print out first bills:|| yes
Register payments: ||
update the account:|| no
print out receipt: || no
Print second bills: || no
Print third bills: || no
Other Recette Tasks: ||
Maintain receipt book:I| no
Maintain daily ledger:1| no
Monthly totals: || no
List tax exemptions || no
for M. of Finance ||
1I
...................... |1i.......
Data queries: ||
||
Standard queries: || no
Interactive queries: || no
I I|I
| no | yes | yes
| yes yes | yes
no j yes yes
no no yes
yes | yes yes
| yes | yes yes
no yes no
| | | e
| yes yes | yes
| | | e
| yes yes | yes
| yes I yes yes| yes yes j yes
| yes yes yes
| yes | yes yes
|no jno |no
no yes | yes
no | yes | yes
Ino Ino Ino
Ino |no |no
yes o Ino
|Ino |Ino |Ino
j no |Ino |Ino
|yes |no |no
INS CNI
System System
| I
yes yes yes
I yes | yes yes
I yes | yes yes
yes no yes
| yes no yes
| |
no j no
Ino |no
| || yes no
| I
yes j no yes| |
| |
I yes eno yes
| yes I yes yes| |
| |
I |
yes | yes yes| |
| yes | yes yes
| yes eno yes
| yes | yes yes
| yes | yes yes| I
| |
| |
I yes j no no
................................
I no | no yes
no no no
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Figure 6-1: Time line of Information systems development in case study cities
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technology, in order to facilitate comparisons as we discuss them.
To analyze the city experiences, we must investigate the three areas
described in the framework. First, we must determine what their
objectives and overall strategies are, how they may be inadequate, and
where they came from. Understanding why Tunisian cities have framed
their objectives narrowly rather than broadly will be crucial to
assessing whether the obstacles can be avoided or alleviated.
Second, we will investigate the consequences of those objectives and
strategies for technological choices. The objectives lead cities to
decisions about applications choice, software, and hardware which are
satisfactory for their initial transactions processing objectives, but
will not facilitate the transition to decision support. Instead these
choices put them on a learning path very much like the Western one.
While this may eventually lead to an interest in decision support, as it
has in the West, it will be a very slow and costly route to accomplishing
broader objectives. In looking at technology questions we will also look
at how these objectives have led CNI to make choices and pursue
strategies in designing and marketing software packages which are not
optimal for encouraging the use of information in decision-making. We
will consider why CNI has made those choices, what difficulties they
generate, and whether they could have done otherwise.
Third, we will look at how the organizational structures surrounding
computing result from the previous two factors. These structures will
make it difficult to shift into decision support, because the cities do
not create a learning path that will enable them to develop the expertise
needed to develop useful information systems and make effective use of
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them.
Based on this analysis, we will be able to draw general conclusions
about the nature of the constraints facing the Tunisian cities which may
be of interest to other countries. In Chapter 7 we will make
recommendations for cities or other agencies, for national governments,
and for donor agencies which suggest how each institution might most
effectively foster a broader approach to information technology in local
government.
OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY
The objective of automation in Tunisian municipalities has been to
cope with delays, errors, and lack of control in the massive manual
processing involved in tax administration, personnel, budgeting, and
other city operations. Virtually everything about the systems
implemented--applications portfolio, software tools, hardware choices,
roles played by DP staff and end users--is oriented towards automating
manual processes in order to improve their efficiency.
Many important management problems facing Tunisian municipalities
cannot be solved by this approach, although they could be addressed
through the use of decision support tools linked to existing information
systems or automated data. For example, in automating property tax
administration, city officials say they are interested in improving tax
recovery as well as streamlining ongoing processes. However, without
some access to data and analysis tools they will be unable to work with
information in the ways needed to develop strategies which actually
improve recovery. Similarly the amount of time currently spent in
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assessment hearings is an enormous drain on the time of top managers;
however the systems are not flexible enough to permit analysis of who is
appealing or why, and to assist in developing strategies to reduce the
number of appeals. Solutions to other related problems might also be
developed through analysis of property tax data. These include the
control of unauthorized building construction, management of the licenses
for signs and street vendors, and other tasks over which the city
currently has little control.
The inadequacy of transactions processing systems for addressing
management problems will become obvious once the immediate needs for
better control over operational processes have been addressed and the
fundamental underlying problems surface. However, if the cities do not
anticipate DSS needs now, it will greatly increase the costs of meeting
them once they do become obvious, because the cities will be locked into
computer systems and DP organizational structures which will be equipped
to meet the first kind of need but not the second. By anticipating the
less immediate needs at the start they can develop their transactions
processing applications and DP staff in ways which will make it
relatively easy to begin work on the second round of problems when they
arise. Several key factors contribute to Tunisian cities' sole emphasis
on transactions processing.
Volume of Manual Processing
The volume of paperwork currently being handled manually, especially
in the processing of the property tax, makes it inevitable that this will
be the most immediate problem to be resolved through the introduction of
computers. The paperwork is causing significant delays in all cities,
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the records are cumbersome and inaccurate, and so on. Computers offer an
excellent and straightforward solution to this problem, and it is
eminently reasonable that the cities are anxious to use them for this
purpose.
Centralized Authority Structure
An equally inevitable factor in the low interest in decision support
is the centralization of authority in Tunisian government. Both within
the cities and in their relationship to the national government, city
leaders and their employees are discouraged from making decisions based
on their own information or authority. They are frequently unwilling to
take initiative in solving problems, deferring instead to higher levels
of authority. This creates a reluctance to introduce decision support
tools, even when their potential to contribute to problem solving is
obvious. The authority structure in Tunisian municipalities is a much
broader issue than could be resolved through the introduction of
information systems, and is not directly addressed in this thesis.
However, this problem suggests the need for increased initiative on the
part of municipal officials in dealing with their own problems in order
for information systems to have more impact on urban management.
Top Leaders' Relations with Advisors
Top leaders in Tunisian cities do not usually know enough about
information systems to know how the technology can solve their problems.
As a result, they are not equipped to evaluate the advice offered them by
the consultants preparing IS plans. They can tell whether a proposed
solution has something to do with the general problem, but by and large
they lack the technical skills to evaluate whether it will actually solve
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the problem at hand, or whether it is the best solution. Thus if the
advisors tell them that automating the routine processing involved in
administering the property tax will improve recovery, they are not
equipped to assess how else computers could help them deal with that
problem. Similarly, the city leaders are not aware of the costs incurred
in the "one problem at a time" approach to automation, which they are
following in their decision not to consider the management issues until
transactions processing applications are automated.
The way in which Tunisian city leaders use advisors is one part of
this problem. They select an advisor based on whom they know, or who
approaches them with suggestions, and the choice of advisor determines
what kind of path they will follow. Generally they are offered a single
IS strategy, rather than a range of realistic choices. Unlike the
hardware selection process, in which they solicit bids from many vendors
and evaluate them according to standard criteria set by CNI, none of the
cities has sought strategic advice from more than one source, so they do
not have the opportunity to compare different approaches. This does not
put them in a position to choose among options, or give them any sense of
the tradeoffs involved in making a choice.
Training of Computer Professionals
The training and perspective of most Tunisian computer
professionals, both city employees and outside advisors, has had a major
influence on the objectives of municipal automation. They are trained as
programmers and systems analysts rather than as managers, and are
oriented towards using the technology to improve the efficiency of
information flows and transactions processing rather than to permit the
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use of information in management and policy decisions. Their training
does not give them exposure to the Western experiences shifting from
transactions processing into decision support in the 1970s, so they do
not appreciate the desirability of keeping both objectives in mind in
introducing computers. They are not experienced with fourth generation
languages, PC software, or approaches to computer use in which the end
users play an important role. When addressing the problems of the
Tunisian cities, therefore, they think about developing centralized
systems to handle the processing questions, rather than about flexibly
controlled systems which enable users to change the ways they use
information to solve problems.
CNI Influence
CNI's position of particular authority has strongly influenced the
IS strategies of many cities in the direction of transactions processing
rather than decision support. CNI's position in the national government,
the expertise of its staff, and the respect which it has among most local
governments put it in an excellent position to offer assistance and
services to the cities. Because of the strong role of the national
government in municipal affairs, city leaders feel that if they work with
the public agency they will receive the authorizations they need to go
forward. This was quite explicit in Sousse, which contracted with CNI
for an IS plan which it did not expect to follow, simply because they
knew that in this way they would receive permission to purchase more
hardware. Even without this ulterior motive, there is a bias in favor of
public sector aid over private sector, because the public sector is
expected to be more concerned about the cities' interests than a private
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firm.
CNI's orientation towards transactions processing rather than
decision support comes from the same sources as other advisors'. Most of
the CNI professionals working on municipal automation were trained in
Tunisia as programmers or systems analysts, and they have the same biases
towards centralized systems as other Tunisian computer professionals.
They are learning about municipal automation from their own experiences,
and from the experiences of cities like Kairouan and Ariana where they
have not worked, but not from Western organizations which are fifteen or
twenty years ahead of Tunisia in the use of information technology.
Moreover, from their perspective as national government employees, CNI
programmers may be inclined to feel that municipal governments do not
have the capability to work with decision support tools or take
initiative in their own information systems use.
Like other outside advisors, CNI's approach is to map out a plan of
action for the city, and in some cases carry it out themselves. Their
influence tends to be in the direction of long run planning and large-
scale purchasing, and against incremental growth and changes in the
technology used. This can be seen in Sfax, where the CNI plan is being
followed to the letter and some of the software has been developed by CNI
programmers, and in Rades, which will implement all of CNI's packaged
software as it is ready. It will also in effect be their strategy in the
dozens of other cities likely to use their packages, which will have no
opportunity to evaluate CNI's decisions because they are too small to
have any alternatives. In some cities they have also dictated hardware
choices, as in Ariana, because of their authority to approve all hardware
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purchases. They do not offer the cities a set of options, nor do they
train city leaders or DP staff to evaluate several different IS
strategies.
Because of this approach, the cities studied which have begun
automating without CNI--Kairouan, Sousse, and Ariana--are very cautious
about working with the national organization, lest they lose control over
their own information systems strategies. They see the experiences of
Sfax and Rades, which are completely steered by CNI, and of Ariana, which
was forced to buy a mini it did not want, as warnings to stay away from
CNI. Sousse and Kairouan, although they may both end up using CNI
packages, are nervous about giving CNI any influence over their
activities. Sousse felt that they had to have a CNI consultant develop
their information systems plan, in order to receive their hardware
authorization, but has insisted that they will not let themselves be
pressured into following that plan. CNI officials, for their part,
express some reservations about the IS efforts of the cities or their
private consultants, disparaging Ariana's integrated database system, and
claiming that the Kairouan property tax application does not work.
These turf conflicts suggest that CNI should take a somewhat
different approach to providing information systems advice, in favor of
one which is less threatening to cities which are taking some initiative
on their own. The organization is in a position to be of considerable
use to all municipalities because it is a national government agency and
because its staff have a lot of experience with municipal automation. To
the extent that its style is keeping cities from taking advantage of what
it has to offer, it is not fulfilling its mission as fully as it could.
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Summary: Objectives and Strategy
Five major factors are leading the Tunisian cities to emphasize
transactions processing in their objectives and strategy. The first, the
volume of manual processing, clearly indicates that transactions
processing is the most immediate need. However the management issues are
also important, and the immediacy of one issue does not suggest that
omitting the other is necessary. The second obstacle, the centralization
of decision-making authority, is largely beyond the scope of an
information systems project. However within the limits of municipal
responsibilities, specific steps to increase the understanding of how
information can be used to resolve management problems would help relax
this constraint somewhat. The last three obstacles, the understanding of
city leaders, the training of computer professionals, and the orientation
of CNI, all are issues of knowledge about information technology. This
suggests that specific steps to broaden Tunisian understanding of how
information technology can be used could lead them to take a more
comprehensive approach to municipal automation.
TECHNOLOGY CHOICES
The objectives that Tunisian cities hope to meet through automation
have direct implications for the selection and design of applications to
be automated, the programming languages used to write them, and the
hardware on which they are run. These choices are not static, one-time
decisions; rather, they set the cities on a path of development in which
each choice leads to the next one as they learn from their own and each
other's experiences. This may eventually lead to an interest in decision
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support, but it is a slow road, and will engender many of the same
conflicts and costs which Western organizations faced when they became
interested in using computers to support management and policy decisions.
The objectives of municipal automation have implications for
technology choices both in the cities themselves, and in CNI. Because
CNI is important in the Tunisian context, and because it offers an
interesting model for other countries, we will consider its decision to
develop applications packages in BASIC rather than in a database manager
in a separate section from the discussion of choices made by individual
cities.
Selection and Design of Applications
Tunisian cities are following a path very much like that of Western
organizations in their selection and design of applications. They have
been motivated primarily by a desire to improve the efficiency of routine
operations. As they have learned from experience, they have developed
increasingly complex systems, and like Western organizations they have
become interested in the potential of integrated databases to improve the
efficiency of their systems. They have not yet reached the stage of
recognizing that their systems meet only the most routine operational
objective and do not support management needs for information. On the
development path which they are following, it will be many years before
they reach that stage.
The earliest systems relied on service bureaus, like the INS
property tax system in Tunis and the Informatique et Gestion property tax
and payroll systems used in Kairouan. (See Table 6-1 for summary data
comparing city strategies.) These were very limited in scope, and
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somewhat inconvenient, especially for cities not in the Tunis area.
However, until the early 1980s they were the only option available to
most cities.
Two significant technological developments--minicomputers and
microcomputers--changed the options available to the cities. On their
own computers the cities began developing stand-alone applications which
duplicated manual processes. The earliest ones, those of Sousse and
Kairouan, were quite limited in scope. Although the property tax
applications introduced by both of those cities were regarded as great
improvements over the previous situation, as Table 6-1 shows they both
covered only the census portion of the tax cycle, and did not automate
the collection process. Later independent applications, like the CNI
property tax program designed for Sfax and the CNI package being used in
Rades, are much more complete, including the entire billing and
collection process. However, they still are narrowly oriented towards
streamlining routine operations.
Seeing the limitations of stand-alone applications, the French-
trained consultants working for Ariana proposed an integrated database
which would link the data for all of the city's operational applications.
This system will ensure that data will be consistent, and avoid data
duplication with the consequent risks of error. However it has proven
very difficult to implement, because the scope of the project was too
large and required too much IS skill for a city government facing severe
problems managing its own rapid growth. In the interest of having
something to show for its investments in information technology, the city
is now setting up several stand-alone applications which it may link in
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the future. Aware of the problems encountered in Ariana, CNI is
proposing a more limited integrated database in Tunis, which links fewer
applications and therefore will take less coordinated management effort
to implement.
Municipal approaches to system design have changed as city leaders
and computer professionals learn from experience, both within and across
cities. Cities like Sousse and Tunis have been using computers for long
enough to have passed through several different types of applications,
and so have been able to learn directly from their own experiences. For
example, the secretary general and DP director of Sousse have developed a
very clear sense of the limitations of single-user machines. City
officials in Kairouan and Tunis are very clear on the difficulty of
working with service bureaus.
More often, cities learn from each other's experiences. CNI is an
important conduit of such learning. CNI officials had access to the
source code for the RTI property tax application implemented in Kairouan,
and so were aware of the limitations of system which did not include tax
collection when they developed their own package now being used in Rades.
They were also well aware of the problems implementing the integrated
database in Ariana, and could be careful to avoid similar problems in
proposing such a system for Tunis. Cities are also learning directly
from each other's experiences. City leaders and DP staff are very much
interested in knowing what is going on elsewhere; although some of this
interest is out of a competitive urge, it also enables them to find out
about more opportunities and share information.
Learning about system design has not progressed far enough for
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Tunisian cities to be interested in decision support. Even the
integrated databases currently under development, whose designers
describe them as tools to assist management, do not allow interactive
access to data, and because of the complexity of the file structures it
would be difficult to add in later. Moreover, even if it were available,
it is not clear that the systems have been designed to allow users to
access historical data, and so assess trends over time, or that the file
structures are simple enough that end users could retrieve the
information they need without substantial help from the DP staff.
Most of the property tax applications, and both of the integrated
databases, are designed to include standard reports and statistical
functions for providing some information to managers or professional
staff. None of these report functions has actually been written. In
every city, time ran out on systems development, or moving on to the next
project became more important, and the report functions were omitted.
Although designers have become more sophisticated in creating operational
systems, they still are not concerned about meeting the information needs
of middle or top level managers by giving them flexible access to data.
As a result the preliminary steps which could stimulate interest in using
information to assess policy questions are not being taken by the
Tunisian cities.
Programming Languages
Because Tunisian cities are interested only in transactions
processing, their applications do not allow any end user access to data.
They have never considered using software tools which could facilitate
both end user access to data and applications development, such as fourth
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generation languages or PC packages. They also have not provided report
generation capabilities within their applications, or even included the
production of standard reports. Instead, they are writing applications
in BASIC or COBOL, and storing data in files designed with only TP
efficiency in mind.
As a result, accessing the data in the transactions processing
systems is difficult. If anyone wants information from the database
other than what can be obtained through the menu-driven applications,
they go to the secretary general with their request. If he approves it,
he instructs the DP staff to write programs to generate the report when
they have the time. This procedure may be adequate for occasional
reports, but is not likely to be flexible enough or rapid enough to
permit the kinds of data access which are desirable for many managerial
decisions. This process may be a deterrent to managers interested in
using automated information to support their work on any regular basis.
The use of database managers instead of high-level languages for
software development could make such data access considerably easier. On
microcomputers the dbms tools are easy for end users to learn, and at
least so far the data structures in the PC-based packages are simple
enough that end users would be able to work directly with the information
they need. Thus in Kairouan, for example, the tax service staff could
work directly with dBase to access their data and perform simple
analyses. This would, of course, require access controls to prevent
unauthorized data changes; however developing these should not be
difficult.
On minicomputers this would not be as simple. In part this is
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because mini-based software tools are more difficult to master. In
addition, organizations investing in minicomputers typically also invest
in more sophisticated applications with more complex data structures than
is characteristic of PC-based systems. Nevertheless, using database
management tools would still simplify the process. If end users were not
sophisticated enough to work directly in the minicomputer environment,
the DP staff could extract data for them, and download it to PCs for end
user analysis using micro-based packages. This might be a reasonable
strategy for a city like Sfax, which has already invested in developing
systems on a mini which does not allow easy end user access. Even if
they do work directly on the mini, end users might prefer to work with
data extracts, to simplify the structure of the files they are working
with and clear out some of the detailed data on individual transactions
which are not typically useful for decision support purposes. If end
users want to look at trends over time, the extracting problems will be
more complex, since TP data are usually cross-sectional, and are more
suited to providing static summaries than detailed time-series. Even
with the need to manipulate the data, however, accessing information for
decision support will still be considerably easier if data are initially
stored in a dbms.
However, the Tunisians cities do not see any compelling reason to
use any software tools other than programming languages. Since they are
not interested in decision support, the relative ease of accessing
information with database management tools will not be an argument for
using them. Because Tunisian computer scientists are trained in systems
analysis and programming rather than to work with dbms, 4gl, or PCs,
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their orientation is towards the use of high-level programming languages.
For this reason they also do not view the use of such tools as a way to
reduce the time required for systems development, although this is an
important consideration in Western organizations. Moreover, for systems
designed only to provide transactions processing, programming languages
can be much more efficient, since they allow the system's designers to
create routines which do only what is needed, rather than being
constrained by the standard functions written into the database
management package. The resulting programs can run faster and more
efficiently, which is important for some applications.
The use of high level programming languages, and the consequent
difficulty of access to data, prevents the cities from initiating the
learning process needed to develop effective use of decision support
tools or learn about the broader potential of automation. At present the
property tax applications do not even produce any standard reports
designed to provide regular information to professionals or managers, or
include any report-generating utilities. Thus except in Kairouan, where
limited data access is available, potential end users in the tax service
and in departments handling building construction, administrative
authorizations, or tax collection have no opportunity to try using the
data to address their problems. They cannot develop a better sense of
what kind of data they might want, or how those data should be structured
and coded in order to allow them to answer their questions.
Moreover, the decision to write applications in programming
languages and not use database management tools will not be easy to
reverse. If a dbms were to be introduced later on, it would require
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rewriting much of the software already written in order to permit access
to data stored in a new format. A simpler DSS route would be possible if
the cities could generate ascii data files from their programs, which
could be pulled into other software packages; however the routines to do
this do not currently exist.
The evidence from Kairouan, where data are stored in a database
management system and can be accessed easily by end users, supports the
argument that interactive data access permits city officials to learn
about how they want to use data to support management or decision-making.
The property tax application developed by RTI for Kairouan allows the
user to apply a subset of the standard dBase functions to perform simple
data queries and aggregations. Although at the start Kairouan officials
would probably have been just as uninterested in this capability as their
colleagues were elsewhere, in fact its availability has led the users of
the system to begin exploring the data, and stimulated their interest in
using the information to help address other city management problems.
Based on initial attempts to use property tax data to assist management
of the administrative authorizations, the tax service director is
recoding several key variables so that it will be easier to sort parcels
according to their use. In order to improve his understanding of current
assessment practices he is recoding other variables so he can more
accurately separate rented from owner-occupied properties. Had the
interactive queries not been possible in his software, he would never
have tried to ask questions about his data, nor would he have recognized
that they could be useful to improve tax management if certain variables
were coded differently.
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CNI Software Choices
CNI's decision to use BASIC instead of a database management package
to develop PC-based applications software warrants special consideration.
The CNI software development project could offer great potential for
other countries. It is therefore important to understand why CNI has
chosen to use BASIC, and therefore whether a different route could be
followed elsewhere.
CNI's decision to program in BASIC results primarily from their
objectives in developing software packages for small municipalities.
They want to provide turnkey systems for transactions processing which
will not require the cities to hire any specialized staff or learn any
new skills. They are concerned about making automation as easy as
possible for the cities, since they feel that most small cities do not
have the skills to make effective use of interactive information systems.
However, they are not interested in encouraging the use of accurate
information to support management or policy decisions. Since they are
not concerned about data access as an objective, they do not see this as
a benefit of working in a dbms.
Given their objectives, writing software in BASIC is an adequate
solution. All else being equal, systems development would take longer in
BASIC than in a dbms, but since their staff are experienced BASIC
programmers and not experienced dbms users, this is not a convincing
argument for them. Writing in BASIC also leaves open the possibility of
recompiling the package to run on machines other than the single-user PCs
for which it was designed, since the language is readily available on
virtually all computers; the CNI programmers feel this may be useful.
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While this may also be possible with some dbms packages, this capability
is very new, and not likely to be considered (or available) in Tunisia.
However, the use of BASIC makes it virtually impossible for the
cities to access their data directly, because the data are stored in a
binary format which the city staff lack both the skills and the
information to decode. The property tax package implemented in Rades was
supposed to include some query and simple statistical routines, which
would have permitted limited data access. However, these were never
implemented, and the system does not include any standard reports.
System users therefore have no way to get at their data. Without
producing any standard reports, the system's design also does nothing to
encourage interest in using the data.
This problem could be addressed by designing the same system using a
database management package. The application itself would be a set of
compiled menu-driven programs which the city staff could use at once with
very limited training. In addition, however, the database management
system would allow interactive use of the data. Once the software was
implemented and the data entered, city staff could learn to work with the
dbms as their interest in accessing the data grew and they developed the
skills required. They will also learn how they will need to manipulate
the TP data in order to answer management and policy questions--for
example producing summaries or converting cross-sectional data into time
series records--and develop a better understanding of the extent to which
TP data will be applicable to decision support needs. These kinds of
data use would, of course, require implementation of mechanisms to
protect the integrity of the TP data so they are not inadvertently
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changed by the end users.
If CNI were to make a commitment to offering end user access to
information, however, they would have to change their software support
strategy significantly. At present, the packages are sold for a flat fee
with three years of software support included in the purchase price. So
far that support has only included setting up the software in Rades and
dealing with problems which arose in the test phase, since no other
cities are currently using the packages. CNI has not hired additional
staff to provide support, and apparently does not intend to do so. With
the current menu-driven packages and no means of accessing the data, the
amount of support required will probably be minimal.
However, if they were marketing a package with which users learned
to use database management tools and undertook increasingly complicated
projects, CNI might want to provide significant ongoing support. The
tools are not difficult to learn on microcomputers, but as users became
more sophisticated they would want to be able to turn to someone when
they had more complex questions about how to work with the packages. To
cover the costs of supporting a large number of end users, CNI might go
to a fee structure where the city paid an initial installation charge,
and then purchased an ongoing maintenance contract which paid for
support, upgrades, and other ongoing services. CNI would also have to
make the staff commitment to ensure that it could provide the support,
which they have not had to do so far.
CNI has chosen a software development and marketing strategy which
is motivated by a desire to improve routine operations without requiring
the cities to make major investments in DP professionals. Their
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software, support structure, and fees are designed accordingly. An
organization interested both in introducing transactions processing and
in encouraging use of information for decision support could develop
similar packages, but distribute them with the support and training
needed to allow interactive access to and analysis of the data. They
would write their applications using a database management package so
that the data would be more easily accessible to the end users. They
would also make a significant ongoing commitment to providing user
support, hiring the trained staff to help end users, and developing a fee
structure which would ensure a continuing source of funds to pay for end
user support.
Hardware
The hardware choices made by the Tunisian cities result from a
combination of several factors. First, the overall objectives of
automation, and the resulting applications and software choices,
determine the general specifications of the computers bought by Tunisian
cities. Second, within those general specifications cities make choices
based on the volume of data to be treated (closely related to city size),
how much they are willing to spend, and the machines available on
Tunisian markets. Although occasionally the direction of causality runs
the other way--for example the introduction of microcomputers influenced
the applications chosen for automation--usually objectives determine
hardware choices. Third, almost all of the cities studied view the
purchase of a computer as a one-time event, rather than as the gradual
development of a system.
Impact of Objectives
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The focus of Tunisian cities on transactions processing objectives
limits the considerations which go into hardware choices. Because none
of the cities is specifically interested in accessing or analyzing data,
they did not consider ease of doing so in their hardware choices. Thus
they did not take into account the availability of end user computing
tools on multi-user micros or minis, nor were they particularly
interested in micro-based packaged software as an argument in favor of
buying single-user micros. They also have not considered the ability to
network their machines, or the ease of transferring data across phone
lines to a PC in their hardware choices, and although Tunis has
considered using PCs rather than dumb terminals as the interface with
their multi-user systems, this is because they are cheaper, not in order
to permit end user computing.
By not considering the availability of end user computing tools in
hardware choices some cities have constrained their ability to shift into
decision support. Cities using IBM-compatible microcomputers will be
able to use EUC packages even if this was not a factor in their choice of
machines, if they can find a way to extract the data from their
applications. However Sousse and Sfax have purchased multi-user machines
for which EUC tools are not available. As a result the options available
to them if they develop an interest in accessing data more flexibly will
be limited.
Impact of Size and Price
Within the context of these overall objectives, the hardware options
considered by individual cities depend in large measure on city size and
willingness to pay. At the small-city end of the spectrum (cities with
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population under 50,000), the options are essentially limited to
purchasing a single-user PC and the CNI packages, or subcontracting with
Informatique et Gestion (I&G), the Tunis-based service bureau which has
specialized in meeting the data processing needs of municipal
governments. Financially the PC option is clearly better. For the
property tax application alone, the investment in an XT clone and the CNI
software package costs about $11,000. This pays for itself in less than
two years with the savings on I&G data processing for a city with ten
thousand parcels. The CNI software gives the city much more complete
coverage of the tax process, and puts control of the system in city hands
instead of requiring them to turn all of their records over to an outside
firm and submit to delays which are outside of their control. For all of
these reasons, the CNI option is likely to offer stiff competition to
Informatique et Gestion.1
Microcomputers could be used by Tunisian cities in two different
ways; putting all city operations on a single PC, or purchasing a
separate PC for each application to be automated. Although both Rades
and Kairouan claim that they will use only one PC for all of their
operations, in fact this is unrealistic; they will run out of space on
their hard disks, and run into bottlenecks over machine time as many
different departments try to access the same PC. With its two ten-
megabyte hard disks and nearly 15,000 records in the property tax system
1 Interestingly, the president of Informatique et Gestion is not
worried about the competition, and feels that his firm can
comfortably share the market with CNI. Possibly he feels that in
the time it will take for a significant number of cities to shift to
the CNI software, Informatique et Gestion will find other niches to
fill.
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(see Table 6-1), Kairouan is already running into data storage problems,
and its machine is in use at least half the time on property tax work.
In Rades, with only 5,000 parcels in the property tax system, and twenty
megabytes of hard disk space, a single PC can go much farther, but
machine time is likely to become a constraint there as well. With about
1,000 bytes per record on the property tax systems, a single PC could
probably be used to run this application for a city with 15,000 to 20,000
parcels. This would allow extra hard disk space for programs and
indexes, but would not leave hard disk space for manipulating more than
one year's data at a time, and so would not be adequate if analyzing time
series data was important to the city. This could serve a city of about
75,000 to 120,000 people, given that the case study cities average about
one parcel per four to six people (see Table 6-1). At the other end of
the size spectrum, nearly 50% of Tunisian cities have populations under
10,0002. Many of these cities may be able to automate all of their
operations on a single PC, and CNI has even suggested that very small
cities could join together to share a single microcomputer.
The options available to somewhat larger cities are less clear. Of
the two mid-sized cities studied, Kairouan has one XT and has only
automated one application, while Sousse has gone for multi-user micros on
which they are automating most of their routine operations. Sousse
purchased the two SANCOs for about $17,000 each, which makes them only
somewhat more expensive than PCs. The SANCOs offer the benefits of
multi-user file access, which was Sousse's main concern in buying them.
However, there are problems with this choice. Since no applications
2 1984 census of population data.
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packages are available and Sousse must develop custom applications for
transactions processing, the software costs are much higher than using a
PC with the CNI packages. The multi-user micros are also somewhat harder
to operate than PCs, and will therefore require more investment in DP
management time. In addition, because the SANCO machines are not an
industry standard and their architecture is closed, end user computing
tools are not being developed for them, and it may be difficult to find
hardware which is compatible with them.
A number of opportunities are available to mid-sized cities which
have not been tried in Tunisia. Networked microcomputers could allow a
city to automate the operations of many different departments without
conflicts over machine time. With data stored on a file server,
different departments--e.g. the tax service and the recette--would be
able to share data. Networks were not widely available when the CNI
packages were written, so they are not designed to run on a networked
system. Using them would therefore require the cities to schedule data
updates on the file server to avoid conflicts between departments sharing
data. However this configuration could facilitate end user access to the
data, allowing end users to analyze the information for management
decisions, working on their own PCs with packaged software.
Mid-sized cities could also consider using low-end minicomputers,
like the micro-VAX II. These would provide the multi-user access of the
SANCOs, but offer more EUC software availability and more expansion
potential. Like the SANCOs, a small mini would require custom software
development, but it could be done using the database management tools
which are available for the machine. End user computing would be more
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difficult on a small mini than on a network of PCs, because the packages
available are much more complex and require more training to use. Like
networked micros, this hardware option seems to be virtually unknown to
municipal governments in Tunisia.
For large cities the choices are more clear, because they do not
have the option of choosing between packaged software on PCs and custom
software on minis; only the minis are large enough to handle the amount
of data they generate. Two cities, Sfax and Ariana, have opted for a
single mini on which they are creating centralized DP operations. The
minis currently in use are much larger, more powerful, and more expensive
than the multi-user micros; for example, Sfax spent about $240,000 on its
IBM System 38. The cities buying minis are also investing a lot of money
in custom applications development, and are establishing larger DP
staffs. Neither city considered the availability of either EUC tools, or
packaged software for budget, payroll, tax assessment or other city
functions, in selecting their machines. Both cities have followed highly
structured IS strategies, planning their applications for years to come,
and buying enough hardware to support all the applications in their
plans.
The hardware configuration proposed in the Tunis IS plan, and the
process through which they arrived at it, suggest that Tunisian cities
are learning from experience with hardware as well as software. Unlike
other cities, Tunis compared several hardware configurations before
making a choice, and has opted for a mixed configuration of many
machines, instead of a single centralized system. The plan proposes a
centralized mini in the DP department to handle all parcel-based
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applications, and microcomputer workstations in nine user departments and
eleven neighborhood offices to serve as terminals and run independent
applications. It considered two other hardware configurations; a
completely centralized minicomputer, and a completely distributed system
of micros. They chose the intermediate route primarily to allow the
centralization desired for applications which share data, while
minimizing the extent to which they had to rely on networks or telephone
lines to transfer data.
While this configuration does suggest increased understanding of the
value of different kinds of hardware, it does not reflect a broader set
of objectives in automating. The departments and neighborhood offices
are using micros as terminals as a cost-saving measure, not in order to
take advantage of the software which they support, and the plan does not
call for use of PC packages to develop the applications which run on
micros. Thus although they are approaching hardware decisions more
flexibly than other cities, they still are not thinking in terms of the
management objectives which could be accomplished by a more flexible
approach to software.
The hardware and software readily available on Tunisian markets, and
the prices, may also limit the options which the cities consider. Very
low-end microcomputers are apparently more readily available than more
up-to-date technologies, so cities which seek advice from vendors will
not be exposed to a full range of options. The high cost of computer
equipment may also induce cities to purchase simpler machines than might
be optimal if they had a full range of choice. It may also be a factor
in their choice of somewhat outdated machines, such as dual-drive PCs or
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XTs with 256K of RAM and 10-meg disks, rather than ATs with larger hard
disks and 640K or PS2s.
Impact of Not Anticipating System Expansion
Beyond the focus on transactions processing, and the limits imposed
by city size and hardware cost and availability, Tunisian hardware
choices are affected by the fact that most city leaders see the purchase
of a computer as a one-time event. In cities ranging from Rades with one
XT, to Sfax and Ariana with their minis, city leaders said they would
have no reason to expand their hardware capacity in the future, because
the existing system was large enough to meet all of their needs.
Because they view their hardware investments as one-time purchases,
city leaders are not paying attention to developments in the computer
industry, or planning for the expandability of their systems. They are
not anticipating technological developments which will create new
opportunities which they will want to take advantage of in the future.
As a result, they run the risk of investing in systems which will not be
expandable. Admittedly, it is very difficult to keep fully abreast of
the rapid changes in computer hardware, especially from a Third World
country. However this lack of knowledge can lead cities to purchase
machines which can not be upgraded, may not be compatible with machines
likely to be commonly available in a few years, and may not even continue
to be supported by their manufacturers as technology changes.
The one exception to this pattern, Sousse, shows what can be gained
from viewing hardware as something which will develop incrementally as
software does. Sousse has gone through three different hardware
configurations in ten years, as their sense of what they needed and were
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willing to pay for changed. They seem to have been able to follow this
path in part because they did not have to prepare an IS plan until they
already had eight years of experience with computers, and therefore did
not have to commit themselves to any long-run plans. Moreover at some
points in their development they deliberately made small purchases in
order to avoid the CNI authorization requirements. Because they expect
to make additional hardware purchases in the future, they can be open to
new proposals like the land information system that they are now
considering, which will require purchase of graphics monitors and
digitizers. In this way they are more free to learn from their
experiences, and respond to new needs which arise from increased
understanding of how the technology can be used. Other cities may be
closing out this option by their insistence that they will not make
further hardware purchases in the future.
Summary: Choice of Hardware
This discussion of hardware choices provides a clear picture of the
factors which lead Tunisian cities to purchase systems which may not
adequately meet decision support needs. At the broadest level, their
objectives in automating determine the criteria which go into their
hardware specifications; at present that includes only a concern with
efficient transactions processing. Given their objectives, city size is
an important determinant of whether they choose PCs, multi-user micros,
or minis. Within a general type of machine, price and availability on
the Tunisian market limit choices of brands or models, causing some
cities to choose low-end machines which do not allow them to take full
advantage of what the technology can offer. The view of the purchase of
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a computer as something which will only be done once leads most cities to
introduce systems which may not be expandable in the future.
Two of these factors, the objectives of computer use and the one-
time approach to computer purchases, can be addressed through better
understanding of the technology and how it can be used for management
support. The limitations posed by prices and availability of computers
on the Tunisian market may have to be addressed through national policies
to lower costs and encourage supply of more up-to-date technology, such
as reduction in tariffs or encouraging collective purchasing which could
reduce prices.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DP SUPPORT
The roles of DP staff and other actors in the use of computers in
Tunisian municipalities are a direct outcome of their objectives in
automating and the technological choices made to implement them.
Tunisian cities are creating organizational environments which are
effective for implementing and using transactions processing systems, and
which look a lot like the distribution of roles for transactions
processing described in Chapter Three. They do not permit the
flexibility and learning which must accompany decision support, however,
and thus will not initiate the learning process needed for DSS to grow.
The overall pattern of responsibilities of DP professionals and
users in Tunisian cities is highly centralized. Whether they have a
micro or a mini, in all cities access to the machine is tightly
controlled, in what has sometimes been termed "managing micros like
mainframes". This is the easiest way to guarantee data security, avoid
274
the need to train large numbers of staff, and ensure the safety of
hardware and software.
However, these mechanisms make it difficult for any city staff to
gain the familiarity with computer use which is a starting point for
thinking about use of computers to support decision-making. Professional
and managerial staff cannot develop any expertise with computers, so they
have no sense of what the tool can do to improve their work. The
transactions processing applications implemented in most cities do not
contribute to creating a demand for information to support decision-
making, since they do not provide printed reports which could accustom
people to the availability of reliable information or serve as a starting
point for appreciating its utility. Moreover, these cities are setting
themselves up for the same organizational conflicts which have arisen in
the West over the introduction of end user computing. Because DP staff
are accustomed to centralized systems and tight management control, they
can be expected to resist the introduction of systems which reduce their
control, raising the same mix of technical and political objections which
have been heard in Western organizations. This could lead to the
introduction of microcomputers and end user computing by bypassing the DP
departments, as the West where end users have duplicated many of the
functions of DP staff and invented their own strategies for managing
computer use, at considerable additional cost to the organization.
In this respect as well as in their technical choices, Tunisian
cities are following the same pattern of development as Western
organizations have followed historically. This path may eventually lead
to an interest in decision support, as it has in the West. However, by
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not anticipating this interest, the cities are creating organizational
structures which will hinder it and make the shift to DSS more expensive
than it need be, even as their technological choices will constrain the
introduction of decision support tools. Instead of taking advantage of
the opportunity to accelerate the development of their information
systems capacity, they are slowing themselves down and following a more
costly route.
The roles which have evolved for different actors in the municipal
government illustrate why this pattern has evolved and how it will impose
costs. It is useful to consider each of the six actors discussed in the
framework; top managers, user department heads, professionals, clerks, DP
staff, and consultants.
City Leaders
In most cities top managers support automation, but do not know a
lot about it, and in many cases were not actively involved in initiating
it. As we discussed in considering who determines information systems
strategy, none of the secretary generals knows enough about computers to
actually choose among options. For the most part they have simply
responded positively or negatively to proposals put to them by the
outside advisors or the internal champions of automation.
Obtaining top leadership support has not been a major problem in any
of the cities, contrary to what could have been anticipated from the
literature on the use of information technology in development projects.
The difference is probably attributable to two factors. First, most of
these systems do not involve politically sensitive changes in municipal
operations. Consequently it is less likely that there will be opposition
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to implementing them, either at the level of top management, or elsewhere
in the organizational structure.
Second, because this research only looks at the cities which were
willing to invest in computer technology, it is of necessity limited to
those where the leadership supports automation. We did not study cities
where top managers squelched the suggestion that the city automate its
operations--although we have no evidence that there are any such cities.
Because of the structure of decision-making in Tunisia, no one could
decide to purchase a computer or receive the funds to do so without going
through the top managers. Therefore the projects that get underway are
the ones that have their support.
Kairouan is the exception to this, of course. Since that city did
not pay for its own system, top leaders did not have to be as committed
to automation as they did elsewhere. This relative lack of commitment
may explain some of their management decisions, such as not purchasing a
hardware maintenance contract for the XT, and not investing any city
funds to provide additional training for the system's users. This
suggests that the lack of top management support may be more apparent as
a problem in donor-funded projects than elsewhere, because in a city
without donor funds the project could never have been initiated without
management support.
User Department Heads
In most cases, end user department heads have played a passive role
in the automation of their work. The tax service staff and directors saw
automation as something that was done to them, over which they had no
control. In cities which were still planning property tax applications--
277
as in the recettes of cities which had already implemented the municipal
part of the automated systems--staff take a "believe it when I see it"
attitude. As a rule they felt that they had no part in the decision to
automate, or in the system design process. In many cases this was
literally true; for example the secretary general of Sousse indicated
that the head of the tax service was told, not asked, about the
automation of his department. Because of the authority structure of the
city governments, and because the applications are automating routine
processes rather than changing how decisions are made, it is possible to
implement new systems without more active cooperation or participation
from the user departments. For decision support systems this is not
likely to be effective, since such tools require the cooperation and
understanding of the users, and cannot be implemented by decree of the
secretary general. This role for the user departments would have to be
quite different in order to introduce systems which change the way
information is used in management and decision-making.
EUC Users/Professional Staff
Professional staff cannot access data through EUC tools in any
Tunisian city, with the possible exception of Kairouan. The property tax
applications do not permit end user access to data, nor do they generate
regular reports for distribution to professional and managerial staff.
As a result the professional staff are not using the property tax data at
all to support management of the tax or policy decisions.
At present there is not much demand for such information. In most
cities, the tax service staff consist of the director and a group of
census agents who collect data, assess properties, and write out
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assessment notices and tax roles. The director is the only professional
in the department, and the only one likely to be interested in using the
data. Most department heads are not currently interested in data access,
and the existing applications do not generate any such interest through
the provision of routine data reports.
However, once the property tax systems are fully operational,
department heads are likely to realize that routine automation is
inadequate to resolve many of the existing management problems. This
will probably be particularly true with respect to improving tax
recovery, as it becomes clear that although improving the billing process
will probably help, it is not sufficient to solve the problems. It may
also be true with respect to improving assessments, and developing ways
to reduce the number of appeals, both of which are of only secondary
importance at present. At that point demand may grow for improved access
to the information in the TP systems.
The growth in demand for information as managers recognize the
importance of policy problems will highlight the need to strengthen the
middle management and professional staff in Tunisian cities. With the
current flat organizational structure, few people in most of the cities
have either the skills or the authority to analyze management or urban
policy. The effective use of decision support systems may depend on some
strengthening the skills and expanding the numbers and authority of the
middle ranks of the municipal hierarchy, so that middle managers have
more real responsibility for evaluating options and making decisions.
Kairouan is the exception to the general absence of end user
computing. The property tax application includes routines which allow
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limited end user access to the data. Since the system is written in
dBase it is, of course, easy to access data through the package itself,
although the tax service staff do not know how to do this. When this
system was introduced no one in the city was interested in accessing
property tax data to support management of other city functions.
However, the ability to do so through the property tax package has
stimulated the tax service director's interest in analyzing the data, and
figuring out new ways to use it to help other managers in the city. His
use is limited by the software and his skills; however this example does
suggest that easy data access tools can serve as a catalyst to stimulate
further interest in using information to support decision-making.
The professional staff in other technical services departments--e.g.
overseeing new construction and subdivisions--may be interested in
accessing the data for management needs as well. However at present that
is both technically and organizationally difficult. Those staff have not
had any role in the development of most of the existing systems, so their
data needs have not been incorporated into them at all. So far this kind
of data use has occurred only in Kairouan, where data on commercial
properties collected in the property tax census are being used to assist
in the issuing of licenses to street merchants. The data needs of
professional planning staff have received some attention in the cities
now planning or developing integrated parcel-based databases (Sousse,
Tunis, and Ariana). However the focus in these systems is more on
integrating data structures than on allowing end user access to data, so
their impact will be limited to operational efficiencies rather than
permitting more effective management. Neither at present, nor in the
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future according to current plans, will these end users have an
opportunity to begin learning how they could use better information to
support their work.
Clerks
Unlike the experience in many of the donor-funded projects, the
impacts of automation on clerical staff have been felt more in the
reduced burden of manual processing than in the development of new
skills. Where the property tax systems are up and running, very few
people are trained to use them. The skills learned by these users are
minimal. They learn to run menu-driven packages, and they get a limited
sense of the mistakes that are possible in a system, since they have to
live with the bugs in the programs. However, because of the way the
systems are designed, there really is no cause or occasion for them to
learn much more about computers, and indeed they do not. Because their
skill development is so limited, they do not see new job markets opening
up for them, and retention of trained staff is not a major problem.
Clerical staff have sometimes been afraid of losing their jobs to
the computers. This has not happened. City officials uniformly
emphasize that no one will be fired because of automation. Most tax
service heads feel that tasks which have gone undone could now be handled
by the newly-freed census agents, although they are not always clear
about what those tasks are. In some cities the clerks are putting time
into the minor taxes and fees under the authority of the tax service (on
undeveloped land, hotels, signage, etc.), which had been slighted because
the property tax was so much more important. Municipal tax services may
well have been understaffed prior to automation, due to a hiring freeze
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in effect at a time when urban populations have grown substantially.
Consequently, the tax services may not be finding themselves with excess
of staff as a result of the introduction of the computers.
DP Staff
The DP staff have almost complete control over existing hardware,
information systems, and data. They manage hardware and software,
operate the machines, run programs in batch mode, run large printing
jobs, and handle other routine tasks. In most cities they are
responsible for systems development, or for supervising the activities of
consultants who are developing new systems. In some cities data entry is
shared by DP staff and end users; in others the DP professional does
everything on the computer including all end use of applications
packages. DP staff usually do not play an important role in IS planning,
though; their role is more operational and managerial than strategic.
It will be difficult to change this pattern to introduce end user
computing tools or decision support systems. As occurred in the West in
the 1970s, the DP staff are likely to resist introduction of a technology
which decreases their control over information systems and increases the
control of people without professional training in the field. Because
their training and experience has been in the use of centralized
transactions processing systems, they are likely to see user-developed
systems and interactive data access as risky and unreliable, because they
will not include the controls needed for transactions processing systems.
This may result in end user departments purchasing their own
microcomputers for end user computing, without benefiting from the
expertise of the DP staff. This has occurred widely in the West, where
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it is proving costly; it is also being repeated in donor-funded projects
which bypass existing DP departments. If DP staff were trained and hired
to work with both approaches to computing, it might be possible to avoid
the duplication and fragmentation of efforts which this pattern
generates.
The role of DP staff in the microcomputer-based cities puts a limit
on the extent to which potential end users can learn anything about
information systems. Rades has hired a single DP professional who is
expected to be the only user of the computer, and Kairouan expects to
follow the same model in making the tax service director into the DP
department head. Even though these cities have computers which allow
easy end user access, this model of computer use effectively prevents the
initiation of a learning path through which professionals or managers
could develop a sense of how information systems could support their
work. Although with only one microcomputer running several applications,
it would be difficult to open up machine access to end users, the
Kairouan experience so far shows that end users can learn to run their
own applications and can develop some understanding of how to use their
data if they have access to the machine. This suggests that for future
applications, as well, the cities would do better to put the end users
directly on the machine rather than funnelling access through a DP staff
person.
Outside Consultants
Outside consultants and advisors have played several roles in
Tunisian automation. In terms of influence on use of the technology,
their role as advisors and IS planners is clearly the most significant.
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The reliance on outsiders to develop IS strategy reflects the
inexperience of city leaders and DP staff with the planning and
management of information technology. As we have already discussed,
these outside advisors have largely set the course for municipal computer
use in the direction of transactions processing and rather than using the
technology to support managers or decision-makers.
They also play an important, although less influential, role in
systems development. The development of the consultant role in systems
development illustrates how Tunisian cities are learning from their own
experiences managing information technology. Most of the larger cities
have experience with both in-house development and hiring outside
consultants, and almost all of them expect to continue relying on outside
support for development. Through these experiences, most cities have
come to recognize IS operation and management as important tasks distinct
from systems development. When the DP director is overloaded, systems
development may be the only task which can easily be contracted out,
because the projects are relatively discrete and incremental. The
reliance on consultants may also result from public sector hiring
practices in Tunisia. Civil service salary restrictions and procedures
make it hard to hire good programmers in municipal government, and make
it impossible to hire anyone quickly or for a short-term job.
Consultants offer a way around many of these constraints, and so provide
a convenient route for many municipalities.
Summary: Organizational Structure and DP Support
The roles played by professionals and by DP staff will be the major
constraints as Tunisian cities recognize a need to use information in new
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ways to address management and policy problems. The transactions
processing systems being implemented in Tunisian cities do not allow
professional staff to begin the learning path which will be essential for
them to make effective use of data in their work. The control structure
and technical configurations which are upheld by the DP staff will also
be very difficult to change as the city's information system needs grow.
In these ways the organizational structures being created around
information technology resemble those of Western organizations, and will
impose significant costs on the cities when they become interested in
decision support.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the Tunisian experiences introducing computers in
municipal governments allows us to identify several important issues
which have implications for information systems strategies followed both
in Tunisia and in other countries. This chapter has allowed us to
clarify some of the major obstacles to use of computers to support both
operations and management in Tunisia, and identify key variables which
could be modified in order to overcome those obstacles. The next chapter
will discuss particular strategies for changing those variables, making
general recommendations for the introduction of information technology in
other countries.
The Tunisian Experiences
The Tunisian cases show a significant local and national commitment
to the use of information technology in municipal government. However,
Tunisian city leaders and their advisors are taking too narrow an
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approach to information technology. They define the problems facing
their cities in terms of routine operations, rather than fundamental
policy questions. As a result they are concentrating only on
transactions processing, and are not placing any emphasis on the ability
to access and analyze data. This will not be adequate to address the
management problems they currently face. Transactions processing systems
are essential to improve the efficiency and accuracy of ongoing
operations, freeing staff time to deal with non-routine tasks; they are
an appropriate starting point in all of the cases. In addition, however,
the introduction of interactive software tools which allow end user
access to data is needed to strengthen the information base which
professional and managerial staff use to address problems such as
improving property tax recovery, streamlining tax administration, and
improving property assessments.
The information systems being set up in response to Tunisian
objectives will impose significant limitations on use of the technology
in the future. The focus on transactions processing alone will greatly
increase the difficulty and cost of assisting professional and managerial
staff to use information in their work once they recognize this need.
Because they have not anticipated broad objectives from the start, most
cities will find themselves locked into technical and organizational
configurations which do not allow an easy shift into decision support
applications. The software choices and applications designs do not
provide end users any access to automated data. As a result, they cannot
begin the learning process which is essential for effective use of
decision support tools. Because this access has not been a consideration
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in hardware choices, the cities have often purchased computers on which
such tools are not available, limiting their ability to expand in this
direction in the future. Moreover, the DP staff roles appropriate to
support these transactions processing systems are creating an entrenched
data processing staff likely to resist the introduction of technologies
which reduce their control over information systems. This threatens to
duplicate the pattern of the West, where end user computing had to be
introduced around the existing DP staff, rather than with their help,
because they would not support a new technology which they could not
control.
Thus in the Tunisian experience the existence of computer technology
which could support both transactions processing and decision support is
not sufficient to bring about an information systems development strategy
which incorporates both objectives. Tunisian cities do use some of the
hardware which could permit development of systems which meet both
objectives, such as microcomputers and minicomputers. However they do
not have access to information about Western experiences with this
technology, or about the costs generated by the sequential development
pattern of Western organizations. Without the information to show why a
broader approach is necessary and what it would take to implement it,
they have not used the technology to facilitate both transactions
processing and decision support on the same systems.
One interpretation of this experience is that it simply is not
feasible to bypass the learning process followed by Western organizations
over the past thirty years; that learning from the experiences of others
is not a satisfactory alternative to learning through experience. The
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Tunisian cities do not allow us to prove or disprove this hypothesis,
because they have not tried to bypass the Western stages of development.
However, several factors suggest that this hypothesis will not explain
what we have observed in Tunisia. First, the case of Kairouan clearly
shows that the availability of some access to information leads end users
to change their orientation towards computer use, pushing the city into a
different development path from the Western one. Second, the literature
on use of information technology in development projects which was
discussed in Chapter 2 supports the idea that if someone provided access
to information and showed the users how it could be helpful, this would
spark interest in its use. Third, Tunisian cities currently do not have
information about Western experiences, their experiences do not enable us
to assess whether such information would allow them to take a faster
route.
Obstacles to Broader Objectives
The Tunisian cases do suggest three key factors which explain their
approach to automation. First, the overwhelming scope of the manual
processing tasks facing Tunisian cities creates an immediate need to
concentrate on transactions processing systems. On the property tax in
particular, the time required to write out tens of thousands of
assessment notices and bills each year sets the cities months and even
years behind on tax collection, making it impossible to recover most of
the tax owed. It is eminently reasonable that Tunisian cities regard the
automation of routine tasks as their first priority. Moreover, there are
some differences between transactions processing and decision support
data requirements, which mean that one system can not fully meet both
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needs. However, this does not justify a focus on transactions processing
to the exclusion of other less immediate but equally important needs.
Second, the centralization of authority and decision-making which
characterizes Tunisian municipal governments works against the
introduction of systems which make it easier to use information in
decision making. The overall nature of local government in Tunisia goes
far beyond the scope of any information systems project, or the scope of
this thesis. However, even with the current structure of local
government, it would be possible to improve municipal management through
better use reliable data to support policy decisions. Developing and
implementing strategies to make this happen will be an important part of
any effort to introduce a broader perspective on the use of information
technology.
Third, and perhaps most important, the cases highlight the
importance of access to information about computer technology, its use,
and its management, in determining the patterns followed by the cities.
City leaders rely very heavily on outside advisors and in-house computer
staff who by training and experience are oriented only towards custom-
built transactions processing systems. Tunisian computer professionals
have not yet learned to think in terms of systems which place access and
control in the hands of end users of information as well as trained
programmers and systems analysts, nor do they take advantage of modern
applications packages. At the same time city leaders do not know enough
about the technology to evaluate either the objectives or the software
solutions proposed by their advisors. Neither the formal training of
computer professionals, nor the informal learning within and across
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cities, incorporates the experiences of Western organizations which are
further along than Tunisia in their use of the technology. This lack of
knowledge leads the cities to retrace the path followed by Western
organizations in the 1960s, rather than bypassing this sequence in favor
of an approach which incorporates both transactions processing and
decision support objectives.
Potential for Overcoming Obstacles
The six case studies suggest that Tunisian cities face significant
obstacles to using information technology in a broader and more flexible
way. However, none of the obstacles seems to be insurmountable. The
importance of exposure to Western experiences and knowledge suggests that
cities will have to rely heavily on outside influence and expertise in
order to broaden their perspective on automation. The example of CNI,
which has been both instrumental in assisting the introduction of
computers in local government and in facilitating learning across cities,
suggests a valuable model for how the national government could encourage
automation at the local level. Foreign donors may also play an important
role in improving understanding of the problems and potential of current
information technology. The next chapter presents a series of strategies
designed to overcome the obstacles which have limited Tunisian cities,
and describes the technological and organizational configurations which
could enable Third World municipalities to achieve a broader set of
objectives.
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CHAPTER 7
IMPLEMENTING AUTOMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADVICE
The Tunisian experiences suggest that a fundamental issue in the
introduction of computers in developing country municipalities will be
the definition of objectives. The basic problems faced by the Tunisian
cities depend both on transactions processing systems to simplify routine
operations, and on access to decision support tools with which managers
can analyze and evaluate existing procedures. In the case of the
property tax, for example, transactions processing systems are essential
in order to produce tax bills and roles in a timely manner, but they will
not be sufficient to improve tax recovery. Improving tax recovery will
depend on the ability to analyze payment data in order to design
effective collective and enforcement strategies. While the Tunisian
cities are responding to the immediate need to improve processing, they
are designing systems which will not address the fundamental tax recovery
problems.
The issue here is one of how problems are framed. At present
Tunisian city leaders are framing their problems in terms of processing
needs, rather than in terms of the fundamental goals which they hope to
accomplish by automating. As a result, they are developing computer
systems which are well suited to the immediate needs, but not to the
ultimate ones. The development path followed by Western organizations,
and the nature of the problems being discussed in Tunisia, suggest that
in time the Tunisian cities will redefine their objectives in terms of
solving basic problems rather than simply improving efficiency. When
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that happens they will recognize that the computer systems now being
implemented are not adequate to accomplish their ultimate goals, and they
will begin redesigning those systems. However, Western experience has
also shown that this is a slow and costly route to follow, because it
involves development of information systems and organizational structures
which are difficult and expensive to change.
What is needed, therefore, is a way for Tunisian cities to recognize
these ultimate objectives earlier, so that they can begin their
information systems development process with a focus on systems which
will meet both immediate and medium term needs. This is possible today
because the technological starting point is sufficient to allow the
development of such systems, whereas it was not in the past. It could
happen if city leaders took a more comprehensive approach to framing
their own problems, so that they would recognize the need for information
systems which allow analysis of information as well as simple processing.
However it is not clear what will cause that shift in thinking on the
part of city leaders. Nor is it clear how that shift would translate
into a different information system design given how little they know
about the technology. Of course it is possible that city leaders in
other countries--unlike the Tunisians--are already thinking in these
terms, and therefore are ready to look at more detailed questions of how
to design and implement information systems which meet their long-run
goals. If they are not already thinking in these terms, however, the
shift to a broader approach to problem definition could come from
outsiders, who encourage city leaders to think more broadly about their
goals, and who serve as the catalysts for the development of information
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systems which can meet those goals.
Consequently, our recommendations for how to facilitate the
introduction of information technology in municipal governments are
addressed towards several different actors. First, we describe the
strategies which could be followed by cities which are already committed
to using information technology to support immediate and medium term
goals. In this area we consider management strategies and the hardware
and software configurations which could be appropriate for cities of
different sizes or with different automation needs. Second, we look at
two different kinds of outside institutions, national government agencies
and foreign donors, to see how they can influence the ways in which
municipal governments frame their problems or approach the use of
information technology.
INDIVIDUAL CITY STRATEGIES
Cities whose IS objectives include dealing with immediate processing
needs and addressing fundamental long-run policy problems will have to
think about both organizational and technological issues in developing
their information systems. We will discuss several management issues
first, because they will be relevant to all of the technological
configurations likely to be used. These concerns include the role of DP
staff, how city leaders work with outside advisors, and what steps will
be needed to support the use of information in decision-making. With
these general management issues on the table, we will consider the
technological choices likely to be made by the cities. These will depend
largely on city size, automation needs, and of course the objectives of
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automation. We will discuss several configurations which could be of
interest, considering how they are suited to different cities, and their
implications for IS management and DP support.
General Management Issues
Roles of DP Staff
>> DP staff should be able to provide the support required for both
transactions processing and decision support, without expecting that
they will have total control over all computing in the organization.
>> Developing management and DP structures appropriate for decision
support may require decentralization of authority and access to
information within the organization.
Transactions processing systems and decision support systems require
different kinds of DP support and management. Transactions processing
systems are usually centralized, and require that a significant amount of
control be in the hands of computer professionals who can ensure the
security of the data. This is sometimes thought of as the "mainframe"
approach to managing information systems. However, it is not a function
of hardware so much as of the type of applications being run. Even on
microcomputers, transactions processing systems will often require tight
centralized control to ensure the reliability of the data and the smooth
operation of the system.
Decision support systems, on the other hand, will not be effective
unless end users have more control over their own computing, and DP staff
play a more supportive advisory role. The success of decision support
depends on end users having the flexibility to experiment with their own
software and data, without being hampered by the standard procedures and
controls which are essential for transactions processing. However they
are likely to need help from computer professionals to determine how to
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access information, analyze data, or select software tools.
It may be difficult to establish these two very different modes of
operation within a single DP department. Cities should anticipate this
problem when they introduce computers. In particular, they should try to
keep DP staff whose initial responsibilities are for transactions
processing from becoming so entrenched in that role that they cannot
provide support for end user computing, or regard it as an encroachment
on their turf. If computer professionals are hired to be part of a
department whose goals are clearly defined in terms of both transactions
processing and decision support, it may be easier to prevent this
entrenchment than if they are hired to develop transactions processing
applications and later asked to shift into a more supportive role on end
user computing.
The mode of DP operations appropriate to end user computing,
particularly the distribution of control over hardware, software, and
data access, may conflict with the prevailing culture or authority
structure of the organization. If, as in Tunisia, the authority
structure is highly centralized and the culture does not support broad
access to information or initiative in making decisions, it may be
difficult to introduce the decentralized management style appropriate for
effective decision support. This could require a significant
redistribution of control within the organization; in Tunisian cities it
could mean giving department heads access to information and the
authority to make decisions which they now refer to the mayor or
secretary general. The extent to which this creates conflict will depend
heavily on the existing organizational structure and culture, and the
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extent to which it can accommodate the decentralized control appropriate
for decision support.
Role of Outside Advisors
>> City leaders should take a critical approach to their advisors,
seeking information from many sources, and comparing and evaluating
the options they offer.
City decision-makers often do not know very much about information
technology, and so rely heavily on advice provided by outside
consultants. One strategy which may put city leaders in a better
position to evaluate the advice they receive would be to hire several
independent consultants to prepare preliminary information systems plans,
rather than relying heavily on a single advisor to fully develop and
implement an IS strategy. In these preliminary plans--which would, of
course, be much less detailed and expensive than the Tunisian IS plans--
they should ask for alternative scenarios, and explanations of why one is
recommended over another. This would give the cities several opinions to
compare instead of only one to follow, and could enable them to use the
IS planning process as an opportunity to learn more about what can be
done with computers. With more awareness of the broad range of options
available to them, they will be better equipped to assess the trade-offs
involved in their choice of strategies, rather than leaving their
strategies up to the preferences of a single advisor.
For cities like those in Tunisia, this would involve a significant
change from the current approach. However this route is not totally
unfamiliar. Large Tunisian cities now use this approach to select
hardware, for which they issue an RFP and then choose among the
responses. For hardware, the criteria for evaluating the proposals can
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be specified in explicit rules, like those defined by CNI for Tunisian
cities. If the cities apply this approach to choose an IS strategy, they
will have to establish criteria for choosing among options; however
because the issues are less quantifiable, it will not be possible to
develop rules which are as clear cut. The more the city leaders talk to
computer advisors, and the better their understanding of the options, the
better equipped they will be to choose the option best suited to their
needs. Helping cities to develop criteria for evaluating different IS
strategies may be an area in which outside organizations like the
national government or foreign donors could play a useful role.
Supporting the Use of Information
>> The introduction of information technology should include provision
of software tools and training to overcome reluctance or
inexperience with the use of information in making decisions. At
different points on the TP-DSS continuum this may include:
- providing standard reports on transactions processing data to
managers, in order to stimulate interest in using information by
showing how it can assist their work;
- consideration by systems analysts of how the automated data could
be used by professional and managerial staff;
- involving potential end users in the systems design process, in
order to encourage them to think about what kind of data they
will need and how they will want to use it; this will serve both
to elicit information about how information will be used, and to
educate the users about how information could support their work;
- including report generators in TP systems, so that as interest in
using information begins to grow it will be easy to produce new
reports;
- helping end users to retrieve or manipulate data so they are in a
form useful for decision support;
- helping end users to anticipate connections between municipal
data bases and those of other organizations;
- training end users in the use of analytical tools;
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- strengthening the ranks of professional and management staff who
can carry out policy analysis;
- providing incentives for the use of information in decision-
making.
Even when city leaders are convinced of the value of information to
support decision-making, professional and managerial staff within the
cities may not yet be accustomed to working this way. These deliberate
steps to encourage and support better use of information in making
decisions may therefore be an important part of the design and
implementation of information systems.
The simplest strategies to support the use of information involve
providing standard reports to people who may not have expressed any
interest in receiving them, simply to show them how the information may
relate to their work. These will be based on the systems analysts' best
estimates of how the information could be used, and on input from the end
users during the systems development process. Report generators will
make it easier to develop new reports from transactions processing
applications, as interest in the information grows.
As end users become interested in more complex investigation of TP
data, DP staff will have to deal directly with the differences between
the data required for TP and for DSS. In looking at a single year, end
users will probably want extracts of the data files, since the level of
detail in the base data will be too great to work with easily. These
will have to be provided by the DP staff unless the data are accessible
through a database manager and the structures so simple that end users
can pull out their own extracts. Similarly, if end users are interested
in time series data they will probably need help constructing data
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extracts which provide the information they need. If data structures
have been modified at any point this can be very difficult. The more
these kinds of needs can be anticipated by end users during the
development of the TP systems, the simpler it will be to meet those needs
later on.
At yet a greater level of complexity, in developing TP systems it
may be desirable to anticipate an interest in linking city databases with
those of other organizations. This would call for coordinating the
city's coding rules for such variables as addresses or street names with
those of other agencies like the post office or the national planning
agency. This level of inter-agency cooperation may be very difficult to
implement in a city new to automation, however, and would greatly
increase the time required to get startup applications like the property
tax up and running. While it may be desirable for city IS planners to
have some idea of the issues involved, and the benefits to be gained from
coordinating their systems with other agencies, it may be unrealistic to
expect such coordination to actually happen in cities new to automation.
When city staff begin trying to use information to support
management or decision-making, various other constraints may become
apparent, and will require attention. Both city leaders and professional
staff may need help in thinking through the problems which the cities
face, and developing a clear sense of how improved information could help
solve them. Professional staff may lack the analytical skills to
adequately frame or answer research questions, and may therefore need
training not only in the use of computers, but in the analytical methods
which can be implemented on a computer. The need to strengthen the ranks
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of middle management may also surface, as cities recognize that they
simply do not have a staff of skilled professionals qualified to take on
the policy analysis tasks which are required to develop solutions to
urban problems. It may also be necessary to create some form of
incentives for managerial staff to use information in their decisions,
such as rewarding managers who make effective use of the tools with
increased responsibility, more control over their own budgets, or better
access to computer resources.
Hardware and Software Configurations
Requirements
>> The hardware and software system should allow the development of
efficient and secure transactions processing systems.
>> Both the hardware configuration and the brands or models of
equipment selected should allow easy interactive access to automated
data and end user computing tools in order to facilitate the use of
information in management and decision making.
>> The system should be expandable, i.e. there should exist
straightforward routes to expand hardware capacity, there should be
an active market for software that runs on the system, and it should
account for a sufficient share of the market that future hardware
and software will have to be compatible with it.
>> The system should be compatible with the organizational structure
and management style of the city.
Implementing these requirements involves an evaluation of a wide
range of hardware and software options, how they are suited to the needs
of different cities, and the trade-offs involved in choosing among them.
The Tunisian cases and the experiences of Western organizations suggest
that the appropriate options depend on the size of the city, the nature
of the applications to be automated, the city's management style, the
availability of skilled computer professionals, and the emphasis placed
on different automation objectives. The discussion which follows
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considers some of the configurations of hardware and software which could
meet these requirements. We do not attempt to predict changes in the
technology, or how they will affect the particular choices made by the
cities. However, the factors going into these choices, and the issues
underlying the trade-offs, will not change with marginal improvements in
the technology, so even if the particular hardware or software options we
consider may change somewhat, the general issues will continue to be
important.
Single Microcomputer
Very small cities have the most narrow range of choice. They will
probably be limited to purchasing a single microcomputer, or sending out
their data processing to a service bureau. As we saw in Tunisia, service
bureaus can be useful for routine processing with no investment in in-
house hardware, software, or skills. However they cannot provide many of
the services needed to allow decision support or end user computing. If
these are part of the city's objectives, purchasing a microcomputer and
making some investment in staff and software will be essential.
The single microcomputer route could provide a starting point to a
range of cities. In very small towns it may be possible to automate all
of the city's operations on a single PC. For this to be workable, two
conditions must be met; the city's data must all fit on one hard disk,
and processing must not take enough time to generate conflicts over
access to the machine.. Clearly most cities are not this small. For
larger cities the single-microcomputer starting point can be used to
automate a single application, with the expectation that the city will
purchase additional machines for further applications. This strategy
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could be pursued by quite large cities, as long as the data for the
application chosen fits on a PC hard disk and multi-user access to the
system is not necessary.
Cities using, or beginning with, a single microcomputer face two
important questions about their hardware choices. They will have to
decide how large and powerful a machine they want: how much disk space,
how much memory, and so on. For transactions processing the decision can
be based on the volume of data to be treated. However, end user
computing requires access to much more storage space and memory, to allow
users to experiment without being overly constrained by the machine.
Given current price trends for storage and memory, cities should purchase
generously; the tendency observed in the Tunisian cases to buy low-end
microcomputers is probably not warranted because it will not allow the
space desirable for end user computing.
Perhaps a more important issue will be whether the organization
should buy microcomputers running DOS or OS/2. At the time of this
writing, DOS is still very much an industry standard, and the software
options for PCs, XTs, and ATs are better than for OS/2. However, this
may change rapidly in the near future. The software packages being
developed for OS/2 typically run on ATs, although they may perform better
on PS/2s, especially the more powerful models. However they will not be
usable on PCs or XTs, so cities with low-end microcomputers will be
closed out of many new developments. This kind of consideration makes it
essential that cities interested in automation develop some mechanism to
keep abreast of developments in the industry.
Transactions processing applications can be developed on
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microcomputers using either high-level programming languages or the wide
range of software packages readily available for the machines. More
specialized programs, like mass appraisal packages or the CNI
applications, are not widely available for Third World needs, although as
the Tunisian cases have shown they can be very valuable. Under most
circumstances, therefore, applications will be developed using database
management packages or spreadsheets, because they are easy to use, allow
rapid system modifications, and facilitate end user access to data.
Microcomputers also support a wide range of inexpensive and flexible end
user computing tools, which constitute a major argument for purchasing
single-user PCs.
The management style appropriate for a single-microcomputer
environment will depend on the applications being run. As discussed
above, transactions processing applications will require a relatively
centralized, controlled management style, although still it need not be
as tightly controlled as in Rades, where the one DP staff member is the
only person allowed to touch the computer. DP professionals could do the
applications development, or oversee the implementation of programs
developed by consultants, but end users would do the data entry, queries,
production of standard outputs like tax bills, and other routine use of
menu-driven programs. To the extent that the city is using its machine
for decision support, however, end users will need access to the machine,
and to data and interactive software tools with which to explore and
analyze the data, generate their own reports, and carry out inquiries.
This will shift some control away from DP staff, because end users will
have direct access both to data and to the tools with which to analyze
303
them.
Beginning automation with a single microcomputer can allow an
organization to make some headway in the information systems area without
hiring any DP professionals. Although the extent to which microcomputer
systems can be designed and managed by non-professionals has often been
exaggerated, and significant technical skills will still be required to
develop rigorous transactions processing applications, it is possible to
introduce and use microcomputers with only limited professional help.
Where skilled computer staff are scarce, or the organization is not ready
to make the long-term commitment involved in hiring a permanent employee,
this opportunity can be very valuable.
Multiple Microcomputers
Most cities will be too large to contain their information systems
operations to a single microcomputer. Several different hardware options
may be considered by these cities, including multiple stand-alone PCs,
networked PCs, multi-user microcomputers, and minicomputers. At the
scale of the Tunisian cities, mainframes are not likely to be seriously
considered, although of course in other countries they could be essential
for municipal automation. The choice among these options--or the
combination of them--will be based on the nature of the applications to
be automated, the volume of data involved, the organization's management
style, the availability of skilled computer professionals, and other
features of the information systems environment.
The simplest route beyond a single PC is to set up several
unconnected microcomputers. This approach is reasonable when either
machine time or data storage space is too limited to allow different
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departments to share a single PC. It is appropriate for an organization
with several independent applications, each of which can be handled on a
single machine, and none of which share databases. Stand-alone micros
will not be useful, however, if different departments regularly need to
access each other's updated data. Sharing data across unconnected
microcomputers requires copying information onto floppies and passing
them back and forth. This is adequate for occasional file transfers, but
is unlikely to be reliable enough for applications which depend on
accurate, up-to-date data.
The second option, networked microcomputers, can facilitate the data
sharing which is hard to accomplish with stand-alone machines. By using
the currently available PC network systems, the city can allow users
working on different PCs to read and write to the same data, without the
need to store duplicate copies on each machine. This raises questions
about whether applications software will run securely over the network.
Some database management packages already have network versions which
will allow multiple access to files, and which the cities should be able
to use without rewriting their applications programs. In choosing a
database management package in the first place, the city should take this
into account; this is an instance where anticipating future needs may
save the cities significant conversion costs. If the database package
does not have a network version, then it will be necessary to schedule
data updates so that the different user departments do not conflict with
each other, as with the unconnected machines, or to rewrite the
applications using a package which is designed to run on a network.
Management of multiple independent or networked microcomputers will
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be more complex than management of a single PC, and will be difficult
without specialized staff responsible for keeping the system running.
Keeping track of many stand-alone micros configured differently, and
setting up mechanisms to assure the reliability of data shared across
them, is much more work than dealing with only one machine. Introducing
a network will increase the level of technical skills required, in order
to install the network, design a machine configuration which meets the
users' needs, and train end users to work with it. Cities which
introduced a single microcomputer without any DP staff will probably have
to hire someone to maintain and manage this system, and because network
technology is new, this expertise may be hard to find. Moreover, as the
number of machines grows, the management and control of the system will
become increasingly complex and decentralized. The DP staff may find
themselves trying to maintain many machines which are configured
differently, running different software, and being used by different
people. Both from a simple control standpoint, and in the context of the
existing management structure, this decentralized structure may be hard
to operate if it expands beyond a certain size.
Multi-User Machines
The alternative to using multiple PCs is to set up centralized
multi-user machines, either multi-user microcomputers or minicomputers.
Although there is wide variation within these two groups of machines,
they share some essential features in comparison with single-user
microcomputers. Micros are well designed for incremental growth of a
decentralized system in which end user computing is very easy, and the
level of professional skills required relatively low. Multi-user
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machines, by comparison, are designed to centralize many applications and
users on a single machine, allowing larger individual files and efficient
sharing of data among departments, and making the system much easier to
manage and control than multiple PCs. Their centralized DP management
structures may be more compatible with the organizational structure of
the city as a whole, making the system easier to introduce. Managing
multi-user systems typically requires more technical knowledge than
managing single-user machines, however, which means that from the start
the city must hire skilled DP professionals. As a result the incremental
development of computer skills which PCs allow will be more difficult
with multi-user machines. Whereas PC-based end user computing tools are
plentiful, cheap, and easy to learn, their multi-user equivalents are
typically much more expensive and considerably more difficult. There is
also a stronger industry standard in the PC world than in the multi-user
world, which makes PC hardware and software choices simpler than multi-
user choices. Some minis, like the VAX line, offer upward compatibility
for system expansion within the products offered by a single
manufacturer, but this is not always the case. For cities anticipating
population growth the upward expansion potential of some minis may be an
important consideration, however, since they may fear reaching the limit
above which the micros would simply be inadequate.
The differences between multi-user micros and minis are significant.
The major advantage of multi-user micros is cheap shared file access:
they cost less than most minis, but are easier to manage than stand-alone
PCs. However, unlike PCs, there is no industry standard for operating
systems or software design on the multi-user micros, and the market is
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changing rapidly. Their operating systems are often proprietary versions
of UNIX, which means that there is little packaged software developed for
them. The DOS-based PC packages do not run on the multi-user micros, nor
do standard applications packages written for the VMS or UNIX operating
systems on the minicomputers. Hardware compatibility will also be open
to question, depending on the machine. Given the existence of the low-
end minis which can be upgraded, and the availability of multi-user file
access via PC networks, the arguments for multi-user micros are not
convincing.
For cities interested in multi-user systems, minicomputers are a
more viable option than multi-user micros. They typically offer more end
user computing software, although using EUC tools on minis is still
considerably more difficult than on PCs. Compared to the multi-user
micros, there is more compatibility among systems, and depending on the
brand and model they can be easier to upgrade.
Most minis offer two viable options for developing transactions
processing applications: high-level languages, and database managers
with associated fourth generation programming languages. In the West,
minicomputers also offer a wide range of specialized applications
software marketed with the hardware as turnkey systems. However, few
such packages have been developed to meet Third World needs, so cities
using minis will typically have to develop custom applications. The
choice between programming languages and database management tools or
fourth generation languages is more complex than it is on micros, and is
linked to the strategies for providing end user access to data. Two
different approaches are likely to be viable. One is to purchase a mini
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which supports good database management software and a wide range of end
user computer tools, such as a VAX. The city would develop applications
using a database manager and its programming tools, and train end users
to work directly on the mini from terminals or from PCs connected to the
system. The alternative is to develop applications on the mini, using
either dbms tools or a programming language, but download data to PCs for
analysis using micro-based EUC tools.
The first configuration simplifies the management of the computer
system, because it puts everyone onto a single centralized machine.
Using the dbms for transactions processing applications should speed up
systems development if programmers are trained to work with it, and will
provide a flexible means of access to information. However, it requires
a large up-front investment in dbms software and training of DP staff and
end users, and for some applications the software tools may be clumsy,
inefficient, or simply too slow. Mini-based end user computing tools are
also much more difficult than PC packages for interactive access to data,
because they require more sophistication both with the applications
software and with the more complex operating environment of the minis.
This may deter end users from trying to get direct interactive access to
the data, and so limit the impact of the system on the use of information
in management or decision-making.
The second configuration will probably be easier to implement than
the first. It allows DP staff to use familiar programming languages to
develop applications, and offers a route by which EUC can be added on
incrementally when the city is ready. Moreover, PC-based EUC tools are
much easier to use, more plentiful, and less expensive than mini-based
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tools. This configuration can also allow the city to select a mini which
meets requirements like handling Arabic data, even if it does not support
EUC tools. It leaves open the question of whether transactions
processing applications are written in programming languages or using
database management tools and fourth generation languages. There is no
right answer here; the choice will depend on the applications and the
preferences of the programmers.
The mini-micro configuration will raise some problems, however.
Connecting microcomputers to the mini and downloading data can become a
significant stumbling block in developing country context, where networks
are unfamiliar, and dedicated telephone lines can take years to install.
In addition, as the microcomputer system providing end user computing
grows, managing it and training end users to work on it will raise many
of the management issues faced by cities using only microcomputers.
The expansion opportunities offered by minicomputers depend very
much on the particular machine. Some brands, such as the VAXes, are
designed to offer a full range of compatible machines of different sizes,
so that system upgrades are straightforward. Others, such as the IBM
System 32, 34, 36 or 38 series, can only be upgraded within the series,
and not across them. The same type of situation exists with respect to
software availability and the expectation that new products will be
compatible with existing systems. Here the issue is somewhat more
complex, however, because it depends on expectations about questions like
whether VMS or UNIX will be the standard operating system for VAX minis.
This uncertainty and variation in the industry makes it very important
that cities purchasing minicomputers include these considerations in
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their hardware choices, or they can easily end up with machines which
will not allow them to grow as they learn from experience. Cities using
microcomputers for end user computing will have to develop a similar
awareness about trends in that industry in order to permit expansion of
their decision support capability.
Summary: Individual City Strategies
The recommendations to individual cities are designed to suggest the
opportunities and difficulties involved in designing an information
systems strategy and configuration which includes both transactions
processing and decision support. Many different configurations of
hardware and software can provide both transactions processing and
decision support tools, and allow for growth of the system as city needs
develop. The choice among them will depend largely on the nature of the
applications to be automated, the volume of data to be treated, the
availability of packaged software, and existing management style and
organizational structure. The hardware and software configurations
chosen will have important implications for how information technology is
managed, which must also be taken into account in designing a city's
approach to information systems.
The discussion of individual city strategies raises many needs,
particularly for information and knowledge, which cities will be hard
pressed to meet on their own. Although the technology is already
available, cities need routes through which they can learn from Western
experiences. This will help them understand the importance of setting
broad objectives in the design of IS strategies, in order to avoid
incurring the costs faced by Western organizations as they shifted from
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transactions processing to decision support. More specifically, cities
may find it hard to follow many of our management recommendations, such
as defining IS objectives which will address fundamental urban problems,
developing criteria for evaluating the IS strategies proposed by
different advisors, and training professional staff in the analytical
methods needed for policy analysis. They will also need help developing
better knowledge of hardware and software, particularly developing ways
to keep up on developments in the computer industry. They may also need-
-or at least benefit from--someone developing software packages for
specific city applications, which could allow cities to begin automating
without hiring any computer staff or investing in custom software
development. These are areas in which outside organizations,
particularly the national government or foreign donors, are well equipped
to assist local governments in the introduction of information
technology. The next sections describe mechanisms through which these
institutions could become involved with local automation efforts in order
to meet some of these needs.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY
National policy on information systems is an area of very broad
concern, touching on many different aspects of the technology. The
Tunisian experiences suggest two areas in which the national government
could have a particular impact on municipal computer use. First, a
national organization like CNI could serve as a vehicle for providing
better information to local governments about Western experiences with
information technology and management, as well as for developing software
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packages to meet particular local needs. Second, where university
education is public, as it is in most developing countries, the national
government can shape the training of the computer professionals who
significantly influence IS objectives and strategy in the Tunisian cases.
This can provide a mechanism for introducing more current knowledge about
information technology, and providing the exposure to Western experiences
which would highlight the need for decision support tools to address
basic management and policy questions.
National Organization to Support Computer Use
>> A national organization to support computer use could play an
important role in implementing the individual city strategies
described above, by providing software development and marketing,
strategic assistance to individual cities, and public education.
CNI offers a useful model for how a national government can
encourage and influence the use of information technology at the local
level. A national computer organization need not have CNI's quasi-
public profit-making status, however. Many other possible relationships
with the national administration could be envisioned, including
incorporating its functions into an existing ministry, giving it greater
independence, making it a non-profit organization, or encouraging the
development of some of its functions in the private sector. Which
structure is appropriate may depend on such considerations as how
information technology is managed in other parts of the national
government, the strength of local computer and software markets, the
availability of skilled computer professionals, and the relationship
between local and national government. The Tunisian cases do suggest,
however, that certain of CNI's functions are useful to local governments,
and that some or all of them could effectively be provided by some
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national authority.
Software Development
>> The organization should consider developing software packages for
local governments which would save the cost of custom software
development. Both the software itself and the support with which it
is marketed should be designed to improve operating efficiency, as
well as to encourage the use of the automated information in
management and decision-making.
Developing specialized software packages for local public agencies
can be a valuable way to support the use of information technology at the
local level. The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the existence
of a market like the Tunisian local governments, where many organizations
could use the same programs because their operating procedures are
similar enough to permit sharing software. When this is the case, there
can be significant economies of scale in producing software packages, and
the availability of these tools can significantly reduce the cost of
introducing information technology in small cities.
For such packages to support both transactions processing and
decision support, the organization should follow a strategy which is
different from CNI's. First, the packages should be written using
database management tools rather than a programming language, to permit
relatively easy end user access to the data. Second, the software should
be marketed with more training of end users, both on the TP application
and on the end user tools, in order to ensure that it will actually
improve the use of information in decision-making. Third, the user
support provided with the system should focus on encouraging end users of
decision support tools to expand their knowledge and increase the
complexity of their uses of the system. Fourth, the fee structure for
the package should include an initial installation charge, plus a
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maintenance contract which would cover the costs of updates and ongoing
user support. These strategies could help ensure that the packages
served not only to streamline operations, but also to provide the
information and tools with which to influence how city governments think
about management and decision-making.
Advising Individual Cities
>> A national organization should advise individual cities on
information systems strategy, as a mechanism for transferring
Western experiences with information technology and encouraging the
cities to define their problems and set their objectives broadly.
Strategic advice on the introduction of information technology can
be of considerable value to larger cities, particularly where it is not
available from the private market. In this role, the national agency is
well positioned to encourage city governments to follow the
recommendations described above, particularly to provide the managerial
and technical guidance to help them choose the applications to automate,
develop an IS strategy, design an appropriate hardware and software
configuration, and plan for a growing, changing information system.
It is important, however, that in doing this the national
organization strive to educate city leaders about their options, rather
than actually mapping out a plan of development for them to follow. The
object is not to tell city leaders what to do; it is to describe the
opportunities, tradeoffs, and less obvious costs and benefits of several
options, so that they have the information with which to make their own
decisions. This requires that advisors strike a balance between
providing information which the cities need in order to make informed
choices, and telling them what they should do. This balance may be
difficult if city leaders expect to be instructed by the experts rather
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than making their own decisions, and if outside experts expect to be
heeded rather than evaluated.
Public Education
>> A national organization should offer public education programs
designed to fill in gaps in existing knowledge about software
packages, hardware, changes in the technology, Western experiences
using and managing it, and other information not easily available to
the cities. This should be done through courses, and development of
a library of both published materials and software tools available
for testing.
A national organization to support the use of information technology
can play an important role in public education. In designing education
programs, the organization should concentrate on complementing its other
efforts by filling the gaps in general knowledge. In Tunisia the most
conspicuous gaps are in familiarity with Western experiences moving from
transactions processing to decision support, understanding what current
technology can do well, especially through hands-on experience with
software packages, and keeping up with developments in the computer
industry which have important implications for city strategies.
Several programs could be of particular value in filling these gaps.
The organization could provide training courses in the use of PC packages
and operating systems, basic PC hardware support, programming in EUC or
fourth generation languages, general introductions to information systems
for management, and so on. These could be open to end users, computer
professionals who want to learn new skills, city leaders, or anyone else
interested. They would provide a way to overcome the resistance to new
uses of technology which can stem from ignorance about what it can do or
how to work with it.
They could also develop a library of resources with which people
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could keep abreast of the state of information technology and the
computer industry. These would include books and publications,
especially foreign magazines and journals which an individual or city may
be unable to purchase. Such a "library" could also include software
tools available for testing and use on in-house machines. This would be
intended to increase exposure to PC packages, by making a range of tools
available on a trial basis before cities decided whether they were
interested in purchasing them.
Training and library resources will only be valuable if people
understand the benefit of using them, however. The organization should
view these public education opportunities as complementary to its other
services. As part of the training component of all of its other
activities--working with city leaders to develop IS strategies, or
marketing and implementing its software packages--the national
organization should encourage city staff to make use of these resources,
and help them understand how they can be of value. This will increase
the likelihood that they will serve a real educational need, rather than
going unused by clients to do not know how or why to use them.
Training of Computer Professionals
>> University information systems curricula should provide the
information and training needed to encourage computer professionals
to think in terms of both transactions processing and decision
support in their design of information systems. In addition to
conventional programming and systems analysis, their training should
include:
- a focus on management, and the role of information in management,
covering the use of computer-based information to support
management decisions, how to manage the introduction of this kind
of computer use, and how to develop IS strategy;
- up to date information about developments in information
technology;
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- work with PC packages, fourth generation languages, and other
tools which facilitate end user access to data; this will enable
them to recognize the potential of these tools, and think in
terms of using them in municipal governments;
- exposure to the experiences of Western organizations with current
information technology, in order to allow people to learn
valuable lessons about the potential of the tools and the
difficulty of shifting from one kind of use to another.
The Tunisian experiences suggest that the orientation and training
of computer professionals and decision-makers can be a major limitation
on the use of information technology. National policy can shape their
training, in order to broaden their perspective on the use of the
technology, and to provide them with enough up-to-date technical
expertise that they know how to use current systems to accomplish broad
objectives. This could be done by changing the university curriculum in
information systems, and hoping that private schools would follow the
national lead. To the extent that the major universities are national,
this may be an effective way to influence all information systems
education.
A significant problem in implementing this strategy may be finding
the faculty to teach this kind of curriculum. It could require hiring
foreigners as permanent or visiting faculty, or sending some faculty
abroad for additional training to expose them to broader approaches to
information technology. This kind of curriculum might appropriately be
taught jointly by faculty in computer science and in management, although
inducing them to cooperate in developing a new information systems
curriculum could prove difficult if their domains are usually separate.
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO FOREIGN DONORS
>> Foreign donors should provide information and expertise about how
information technology has been used in the West, to educate and
train public officials and computer professionals so they can
benefit from Western experiences.
Foreign donors can be involved with Third World use of information
technology at many levels of the society, from advising senior officials
on the development of a national information systems policy, to helping
a single town to automate its property taxes on a single PC. The forms
of donor intervention can be very varied. The Tunisian experiences
suggest that foreign assistance may be particularly valuable in
supporting the creation of a national computing organization, and in
contributing to the shaping of a new computer curriculum, because these
are projects through which the information and perspective which they can
provide will be disseminated to many cities. Donor projects in these
areas would directly aim to broaden developing country perspectives on
how information technology can be used, and to provide the information
and guidance necessary to implement that broader perspective. At
present, however, by far the most common context for foreign involvement
with information technology is the introduction and use of microcomputers
in development projects whose objectives are unrelated to computers.
These projects offer an opportunity to transfer information about Western
approaches to information technology to individual users in the field,
rather than to national policy makers.
Support for a National Computer Organization
>> Donors should influence the use of computers in local government by
providing training and funds to create or support the activities of
a national computer organization.
Such an organization would have a broad impact on many cities, and
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so offers a good way to disseminate the expertise of the foreign
advisors. Support could involve training the organization's staff in the
use and management of PCs and end user computing tools, and teaching them
about the Western experiences working with these technologies. This
could lead to the development of a broader perspective on the information
systems strategies appropriate for local governments, which would then be
passed on to the cities in the advice given them by the national
advisors.
Foreign donors could also assist in the development of software
packages for local governments. If the programmers were available to do
the work, the foreign assistance could take the form of training them to
work in EUC packages. It could also involve developing the marketing and
end user support structures needed to make such a project viable,
particularly by providing information about how the software development
and marketing industries operate in other countries. Foreign donors are
also very well positioned to help develop a library of published and
electronic resources, both because they are familiar with the resources
which could be included, and because they can provide the foreign
exchange with which to purchase them.
Support for Information Systems Education
>> Donors should provide both their funds and their expertise to help
develop an information systems curriculum which would offer a broad
training in both technical and management aspects of information
systems use.
Because donor agencies can draw on a broad field of experts familiar
with Western experiences and the literature on computer use, they should
be able to work effectively with Third World educators to strengthen the
training of computer professionals. To facilitate implementation of such
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a curriculum, it might be necessary to provide some overseas visits or
formal training to faculty, in order to enrich their understanding of the
Western experiences using and teaching about information technology.
Donors would also be able to provide foreign exchange to alleviate some
of the current bottlenecks in computer education in the developing world,
particularly access to hardware on which to actually run programs, and
access to Western journals and other publications. If such a project
were developed in the primary university in the country, it might be
possible to distribute the curriculum as a model to other universities
and colleges, to use as a standard for computer education in the country.
If the primary university were private rather than national, donors would
be particularly well placed to play this role, since national authorities
would not have enough control over the educational system to develop new
curricula.
Use of Microcomputers in Development Projects
>> Foreign advisors introducing computers in development projects
should view their actions in the context of the city's information
systems strategy, rather than independently. They should involve
the existing DP staff in their efforts, as a way to broaden the
organization's perspective on computing, and take advantage of in-
house expertise.
When introducing microcomputers in the context of development
projects, foreign advisors have an excellent opportunity to demonstrate
the viability of an approach to computing which incorporates both
transactions processing and decision support objectives, and to train
both end users and computer professionals in the use of EUC tools. To
maximize their impact, it is important to link the donor-funded project
to the existing DP organizational structure, rather than bypassing
transactions processing-oriented DP staff to provide microcomputers and
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EUC to a stand-alone project. Since the existing DP staff have the
authority and influence to disseminate new approaches to computing,
convincing them of the utility of these tools is the best way to
encourage their use beyond a single project. Moreover, the existing DP
department will include the staff best able to maintain and support the
EUC projects, rather than training end user department staff to handle
this responsibility.
In implementing this strategy two obstacles may have to be overcome.
First, the existing DP staff may already be entrenched in a centralized
approach to computer technology, and may resist the idea of supporting
end user computing. This could be overcome by bringing them into the
project as early as possible, so that they will feel that they have a
role in the system to be implemented. The software development process
can be used as an opportunity to train both DP and end users in the use
of PC packages. Funds could be provided for some of them to receive
formal training in the use of end user computing tools, which would help
to make them feel part of the project. These kinds of strategies could
encourage the DP staff to take responsibility for donor projects, rather
than resenting them because they have bypassed the standard chains of
authority.
Second, it may be necessary to convince foreign consultants to think
directly about information technology, even if their primary focus is
elsewhere. Foreign advisors often view computers as stand-alone tools
which can simplify certain kinds of tasks, but not as an element in a
broader information systems strategy. Within donor agencies like USAID
and the World Bank pressure is mounting to take a more direct look at the
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implementation of the technology itself, and some agencies are developing
recommendations for how information systems should be introduced in
development projects.1 However this concern is relatively new, and
certainly has not spread to most of the people involved in introducing
the technology in individual projects.
AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The six cases leave many questions unanswered both about how to
solve the problems observed in Tunisia, and about how the problems of
other countries may differ from the Tunisian experiences. Further
research in a number of areas may offer stronger or more general insights
into how information technology can be introduced in local governments in
the developing world.
We have stressed the importance of developing management strategies
and DP staff roles which can support the rather different needs of
transactions processing and decision support systems. More research on
exactly how this could be done would be of considerable use. This could
involve investigating the use of information technology by new users not
facing the centralization and knowledge gaps of Tunisia, for example in
small businesses in the West. In looking at these organizations it would
be of particular interest to see how the computer professionals have been
trained, and whether conflicts are arising between support for
transactions processing and for end user computing. If the support
systems for the two kinds of information technology are well integrated,
then their training and management strategies could offer a useful model
1 See, for example, USAID 1988.
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to Third World cities.
The research presented here has concentrated on cities which used
information technology. For a more realistic picture of municipal
automation in the Third World, research on cities which have not
automated would also be of considerable interest. This would include
both cities which have not yet considered automation, those using service
bureaus, and those which have decided against it - if there are any.
This broader sample would better enable us to understand the arguments
against automation, and to assess its potential to help a broader a range
of city governments.
The Tunisian cases suggest that the structure of the private market
for computers and computer services, and government regulation of that
market, may be important determinants of how local governments use
information technology. The scope of this research has not allowed us to
fully explore why certain models or brands of hardware are most common in
Tunisia, or why the prices are so high. However, price and availability
do seem to play an important role in city strategies, and are probably
important in other countries as well. Research to determine the impact
of the tariff structure and the low demand for the technology on hardware
availability or prices would be of interest, as would be an investigation
of the potential of government policies to broaden the market, facilitate
large collective purchases of hardware or software, or ensure that
hardware manufacturers market their most current technologies in the
country.
The Tunisian cases also suggest the importance of the training of
computer professionals in determining how cities think about using
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information technology. Further research into alternative approaches to
training computer professionals, especially for countries whose
educational systems are less established than that of Tunisia, may be of
considerable interest in developing strategies to encourage a broad
approach to information technology.
The differences between Tunisia and other developing countries
suggest many other areas in which further research would be of use in
order to assess the generalizability our recommendations, Tunisia's
highly centralized administrative structure is in part the legacy of its
French colonial past. Countries which do not have this past may take a
much more open approach to introducing and using information technology,
and may therefore require different kinds of support from national and
foreign organizations. Countries with fewer skilled computer
professionals may also take a different approach to information
technology. Research on the introduction or use of information
technology in municipal governments in other parts of the world will
provide a valuable comparison with the Tunisian cases, and allow for
stronger generalizations across countries.
CONCLUSIONS
The Tunisian experiences with the introduction of information
technology in municipal governments clearly show that the availability of
a different technological starting point is insufficient to keep Third
World organizations from reliving much of the slow development which
characterized Western organizations. Many factors in addition to
technology must be present for cities to follow a faster pattern of
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development. Important among these are a broad perspective on management
and policy problems which provides the basis for defining information
systems goals and strategies, a cadre of computer professionals familiar
with current technology and its application to management and policy
objectives, and access to up-to-date information both about the
technology itself, and about Western experiences using it. In order for
Third World organizations to make full use of the potential of current
technology, they will need to operate in an environment which includes
not only the hardware itself, but the organizational and educational
resources necessary to use it.
The strategies described in this chapter are designed to provide
some of those additional resources. Municipal governments in Tunisia,
and perhaps elsewhere in the developing world, are reliving the Western
patterns of information systems development, and are likely to go through
the conflicts and growing pains which have confronted Western
organizations. Through a concerted effort at the local, national, and
international levels it should be possible to create an environment for
computer use which allows them instead to introduce information systems
which can be used both to improve the efficiency of ongoing operations,
and to strengthening the management and decision-making through access to
reliable information.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED
CITY OF SOUSSE
Mme. Sofia Ben Sultan, Clerk, Tax Service
Mr. Mamoud Ben Hamimi, Secretary General
Mr. Taoufiq Hamdani, Director, Finance Service
Mr. Tijani Kamoun, Director, Service Informatique
Mr. Hmida Mohsen, Director, Tax Service
CITY OF KAIROUAN
Mr. Abdellatif Daaloul, Secretary General
Mr. Hachemi Jaouandou, Assistant to the Secretary General
Mr. Mohammad Sa'ad, former Secretary General
Mr. Chebin Salah, Assistant to the Receveur
Mr. Mohammed Sellmi, Director, Finance Service
Mr. Jemaa Troudi, Director, Tax Service
CITY OF RADES
Mr. Ali Challouf, Secretary General
Mr. Hassen Kahlaoui, Receveur
Mr. Chergui Meskini, Architect
Mr. Fethi Sighari, Computer Assistant, Tax Service
CITY OF SFAX
Mr. Frej Belel, Director, Tax Service
Mr. Mustapha Freikha, Programmer
Mr. Trieb Gouia, Receveur
Mr. Ridha Louati, Analyst, Service Informatique
Mr. Moncef Mallek, Director, Finance Service
Mr. Hassan Sellami, Assistant to the Secretary General
Mr. Mohammed Triki, Secretary General
CITY OF ARIANA
Mr. Abdullah Ben Arous, Inspector, Finance Service
Mr. Chahed, Receveur
Mme. Admina J'didi, Director, Tax Service
Mr. Ali Mrad, Assistant to the Secretary General
Mr. Hassed Zoghlami, Secretary General
CITY OF TUNIS
Mme. Ashraf Bahri-Meddeb, Assistant to Fethi Enneifer
Mr. Mohammed Hedi Braham, Clerk, Tax Service
Mr. Fethi Enneifer, Head of the Mayor's Cabinet
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Mr. Kemel Ed-Din Guizani, Recette
Mr. Kaddour, Director, Finance Service
Mr. Othman Labidi, Director, Tax Service
Mr. Mouldi, Clerk, Tax Service
Mr. Ridha, Census Agent, Tax Service
Mr. Mongi Sakka, Assistant to Fethi Enneifer
Mr. Souissi, Director, Service Informatique
Mr. Abdelmajid Zamni, Receveur
CENTRE NATIONAL DE L'INFORMATIQUE
Mr. Ben Zachour, Programmer
Mr. J. Bouassida, Director of Municipal Projects
Mr. Farouk Kamoun, President Director-General
Mr. Moncef Hadj Sallah, Analyst, Municipal Projects
Mr. Mongi Triki, Regional Director of CNI, Sfax
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Mr. Khelifa Ben Fatma, economist responsible for property tax
Mr. Mohammed Labidi, Director, Direction Gdndrale de la Comptabilit6
Publique
Mr. Hedi Zachama, responsible for information system use in
municipalities
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Mr. Ahmed Jabeur, Direction G6n6rale de la Comptabilit6 Publique
Mr. Achour Khemiri, Director, Direction Gdndrale de la Comptabilitd
Publique
Mr. Saleh Naija, Direction G6n6rale de la Comptabilit6 Publique
INSTITUT NATIONAL DES STATISTIQUES
Mr. Derouiche, responsible for data processing for Tunis
DISTRICT OF TUNIS
Mlle. Henda Gafsi
Mr. Najib Trabelsi
Mr. Tarek Limam, former employee
PRIVATE FIRMS
Mr. Kouba, SIGMA, Tunis
Mr. Adjulrazzak Legri, SIGMA, Tunis
Mme. Kaouthar Raach, SIGMA, Tunis
Mr. Mohammed Lelleuch, Informatique et Gestion, Tunis
Mr. Mohsan Rekik, Informatique et Gestion, Tunis
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Mr. Dan Goetz, RTI, North Carolina
Mr. Jim McCullough, RTI, North Carolina
Mrs. Hazel Ryon, RTI, North Carolina
Mr. Ahmed Jebrani, International Computer Corporation, Tunis
Representative of Sphere Informatique, Tunis
USAID
Mrs. Sonia Hammam, Tunis
Mr. David Ollinger, Director RHUDO office, Tunis
Mr. Dean Swerdlin, Tunis
Mr. James Vermillion, Tunis
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AID Agency for International Development
CNI Centre National de l'Informatique
DCPL Direction des Collectivit~s Publiques Locales
DSS decision support system
EUC end user computing
FCCL Fonds Communs des Collectivites Locales
FNAH Fond National pour l'Am~lioration de l'Habitat
I&G Informatique et Gestion
IS information systems
IT information technology
RTI Research Triangle Institute
TD Tunisian dinar
TP transactions processing
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Exchange Rate: All currency conversions are done at the 1987 exchange
rate, TD 1.000 - $1.25.
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